NEGRON v. Steve Curtis, Jeff Lovvorn, Defendants. (2019)

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Larry Negron (“Negron”) appeals from orders of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, dated June 16 and June 28, 2017, dismissing his federal employment discrimination claims with prejudice and his state and city claims without prejudice pursuant to an agreed-upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) order, denying his motion to compel additional discovery, and declining to reconsider those decisions. See Order, No. 15-cv-8296 (DLC) (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2017), ECF No. 110; Order, No. 15-cv-8296 (DLC) (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2017), ECF No. 115. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) provides that, except under certain circumstances not applicable in this case, “an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff's request only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291 mandates that appeals courts “shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States․” In Chappelle v. Beacon Communications Corp., this Court concluded that “an appeal from a dismissal of some of a plaintiff’s claims when the balance of his claims have been dismissed without prejudice pursuant to a Rule 41(a) dismissal of the action” is precluded. 84 F.3d 652, 654 (2d Cir. 1996). This follows from § 1291’s final judgment rule, as “a dismissal without prejudice does not preclude another action on the same claims, [so] a plaintiff who is permitted to appeal following a voluntary dismissal without prejudice will effectively have secured an otherwise unavailable interlocutory appeal.” Id.

So too here. Although Negron’s federal claims were dismissed with prejudice, his state and city claims were dismissed without prejudice to filing them again at some other time. And the conditions to his dismissal that Negron appeals—the continued applicability of the district court’s discovery and statute of limitations rulings to his state and city claims—were entered pursuant to a voluntary dismissal without prejudice to which he acceded. As we said in Paysys International, Inc. v. Atos IT Services Ltd., “it is the plaintiff, rather than the court, who has the choice between accepting the conditions and obtaining dismissal and, if he feels that the conditions are too burdensome, withdrawing his dismissal motion and proceeding with the case on the merits.” 901 F.3d 105, 109 (2d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). To allow Negron to receive review of those conditions now would essentially allow him to secure an interlocutory appeal. See Chappelle, 84 F.3d at 654; cf. Atlanta Shipping Corp. v. Chem. Bank, 818 F.2d 240, 246 (2d Cir. 1987) (“A party who loses on a dispositive issue that affects only a portion of his claims may elect to abandon the unaffected claims, invite a final judgment, and thereby secure review of the adverse ruling.”). Thus, we find this case squarely controlled by Chappelle and conclude we lack jurisdiction to consider it.

We have considered Negron’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we DISMISS his appeal for lack of jurisdiction.