JAMES v. JOHN JAY COLLEGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2019)

SUMMARY ORDER

Terrell James appeals from the November 21, 2018 judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Cote, J.) granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

James argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing his first amended complaint with prejudice, rather than providing him an opportunity to voluntarily withdraw the amended complaint. Alternatively, James argues that it was legal error for the district court to grant defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, even in the absence of timely opposition to that motion.

Defendants treat the dismissal here as made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), which authorizes a court to dismiss an action “if the plaintiff fails ․ to comply with․ a court order.” However, the record does not reflect that the district court dismissed the complaint pursuant to Rule 41(b). Instead, both the district court's order of November 20, 2018 and the judgment entered on November 21, 2018 indicate that the district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. That motion was brought based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction against defendant City University of New York and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim against any defendant.

Because James did not timely file opposition, the motion to dismiss was unopposed. However, the lack of opposition does not, without more, justify dismissal. See McCall v. Pataki, 232 F.3d 321, 322-23 (2d Cir.2000). “[T]he sufficiency of a complaint is a matter of law that the district court is capable of determining based on its own reading of the pleading and knowledge of the law.” Goldberg v. Danaher, 599 F.3d 181, 183-84 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Where a district court “appears to have dismissed the complaint solely on the ground that [plaintiff] did not respond to the motion,” then “[d]ismissal on that basis [is] error.” McCall, 232 F.3d at 323.

The state fails to address this argument at all, instead taking the position that the dismissal was based on James's failure to timely follow the district court's filing deadlines. That is a fair reading of the endorsement order on the letter seeking reconsideration, but not the reason for dismissal. Alternatively, the State urges us to decide the motion to dismiss in the first instance. We decline the invitation, and remand for the district court to (1) clarify the ground for dismissing the complaint; and (2) if necessary, decide the defendants’ motion to dismiss based on the merits.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court hereby is VACATED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order.