LAU v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (2019)

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Victor Fai Lau appeals from a judgment of the district court upholding a decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the “Commissioner”) that denied his claim for disability insurance benefits and granted the Commissioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings.¹ Lau also moves to strike the Commissioner's opposition brief, arguing that the Commissioner's attorneys intentionally misaddressed the Commissioner's opposition brief to deny Lau an opportunity to reply. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

“On an appeal from the denial of disability benefits, we focus on the administrative ruling rather than the district court's opinion.” Estrella v. Berryhill, 925 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). In reviewing the administrative record, we determine if there is “substantial evidence ․ to support the Commissioner's decision and if the correct legal standards have been applied.” Id. Substantial evidence is “evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. Indeed, “once an [administrative law judge] [ (“]ALJ[”) ] finds facts, we can reject those facts only if a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise.” Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).

We affirm the judgment below, because we agree with the district court that the Commissioner's ruling is supported by substantial evidence. First, Lau argues that the ALJ improperly ignored medical evidence pertaining to his psychiatric condition, improperly concluding that he did not have a severe psychiatric disability during the relevant period, May 1, 2012, through his date last insured, December 31, 2014. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.131(a) (“To establish a period of disability, [the claimant] must have disability insured status in the quarter in which [he] becomes disabled or in a later quarter in which [he is] disabled.”) The ALJ did, however, consider records submitted from psychiatrists who saw Lau from 2015 onward, ultimately giving them little weight because they did not treat Lau during the relevant time period. Lau offered no medical evidence demonstrating that his psychiatric symptoms were disabling during the relevant period. Accordingly, we conclude that the ALJ's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence. See Arnone v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 34, 41 (2d Cir. 1989).

Lau further argues that the ALJ improperly asked the vocational expert hypothetical questions about occasional exposure to pulmonary irritants, and asserts that his medical records demonstrated that he cannot be exposed to any irritants. Two separate medical evaluations concluded, however, that Lau could be continuously exposed to pulmonary irritants. Accordingly, we conclude that the ALJ's questions were appropriate. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(2).

Finally, Lau argues that the ALJ failed to consider whether his psychiatric conditions combined with his reactive airway disease affected his ability to perform his past work. The ALJ did, however, consider Lau's psychiatric records in determining Lau's residual functional capacity, concluding that his statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his mental health symptoms were not consistent with the medical evidence. Accordingly, we conclude that the ALJ's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence.

We also deny Lau's motion to strike the Commissioner's opposition brief. While Lau argues that he did not timely receive a copy of the brief, the Commissioner submitted a copy of the returned envelope showing Lau's correct address. Moreover, the Court granted Lau an extension of time to file his reply brief which he did not, in any event, use.

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We have considered the remainder of Lau's arguments and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED and Lau's motion to strike the Commissioner's opposition brief is DENIED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The parties consented to jurisdiction by a magistrate judge. See Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 12.