JAVED v. MEDGAR EVERS COLLEGE OF CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK (2018)

AMENDED SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Syed Javed appeals from the September 29, 2017 judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Block, J.), dismissing his complaint against Appellees Medgar Evers College of the City University of New York (“CUNY”), Claudia Colbert, James Haggard, Edi Ruiz, and Tanya Isaacs for failure to state a claim on any of the grounds he alleged. Javed appeals only the dismissal of his claim of employment discrimination against Medgar Evers College under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

We review a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo. See Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 306 (2d Cir. 2015). “On a motion to dismiss, all factual allegations in the complaint are accepted as true and all inferences are drawn in the plaintiff’s favor.” Id.

The district court found that any of Javed’s Title VII claims based on events that occurred prior to March 25, 2014 is time barred. Javed v. Medgar Evers College of the City University of New York, No. 15-cv-7424, 2017 WL 4357138, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2017) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5). Javed does not dispute this finding on appeal. As the district court pointed out, the time bar “includes all conduct by Defendant Colbert, who left the office in 2013.” Id..

Javed failed to identify any actions taken after March 25, 2014 that indicate even a whiff of discriminatory animus. Nor, despite his attempts, has he plausibly alleged “more favorable treatment of employees not in [his] protected group.” Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 312 (internal quotation marks omitted). Javed’s second amended complaint does not sufficiently identify any other Medgar Evers employees as comparators or contain any facts suggesting that those employees were provided more favorable treatment though “similarly situated in all material respects,” Brown v. Daikin America Inc., 756 F.3d 219, 230 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Contrary to the district court’s suggestion, Javed does not need to allege “facts tending to show that Medgar Evers’[s] concern about the IT failure [for which Javed was disciplined, demoted, and fired] was pretextual” to survive a motion to dismiss. Javed, 2017 WL 4357138, at *8. Indeed, he does not even need to establish a prima facie case to do so. See Vega v. Hempstead Union Free School District, 801 F.3d 72, 84 (2d Cir. 2015). But his complaint does need to put forward “at least minimal support for the proposition that the employer was motivated by discriminatory intent.” Id. at 85 (quotation marks omitted). Javed failed to meet even this “minimal burden.” Id.

We have considered the remainder of Javed’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the order of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED. Each side to bear its own costs.