UNITED STATES v. MONNAT (2019)

SUMMARY ORDER

Michael Monnat appeals from a November 20, 2018 amended judgment imposing special conditions of release. Specifically, the conditions Monnat challenges prohibit him from having direct or indirect contact with a minor unless it is supervised and approved by a probation officer; require Monnat to avoid and remove himself from situations where he might have contact with a minor; and prohibit being in any area where minors are likely to congregate. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

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The district court first imposed the special conditions that Monnat challenges in this appeal as a component of Monnat’s original sentence. Monnat subsequently violated these and other conditions of his supervised release. He was sentenced to eight months’ imprisonment for the violation, his term of supervised release was extended to life, and the challenged conditions were reimposed over Monnat’s counsel’s objections. Although Monnat conceded that a life term of supervised release was appropriate, his counsel nevertheless objected to the imposition of these specific conditions.

Monnat does not challenge the legality of these conditions, but rather the district court’s decision to impose them as part of his modified release. The government contends that the law of the case doctrine precludes Monnat from presenting arguments related to his underlying offense conduct or his personal background if they were raised before the district court during his original sentencing. But we conclude that Monnat properly presented—and the district court properly considered—such arguments because the statute governing modification of conditions of supervised release, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), directs courts to consider, among other factors, “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).

We now turn to the substance of Monnat’s appeal. We review the imposition of special conditions of supervised release for abuse of discretion. United States v. McLaurin, 731 F.3d 258, 261 (2d Cir. 2013). “A sentencing court may impose special conditions of supervised release” so long as they “are reasonably related to certain statutory factors governing sentencing, involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to implement the statutory purposes of sentencing, and are consistent with pertinent Sentencing Commission policy statements.” United States v. Gill, 523 F.3d 107, 109 (2d Cir. 2008) (quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting United States v. Myers, 426 F.3d 117, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2005)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); United States v. Betts, 886 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2018) (applying same standard when reviewing imposition of conditions following violation of supervised release).

We have previously held that a condition prohibiting direct or indirect contact with minors may “inflict a greater deprivation on [a defendant’s] liberty than is reasonably necessary” when coupled with a lengthy term of supervised release and a “constellation” of other onerous restrictions. United States v. Jenkins, 854 F.3d 181, 195 (2d Cir. 2017). Yet we have also recognized that “there are ․ cases in which” such conditions “would be required and reasonable.” Id. Because the determination of whether a particular condition is appropriate involves a careful balancing of the deprivation imposed against the statutory purposes of sentencing, we defer to the district court, which has a better sense of the benefits and detriments to the individual defendant.

The problem here is a procedural one. We require district courts “to make an individualized assessment when determining whether to impose a special condition of supervised release, and to state on the record the reason for imposing it.” Betts, 886 F.3d at 202. “[F]ailure to do so is error.” United States v. Bleau, 930 F.3d 35, 43 (2d Cir. 2019).

“[T]he District Court did not adequately explain why” the conditions imposed here were “reasonably necessary to promote the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Id. at 43. The district court concluded that Monnat has “a continued interest in minor female children” and that “he’s not following the tools that were tried to be given to him to correct the problem that he has,” but it failed to link those concerns to the specific conditions imposed, a necessary step given the specific objections made by Monnat’s attorney at sentencing. Because the district court did not “explain its rationale,” id., we remand for further consideration.

We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we VACATE and REMAND the special conditions at issue with instructions that the district court provide a more specific statement of reasons as to the challenged conditions or, in the event that it decides to modify the sentence, any other conditions it may impose.