MANLEY v. CHAMPLAIN STONES LTD (2018)

SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Dujon Manley, pro se, appeals from the August 9, 2017 judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Mordue, J.), adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation to dismiss Manley’s amended complaint against his former employer Champlain Stones, Ltd. for discrimination based on alienage under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and for violating state labor laws. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

We review the sua sponte dismissal of a complaint de novo. McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004). Pro se submissions are reviewed with special solicitude and “must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis omitted).

The district court correctly dismissed Manley’s Section 1981 claim that his former employer fired him because he was not a U.S. citizen and was not authorized to work in the United States. Section 1981 prohibits discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts, including employment contracts, based on alienage—i.e., a person’s citizenship status. Anderson v. Conboy, 156 F.3d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 1998). In Anderson v. Conboy, we concluded that while Section 1981 prohibits alienage discrimination, the statute cannot be construed to require employers to hire aliens who are not authorized to work in the United States. Id. at 180. When an employer refuses to hire or fires an alien because he or she is not authorized to work in the United States, “that employer is discriminating on the basis not of alienage but of noncompliance with federal law.” Id. Here, Manley alleged that he was fired because he was not a U.S. citizen and was not authorized to work in the United States. Manley was not fired simply because he was an alien; he was fired because he was an alien who was not authorized to work in the United States. Thus, Manley failed to allege facts that could be construed to state a claim for alienage discrimination.

Because the district court dismissed Manley’s Section 1981 claim, the only claim over which it had original jurisdiction, it did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Manley’s state law claims. See Kolari v. N.Y.-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[A] district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” (internal quotation marks omitted) ).

We have considered the remainder of Manley’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED. Each side to bear its own costs.