UNITED STATES v. Alexy Diaz, Defendant-Appellee. (2019)

SUMMARY ORDER

The United States appeals from the August 29, 2017 amended judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Arcara, J.) granting Alexy Diaz’s motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and resentencing him principally to time served on the ground that the New York offense of robbery in the third-degree is not a “violent felony” for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

The government argues that Diaz’s conviction for the New York offense of third-degree robbery, in violation of New York Penal Law § 160.05, did qualify as a “violent felony.” We review de novo whether New York robbery in third degree qualifies as an ACCA “violent felony.” See United States v. Brown, 629 F.3d 290, 293 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Our recent decisions in United States v. Thrower, 914 F.3d 770 (2d Cir. 2019) (per curiam), and United States v. Pereira-Gomez, 903 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2018), resolve this case in the government’s favor.

Pursuant to ACCA’s force clause, a “violent felony” is “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, ․ that ․ has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). In Thrower, we held that “[b]y its plain language, the New York robbery statute matches the ACCA definition of a ‘violent felony,’ ” Thrower, 914 F.3d at 775, because it requires the “use[ ] or threaten[ed] ․ immediate use of physical force.” Id. (quoting N.Y. Penal Law § 160.00). Accordingly, “the New York offense of robbery in the third degree, which like every degree of robbery in New York requires the common law element of ‘forcible stealing,’ is a ‘violent felony’ under ACCA.” Id. at 776.

Because robbery in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 160.05 has now been held to be a violent felony under the force clause of ACCA, the district court erred by sentencing Diaz based on a guidelines range that failed to include ACCA’s enhancement.

We have considered Diaz’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s grant of Diaz’s § 2255 motion, VACATE the amended judgment, and REMAND for the district court to reinstate Diaz’s original sentence.