AKINDE v. NEW YORK CITY HEALTH AND HOSPITALS CORPORATION (2018)

SUMMARY ORDER

In this case, plaintiff-appellant Oludotun Akinde, proceeding pro se, filed a lawsuit against defendants-appellees, the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (“HHC”), and Shari Singleton, an employee in HHC's labor relations department (together, “defendants”), after he was placed on involuntary leave from his job without pay. In his complaint, Akinde (1) challenged HHC's decision to place him on leave, which occurred after he reported to management that coworkers had showed up to his house to intimidate him because he filed a state discrimination lawsuit against HHC, and (2) sought an order compelling defendants to provide him with a hearing, reinstate him, and pay his salary while he was on leave. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning that the complaint had become moot after Akinde received the due process hearing that he had requested in his complaint. This appeal followed. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

When a district court has dismissed a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we review its factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Liranzo v. United States, 690 F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2012). An action can become moot if “an event occurs during the course of the proceedings or on appeal that makes it impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief whatever to a prevailing party.” Cty. of Westchester v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 778 F.3d 412, 416 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Insofar as Akinde sought a hearing and reinstatement of his job, the district court correctly determined that his complaint became moot after he received a hearing that denied him reinstatement. Less clear, however, is whether Akinde's complaint also sought monetary damages in the form of lost wages from the time he was placed on medical leave until he received a hearing. The district court appears not to have considered whether such a claim survives a mootness challenge, notwithstanding Akinde's receipt of a hearing. See Cty. of Westchester, 778 F.3d at 416. To that extent, we vacate the judgment of dismissal and remand for further consideration of such a damages claim.

Defendants urge us to affirm on the alternative ground that Akinde's complaint failed to state a plausible claim for relief. Although we have discretion to affirm on any ground supported by the record, McCall v. Pataki, 232 F.3d 321, 323 (2d Cir. 2000), we decline to decide that question in the first instance, and remand to the district court to consider Defendants' alternative arguments. See Absolute Activist Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 71 (2d Cir. 2012) (declining to address alternate grounds for dismissal of a complaint where district court did not consider the arguments in the first instance).

Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this order.