ADAMS v. John Doe, Jane Doe, Defendants. (2018)

SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Bahji Adams, pro se, sued Georgia and Vermont child support offices and officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, challenging the defendants’ enforcement of a child support order against her. The district court dismissed the complaint as to the Georgia defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction, and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as to the Vermont defendants. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

“We review a district court’s dismissal of an action for want of personal jurisdiction de novo, construing all pleadings and affidavits in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[s] and resolving all doubts in the plaintiff[s’] favor.” Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 59 (2d Cir. 2012) (alterations in original). We review a district court’s application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine de novo. Hoblock v. Albany Cty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 2005). We review a district court’s denial of leave to amend the complaint for abuse of discretion. Anderson News, L.L.C. v. Am. Media, Inc., 680 F.3d 162, 185 (2d Cir. 2012).

Adams’s complaint, like others she has filed, challenges the Georgia child support order and the Vermont enforcement of that order by arguing that the defendants did not consider her disabilities. These challenges are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. That doctrine states that federal courts lack jurisdiction over “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005).

All four elements are present here. Adams lost in state court (both Georgia and Vermont), seeks redress for injuries caused by those orders (child support), functionally seeks review and rejection of those orders, and filed her federal lawsuit after the orders were entered in the state proceedings. Adams dresses up her claims as failures to accommodate her disabilities, but she primarily complains about the child support amount ordered by a court, and the accommodation she seeks is to reduce the amount. She thus attacks the orders by challenging the defendants’ enforcement. Her claim is therefore barred by Rooker-Feldman. See, e.g., Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 88 (“[A] federal suit complains of injury from a state-court judgment, even if it appears to complain only of a third party’s actions, when the third party’s actions are produced by a state-court judgment and not simply ratified, acquiesced in, or left unpunished by it.”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend as to the Rooker-Feldman issue. Ordinarily, district courts should not dismiss a pro se complaint without permitting at least one opportunity to amend; but leave to amend is not necessary if it would be futile. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). Here, Adams has twice sought (unsuccessfully) to challenge her child support obligation through federal lawsuits alleging violations of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and due process. Nothing in her brief gives any indication that she would be successful were she given another attempt to assert her claims.

We have considered all of Adams’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.