RODRIGUEZ v. DIAZ (2019)

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff Jorge Rodriguez, an attorney proceeding pro se, sued Reemberto Diaz, a Florida state court judge, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Judge Diaz’s revocation of Rodriguez’s pro hac vice admission in Florida state court violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Supremacy Clause. The district court sua sponte dismissed the complaint, without leave to amend, reasoning that it could not compel state officials to act, Judge Diaz was entitled to judicial immunity, and venue was improper. Rodriguez now appeals. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of the complaint under § 1915(e). See Milan v. Wertheimer, 808 F.3d 961, 963 (2d Cir. 2015) (per curiam). We can affirm the district court “for any reason supported by the record,” Latner v. Mount Sinai Health Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 52, 54 (2d Cir. 2018), including different reasons than those provided by the district court, see Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 466 (2d Cir. 2001). Upon our de novo review, we conclude that the district court lacked jurisdiction over this action.

“When a federal suit follows a state suit, the former may, under certain circumstances, be prohibited by what has become known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” Sung Cho v. City of New York, 910 F.3d 639, 644 (2d Cir. 2018). The doctrine “established the clear principle that federal district courts lack jurisdiction over suits that are, in substance, appeals from state-court judgments[,]” Hoblock v. Albany Cty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 2005), and applies to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments,” Sung Cho, 910 F.3d at 644 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005)). For a court to be deprived of jurisdiction under this doctrine, four requirements must be met: “(1) the federal-court plaintiff must have lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff must complain of injuries caused by a state-court judgment; (3) the plaintiff must invite district court review and rejection of that judgment; and (4) the state-court judgment must have been rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.” Id. at 645. In recent years, “we have applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine with some frequency to cases involving suits directly against state-court judges, or in which error by state-court judges in state-court proceedings is asserted.” Id. at 645 & n.5 (collecting cases).

Here, all four requirements of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine are satisfied. As to the first two factors, Rodriguez effectively “lost” in Florida state court when his pro hac vice status was revoked, and he complains of injuries caused by that decision. As to the third factor, he asked the district court to review and reject the state court judge’s decision to revoke his admission. As to the fourth factor, the state court judge revoked Rodriguez’s pro hac vice status in January 2018, and Rodriguez filed his district court action in October 2018. Reaching the merits of Rodriguez’s claims would necessarily require the district court to reassess the state court’s judgment. Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction. See id. at 649 (observing that federal courts are not “quasi-appellate courts sitting in review of state-court decisions”).

We have considered Rodriguez’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the district court.