WARD v. CITY OF NEW YORK NYC DOB NYC NYC DOB NYC NYC NYC NYC NYC NYC NYC BSIU PAR LT (2019)

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Elaine Ward (“Ward”), proceeding pro se, appeals the district court's judgment sua sponte dismissing her amended complaint, in which she asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, as well as under state law, arising out of the revocation of her master plumber's license and subsequent state court litigation. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

In reviewing a district court's dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we review factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo, see Maloney v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 517 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 2008), and can consider documents attached to the complaint and matters subject to judicial notice, see Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 773 (2d Cir. 1991). Although this Court has not yet determined whether a district court's sua sponte dismissal of a complaint as frivolous is reviewed de novo or for abuse of discretion, we need not make such a determination where the district court's decision “easily passes muster under the more rigorous de novo review.” Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 n.2 (2d Cir. 2000). This Court affords pro se litigants “special solicitude” by interpreting pro se complaints “to raise the strongest claims that [they] suggest[ ].” Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted).

Here, the district court properly dismissed most of Ward's federal claims as untimely. When filed in New York, section 1983 and 1985 claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations, accruing “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of [his or her] action.” Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79–80 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted) (Section 1983); Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 703 (2d Cir. 1994) (Section 1985). Although untimeliness is an affirmative defense, a complaint may be dismissed on this basis if the defense is plain from the face of the complaint. See Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53–54 (2d Cir. 1995).

With the exception of some of Ward's allegations concerning state court proceedings, all of the events recounted in her complaint occurred and were known to her prior to May 17, 2014, which was three years before she initiated this action. Thus, most of her claims are untimely in the absence of equitable tolling. These untimely claims include all her allegations concerning: discrimination and retaliation in the 1980s and 1990s; the 2011 revocation of Ward's master plumber's license; the alleged misconduct leading to the state court's April 2014 grant of leave to appeal; and her former attorney's April 2014 initiation of a lawsuit against her. Ward's theory of equitable tolling is that Defendants-Appellees allegedly concealed their actions from her and colluded with her former attorney to do so. However, Ward alleged that she knew about the concealment and her attorney's improper relationship with the other Defendants-Appellees by April 2014, which was still more than three years before she filed the original complaint in this case on May 17, 2017. Thus, even if Ward were entitled to tolling on her claims until April 2014, most of her claims would still be untimely. See Pearl, 296 F.3d at 79–80; Cornwell, 23 F.3d at 703.

Those of Ward's claims that are not time-barred are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Under that doctrine, federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over claims that, in effect, challenge state court judgments. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486–87, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). A claim brought in federal court is barred under Rooker-Feldman when (1) the plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by a state court judgment; (3) the plaintiff invites the federal court to review and reject that state court judgment; and (4) the state court judgment was rendered prior to the commencement of proceedings in federal court. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005).

The thrust of Ward's complaint regarding the events of May 2014 and thereafter is that Defendants-Appellees, together with state court judges, thwarted her efforts to challenge New York City's appeal and to obtain a traverse hearing, which she contends that she was entitled to based on Defendants-Appellees’ earlier wrongdoing. But each element of Rooker-Feldman is satisfied here. Ward lost in state court prior to initiating this action. See Ward v. City of New York, 23 N.Y.3d 1046, 992 N.Y.S.2d 781, 16 N.E.3d 1261 (2014); Ward v. City of New York, 138 A.D.3d 629, 28 N.Y.S.3d 881 (2016). Ward's alleged injuries, relating to the loss of her professional license and denial of requested hearings, are injuries resulting from the state court judgments. And she now seeks reversal of those judgments, including an order reversing the state court decision not to hold a traverse hearing. Although Ward contends that she is alleging injuries flowing from Defendants-Appellees’ misconduct before the state court, rather than from the state court judgments themselves, her fraud claims allege actions predating the state court's April 2014 grant of leave to appeal. Her allegations concerning events thereafter are that state court judges (who are not parties to this action) issued or refused to issue orders knowing that the City was not entitled to appeal. Such claims “require the federal court to review the state proceedings and determine that the ․ [orders were] issued in error” and are thus barred by Rooker-Feldman. Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 427 (2d Cir. 2014). Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed Ward's amended complaint.¹

The district court also did not err in declining to grant Ward leave to file a second amended complaint. Denials of leave to amend based on futility are reviewed de novo. Hutchison v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Inc., 647 F.3d 479, 490 (2d Cir. 2011). A pro se plaintiff should be “grant[ed] leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). But the district court was not obligated to grant leave to amend a second time after Ward's first amended complaint failed to cure the defects that the court identified in its order to amend. See Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988).

Finally, Ward's claim that the district court was improperly influenced by Defendants-Appellees and was biased against her is meritless and based entirely on her dissatisfaction at the court's adverse rulings. See Chen v. Chen Qualified Settlement Fund, 552 F.3d 218, 227 (2d Cir. 2009).²

We have considered all of Ward's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   To the extent that Ward's amended complaint may be construed to also assert state law claims, Ward abandoned these claims by failing to address in her appellate brief the district court's decision not to exercise jurisdiction over them. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92–93 (2d Cir. 1995) (issues not addressed in pro se appellate brief are abandoned).

2.   Ward moves to strike the appellees’ briefs, oral argument statements, and various certificates of service, to disqualify and sanction counsel, and to amend this Court's docket. These motions are denied as moot.