HIGGINBOTHAM v. SYLVESTER 5060 3686 (2018)

SUMMARY ORDER

Douglas J. Higginbotham appeals from the November 2, 2016 decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Castel, J.) granting summary judgment to the defendant-appellee police officers. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

Higginbotham was working as a cameraman, covering the Occupy Wall Street demonstrations in November 2011. At some point, Higginbotham climbed up to the top of a telephone booth at the edge of Zuccotti Park to get a better vantage point to shoot from. He climbed down after a bit, then climbed back up to continue filming. A crowd of people packed in tightly around the phone booth as the demonstration gradually grew heated. At that point, Higginbotham was ordered down from the phone booth by police officers. When he did not comply, the police officers repeated the command several times before Higginbotham came down. He was arrested and issued a criminal summons for disorderly conduct before being released from custody, although he was never prosecuted. Higginbotham sued the City of New York and the individual police officers involved in his arrest. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he asserted claims for false arrest, malicious prosecution, excessive force, assault, and First Amendment retaliation. The district court dismissed all of the claims at the pleading stage other than the false arrest and First Amendment retaliation claims. Higginbotham v. City of New York, 105 F.Supp.3d 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“Higginbotham I”). The parties conducted discovery; then the defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, finding probable cause for arrest existed that was wholly independent of any improper motive to violate Higginbotham's First Amendment right to video the proceedings, assuming such a right exists. Higgin botham v. Sylvester, 218 F.Supp.3d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“Higginbotham II”). This appeal followed.

“The existence of probable cause to arrest constitutes justification and is a complete defense to an action for false arrest.” Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). A Section 1983 claim for false arrest is “substantially the same as a claim for false arrest under New York law,” and requires a plaintiff to prove that a “defendant intentionally confined him without his consent and without justification.” Id. “In general, probable cause to arrest exists when the officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime.” Id. “Probable cause is ․ evaluated on the totality of the circumstances.” Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 90 (2d Cir. 2007). The existence of probable cause “will also defeat a First Amendment claim that is premised on the allegation that defendants prosecuted a plaintiff out of a retaliatory motive, in an attempt to silence her.” Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 215 (2d Cir. 2012). “An individual does not have a right under the First Amendment to be free from a criminal prosecution supported by probable cause, even if that prosecution is in reality an unsuccessful attempt to deter or silence criticism of the government.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

To prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim, plaintiff must prove “(1) he has an interest protected by the First Amendment; (2) defendants’ actions were motivated or substantially caused by his exercise of that right; and (3) defendants’ actions effectively chilled the exercise of his First Amendment right.” Curley v. Village of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 2001). “Specific proof of improper motivation is required in order for plaintiff to survive summary judgment on a First Amendment retaliation claim.” Id. (citation omitted).

Higginbotham argues that summary judgment was not appropriate here because a reasonable factfinder could find that the police acted with a retaliatory motive: to suppress his First Amendment right to video police activities. We disagree. First, probable cause existed to arrest Higginbotham pursuant to New York Penal Law § 120.20, reckless endangerment. “A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the second degree when he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a substantial risk of serious physical injury to another person.” Id. “A person acts recklessly with respect to a result ․ when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur․” N.Y. Penal Law § 15.05(3). The risk must “constitute[ ] a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.” Id. We agree with the district court that “[t]he undisputed facts support the conclusion that a person of reasonable caution would believe that Higginbotham acted recklessly in creating a substantial risk of serious physical injury to another person.” Higginbotham II, 218 F.Supp.3d at 242.

Our panel held this appeal in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's holding in Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 1945, 201 L.Ed.2d 342 (2018). Lozman holds that a plaintiff may prevail on a civil claim for damages for First Amendment retaliation for an arrest made pursuant to a retaliatory official municipal policy, even if there was probable cause for the arrest, if “the alleged constitutional violation was a but-for cause” of the arrest. 138 S.Ct. at 1952 (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-87, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977) ). But it left open the question of whether Mount Healthy applies where, as here, the defendants are individual police officers, rather than a municipality. Id. at 1953-54. Higginbotham urges us to adopt the Mt. Healthy test for First Amendment retaliation claims, but we need not reach the issue. Even assuming arguendo that Mt. Healthy applies, on the record developed here, a reasonable fact finder could not find that Higginbotham's exercise of his First Amendment right to video police activities was the “but-for” cause of his arrest.

We have considered the remainder of Higginbotham's arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED.