REBENSTORF v. GRANT 18559 (2019)

SUMMARY ORDER

Glenn W. Rebenstorf appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Cogan, J.) denying his motion to vacate the parties’ written settlement agreement. On appeal, Rebenstorf claims that the District Court abused its discretion in (1) denying his motion to vacate the parties’ settlement agreement and (2) failing to conduct a competency evaluation. He also contends that the District Court should have reviewed the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation de novo. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the record of prior proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

First, Rebenstorf claims that in deciding his motion to vacate the parties’ written settlement agreement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), the District Court should have considered his mental illness and his pro se status. However, relief under Rule 60(b) “may be granted only in extraordinary circumstances,” United States v. Bank of N.Y., 14 F.3d 756, 759 (2d Cir. 1994) (quotation marks omitted), and Rebenstorf’s circumstances were not “extraordinary.” Rebenstorf’s pro se status alone did not render him incapable of entering a settlement agreement. Nor was there adequate evidence that Rebenstorf’s mental condition rendered him incapable of comprehending the nature of the settlement agreement. To the contrary, the transcript of the settlement conference shows that Rebenstorf cogently responded to each of the Magistrate Judge’s questions and clearly indicated that he understood the terms of the agreement. The District Court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying Rebenstorf’s motion to vacate. See Manning v. N.Y. Univ., 299 F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir. 2002) (reviewing motion to vacate settlement agreement for abuse of discretion).

The District Court also was not required to sua sponte conduct a competency evaluation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) before denying Rule 60(b) relief. Such a hearing is required only if evidence is presented to the court showing that a party has been adjudicated incompetent or “treated for mental illness of the type that would render him ․ legally incompetent.” Ferrelli v. River Manor Health Care Ctr., 323 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 2003). The mental health evidence adduced by Rebenstorf does not make this showing. In the absence of such evidence, a district court is not obligated “to monitor a pro se litigant’s behavior for signs of mental incompetence.” Id.

Finally, Rebenstorf contends that the District Court erred in reviewing his objections to the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation for clear error rather than de novo. Because Rebenstorf’s objections would not prevail under either standard of review, we need not decide which standard the District Court should have applied. See Moss v. Colvin, 845 F.3d 516, 519 n.2 (2d Cir. 2017).

We have considered Rebenstorf’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.