MEI PING WU v. WHITAKER (2019)

SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Mei Ping Wu, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an October 5, 2016 decision of the BIA affirming an August 5, 2015 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Wu’s application for asylum. In re Mei Ping Wu, No. A088 526 169 (B.I.A. Oct. 5, 2016), aff’g No. A088 526 169 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug. 5, 2015). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. DHS, 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review are well established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165–66 (2d Cir. 2008). Wu does not challenge the agency’s decisions related to her family planning claim; accordingly, the only issue before us is the agency’s denial of asylum based on Wu’s fear of future religious persecution. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 541 n.1, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005) (claim not raised in brief is abandoned).

Absent past persecution, an alien may establish eligibility for asylum by demonstrating a well-founded fear of future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2); Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004). To demonstrate a well-founded fear, an applicant must show either a reasonable possibility that she would be singled out for persecution or that the country of removal has a pattern or practice of persecuting individuals similarly situated to her. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii). “[The] alien must make some showing that authorities in h[er] country of nationality are either aware of h[er] activities or likely to become aware of h[er] activities.” Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2008).

Wu did not assert that Chinese officials are aware of her religious practice. And, given that approximately 45 million individuals practice in unregistered churches in China, the agency did not err in finding that she failed to demonstrate that Chinese officials are likely to discover her practice as required. See id. Further, in some areas of China religious practice is tolerated without interference. Therefore, the agency did not err in determining that Wu failed to demonstrate “systemic or pervasive” persecution of similarly situated Christians sufficient to demonstrate a pattern or practice of persecution in China. In re A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 737, 741 (B.I.A. 2005) (citation omitted); see also Santoso v. Holder, 580 F.3d 110, 112 & n.1 (2d Cir. 2009) (denying petition where agency considered background materials and rejected pattern-or-practice claim).

Accordingly, because the agency reasonably found that Wu failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution, it did not err in denying asylum based on her religious practice. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2). Given the agency’s dispositive finding, we do not reach the agency’s alternative determination that Wu was not credible.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.