REDD v. LEFTENANT (2018)

SUMMARY ORDER

On September 2, 2016, plaintiff-appellant Fedie R. Redd filed suit against defendants-appellees Zina Leftenant, Jason Zimmer, Richard Samuel, Raymond Horton, Megan Rudy, and Patricia Wright asserting state and federal law claims. On September 7, 2017, the district court dismissed Redd’s federal law claims with prejudice, finding, inter alia, that they were time-barred as a matter of law; declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Redd’s state law claims; and entered final judgment in favor of defendants. Redd timely appealed. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

“We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo, accepting as true all factual claims in the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Fink v. Time Warner Cable, 714 F.3d 739, 740-41 (2d Cir. 2013). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Although we must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, that requirement is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision regarding equitable tolling and its denial of leave to amend. Torres v. Barnhart, 417 F.3d 276, 279 (2d Cir. 2005); McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 200 (2d Cir. 2007).

Redd’s claims arising under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 are governed by New York’s three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. See Shomo v. City of N.Y., 579 F.3d 176, 181 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that New York’s three-year statute of limitations applies to § 1983 actions arising in New York); Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 703 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding the same for § 1985 actions). Redd’s claims accrued when Redd knew or had reason to know of her injury. Veal v. Geraci, 23 F.3d 722, 724-25 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that claims can accrue before a plaintiff obtains all relevant proof). Redd was aware of her claims, at the latest, when she initiated a related state court suit on May 3, 2011, more than five years prior to commencing the instant action. Redd is not entitled to equitable tolling as she was plainly aware of her causes of action in 2011 and able to exercise her rights at that time. See Walker v. Jastremski, 430 F.3d 560, 564 (2d Cir. 2005) (explaining that equitable tolling only applies in “rare and exceptional circumstances”). Further, because Redd’s claims are untimely as a matter of law, amendment would be futile. Since Redd’s claims were properly dismissed under the statute of limitations, there is no need for this Court to consider the district court’s other bases for dismissal.

Redd does not present any other cognizable federal causes of action and the district court acted properly in declining supplemental jurisdiction over Redd’s state law claims. We have considered all of Redd’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.