DOSCHER v. SEA PORT GROUP SECURITIES LLC LLC LLC LP LLC (2019)

SUMMARY ORDER

Drew Doscher appeals from the December 6, 2017 opinion and order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Furman, J.) denying his petition to vacate in part and modify in part an arbitration decision by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority awarding him $2,289,774 in damages. Doscher v. Sea Port Group Securities, No. 15-cv-384, 2017 WL 6061653 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

We affirm, primarily for the reasons set forth in the district court’s thorough opinion. A petition brought under the Federal Arbitration Association is “not an occasion for de novo review of an arbitral award.” Wallace v. Buttar, 378 F.3d 182, 189 (2d Cir. 2004). A court’s review of an arbitration award is instead “severely limited.” ReliaStar Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. EMC Nat. Life Co., 564 F.3d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “This Court has repeatedly recognized the strong deference appropriately due arbitral awards and the arbitral process, and has limited its review of arbitration awards in obeisance to that process.” Porzig v. Dresdner, Kleinwort, Benson, N. Am. LLC, 497 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). To vacate the decision of an arbitral panel under the FAA, a party “must clear a high hurdle.” Stolt–Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 671, 130 S.Ct. 1758, 176 L.Ed.2d 605 (2010).

Doscher argues that the arbitrators committed misconduct that prevented him from presenting evidence essential to proving his claim that he held an equity stake in Seaport to the arbitral panel. Doscher also argues that the district court was required to first review the documents at issue before deciding the petition, and that the district court’s failure to do so constitutes reversible error. We disagree. The district court’s task was to determine if the arbitral panel acted in a way that meant “fundamental fairness [was] violated.” Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1997). Given that Doscher did not object to the termination of the proceeding unless the documents at issue were produced, it cannot be said that the panel acted in a “fundamental[ly] unfair” manner in not requiring their production.

We have considered the remainder of Doscher’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the order of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED.