ZHESHAN LI v. BARR (2019)

SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Zheshan Li, a native and citizen of the People's Republic of China, seeks review of a decision of the BIA affirming an Immigration Judge's (“IJ”) denial of Li's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). See In re Zheshan Li, No. AXXX XXX XXX (B.I.A. Feb. 2, 2018), aff'g No. AXXX XXX XXX (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 18, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

Under the circumstances, we have reviewed both the IJ's and the BIA's opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. DHS, 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review are well established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013). The agency did not err in finding that Li failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution on account of his conversion to Christianity and religious activities in the United States.

Absent past persecution, an alien may establish eligibility for asylum by demonstrating a well-founded fear of future persecution. See Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2). To demonstrate a well-founded fear, an applicant must show either a reasonable possibility that he would be singled out for persecution or that the country of removal has a pattern or practice of persecuting similarly situated individuals. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii). “[The] alien must make some showing that authorities in his country of nationality are either aware of his activities or likely to become aware of his activities.” Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2008).

As evidence that Chinese authorities are aware of his religious activities in the United States, Li submitted unsworn letters from his mother and aunt. We defer to the agency's decision to afford little weight to these unsworn letters from interested witnesses. See Y.C., 741 F.3d at 334. Given that Li provided no other independent evidence to support his assertion that authorities are aware of his religious practice, the agency did not err in finding that assertion speculative. See Y.C., 741 F.3d at 334; see also Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (“In the absence of solid support in the record ․ [an applicant's] fear is speculative at best.”).

The agency also reasonably concluded that the country conditions evidence does not support Li's claim. That evidence indicates that tens of millions of Christians practice in unregistered churches in China and that officials do not interfere with religious practice in some areas of the country. Further, that evidence makes no mention of religious persecution in Li's home province of Jilin. Given the large number of religious practitioners in China and regional variations in the restrictions on their activities, the agency did not err in finding that Li failed to establish a well-founded fear of being singled out for religious persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(ii); see also Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 149, 172-73 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding no error in agency's requirement that applicant demonstrate well-founded fear of persecution specific to his or her local area when persecutory acts vary according to locality). Nor did it err in finding that Li failed to demonstrate that China has a pattern or practice of persecuting Christians similarly situated to himself. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii); see also Santoso v. Holder, 580 F.3d 110, 112 (2d Cir. 2009).

Accordingly, because the agency reasonably found that Li failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution, it did not err in denying asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief, all of which were based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).