WALKER v. Prison Health Services, Inc., Defendant. (2019)

SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Kevin Walker, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court's order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the City of New York, its agents, and its employees as barred by a general release that Walker signed when settling a different lawsuit against the City in Walker v. Kelly, S.D.N.Y. 1:11-cv-9610-AT-JCF. Walker argues that the release may be interpreted not to reach his present claims or, in the alternative, that the City misled him regarding its scope. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

District courts have the inherent authority to dismiss an action as frivolous. See Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363–64 (2d Cir. 2000). Although we have not decided whether such a dismissal is reviewed de novo or for abuse of discretion, the district court's grounds for dismissing Walker's complaint “easily pass[ ] muster [even] under the more rigorous de novo review.” Id. at 364 n.2. A district court's interpretation of a contract is reviewed de novo. See Parks Real Estate Purchasing Grp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 472 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2006).

The district court properly dismissed Walker's complaint because his claims were barred by the unambiguous language of the release in Walker v. Kelly, S.D.N.Y. 1:11-cv-9610-AT-JCF, which encompasses all of Walker's civil rights claims against the City, its employees, and its agents arising prior to July 2015. By its terms, therefore, it covers the claims raised in this action, which arose prior to April 2014.¹ Walker v. Kelly, S.D.N.Y. 1:11-cv-9610-AT-JCF, doc. 117-1 ¶ 2. The language limiting the stipulation's admissibility explicitly allows its use to enforce the agreement in other litigation such as this case. See id. ¶ 4. Walker's argument that oral statements narrowed its scope is unavailing because the text of the release prohibited oral amendments, see id. ¶ 7, and “New York's parol evidence rule generally bars admission of extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict the terms of a fully integrated writing” like the release at issue here, Topps Co., Inc. v. Cadbury Stani S.A.I.C., 526 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir. 2008); see Walker v. Kelly, S.D.N.Y. 1:11-cv-9610-AT-JCF, doc. 117-1 ¶ 7 (the stipulation “contains all the terms and conditions agreed upon by the parties”). The district court also properly directed Walker to raise any challenge to the release's validity before the court that approved the settlement agreement and explicitly retained jurisdiction over its enforcement. See In re Am. Exp. Fin. Advisors Sec. Litig., 672 F.3d 113, 134 (2d Cir. 2011) (when a federal court retains jurisdiction over a settlement agreement, “the proper forum for litigating a breach is that same federal court”) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) ).

Walker also argues that the district court erred in declining to grant his motion for default judgment and declining to hold an evidentiary hearing on his motion to vacate the release. We review a district court's rulings on these issues for abuse of discretion. See Covino v. Vt. Dep't of Corrs., 933 F.2d 128, 130 (2d Cir. 1991) (motion for default judgment); Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL Irrevocable Tr., 729 F.3d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 2013) (evidentiary hearing). “A district court has abused its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or rendered a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Sims v. Blot, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to enter a default judgment against the defendants or hold an evidentiary hearing. The defendants did not, as Walker maintains, “totally ignore pleading[s]” during the 18 months between the filing of the complaint and the defendants’ motion for an order to show cause. Instead, the defendants refrained from filing an answer in accordance with the district court's instructions pending Walker's filing an amended complaint. And Walker has not explained how an evidentiary hearing would have addressed the issue that was before the court when it declined to entertain Walker's motion to vacate the release, that is whether the settlement court had retained jurisdiction over the release's enforcement.

We have considered all of Walker's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the district court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   To the extent that Walker argues that the release is not applicable to the present case because Walker v. Kelly involved different defendants, that argument is unpersuasive because the releaseunambiguously includes the defendants in the present case.