UNITED STATES v. STONE (2019)

SUMMARY ORDER

Ryan Stone appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Bryant, J.) sentencing him principally to a within-Guidelines sentence of 292 months’ imprisonment and ten years’ supervised release following his guilty plea to one count of production of child pornography. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the record of prior proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

Stone argues that the District Court misconstrued Stone’s statement at sentencing and erroneously found that Stone lacked remorse. The District Court understood Stone’s statement to imply not that Stone lacked remorse but that he was more concerned with the impact of his crime on his own life, rather than on his victim’s. The District Court’s understanding reflected a permissible view of the record. See United States v. Proshin, 438 F.3d 235, 238 (2d Cir. 2006). In any event, we note that the District Court ultimately applied a three-level reduction for Stone’s acceptance of responsibility.

Stone also argues that the District Court erred by considering only whether to depart rather than vary downward and by discussing only one of the grounds for downward variance that he raised. The District Court did not err. Although it did not use the term “variance,” the District Court stated that it had considered the Section 3553(a) factors on which any variance would be based. The District Court also expressly addressed two of the grounds for a variance raised by Stone, namely, Stone’s troubled childhood and the length of Stone’s previous sentences. Moreover, district courts are not “required ․ to make specific responses to points argued by counsel in connection with sentencing,” United States v. Bonilla, 618 F.3d 102, 111 (2d Cir. 2010), especially where, as with the two grounds for downward variance not expressly addressed by the District Court, “[the] argument is not raised during a sentencing proceeding,” United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 29 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007). The District Court here has “satisf[ied] us ․ that it has considered the party's arguments and has articulated a reasonable basis for exercising its decision-making authority.” United States v. Kerr, 752 F.3d 206, 223 (2d Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted).

Lastly, Stone argues that the sentence was substantively unreasonable. But the District Court’s bottom-of-the-Guidelines sentence was “within the range of permissible decisions.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 191 (2d Cir. 2008).

We have considered Stone’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.