SINGH v. BARR (2019)

SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Pargat Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of a December 28, 2017, decision of the BIA affirming an April 28, 2017, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Pargat Singh, No. A205 442 726 (B.I.A. Dec. 28, 2017), aff’g No. A205 442 726 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 28, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the IJ’s decision without consideration of the IJ’s denial of asylum as untimely or the IJ’s finding regarding Singh’s difficulty defining the term Khalistan because the BIA explicitly declined to rely on those findings. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018).

“Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on ․ the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements ․, the internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record ․ without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 163-64 (2d Cir. 2008). Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Singh was not credible as to his claim that police detained and beat him twice in India on account of his membership in the Akali Dal Mann Party and his fear of similar harm in the future.

The agency reasonably relied on Singh’s inconsistent statements regarding the date he joined his party, whether he had uncut hair and wore a turban in India in accordance with his Sikh faith, and when he cut his hair in relation to his decision to travel to the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).

Having questioned Singh’s credibility, the agency reasonably relied further on his failure to rehabilitate his testimony with reliable corroborating evidence. “An applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). As the IJ found, Singh failed to provide any evidence to rehabilitate his inconsistent testimony regarding the date he joined Akali Dal Mann, his medical certificates indicated that they were issued in 2011 and thus conflicted with his testimony that they were issued to his father years later, and his village leader’s and mother’s affidavits were not reliable due to strikingly similar language including identical typographical errors. See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We generally defer to the agency’s evaluation of the weight to be afforded an applicant’s documentary evidence.”); see also Mei Chai Ye v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 489 F.3d 517, 524 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]his court has ․ firmly embraced the commonsensical notion that striking similarities between affidavits are an indication that the statements are canned.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Given Singh’s inconsistent evidence and insufficient corroboration, the agency’s adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Contrary to Singh’s argument, the credibility determination was dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three claims were based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.