CHEESEBORO v. “John Coe” Motor Vehicle Driver, Defendant–Cross-Defendant. (2018)

SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Chan Cheeseboro, proceeding pro se, appeals from a judgment in favor of Little Richie Bus Service, Inc. (“Little Richie”) in her negligence action. In 2000, Cheeseboro was a student passenger on a Little Richie school bus that was involved in an automobile accident. After the accident, Little Richie transported the involved students to the hospital on a second bus. Years later, Cheeseboro, through counsel, sued Little Richie, claiming negligence because Little Richie’s bus had not been equipped with seatbelts, which she claimed worsened her injuries. On summary judgment, conceding that the bus did in fact have seatbelts, she instead pressed a theory that a bus matron had breached her duty of care to ensure that Cheeseboro was wearing her seat belt at the time of the accident. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Little Richie, concluding that there was no breach, and in any event, Little Richie was entitled to immunity under state law. This appeal followed. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, “resolv[ing] all ambiguities and draw[ing] all inferences against the moving party.” Garcia v. Hartford Police Dep’t, 706 F.3d 120, 126–27 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam). “Summary judgment is proper only when, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 344 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ).

On appeal, Cheeseboro primarily argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. But however deficient her attorney’s performance was, there is no constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in a civil case. See, e.g., United States v. Coven, 662 F.2d 162, 176 (2d Cir. 1981).

Cheeseboro also raises various new and undeveloped challenges to the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Little Richie. The district court concluded that summary judgment was proper because Cheesboro failed to dispute any material fact with respect to either (1) whether Little Richie breached a duty of care owed to her, or (2) whether Little Richie is entitled to immunity under New York Education Law § 3813(4). She fails meaningfully to challenge the second ruling, which alone is a sufficient ground on which to affirm.

Section 3813(4) provides as follows:

In any action for personal injuries by a passenger on a school bus against a ․ school bus operator under contract with a school district, ․ no such person shall be held liable solely because the injured party was not wearing a seat safety belt; provided, however, that nothing contained herein shall be construed to grant immunity from liability for failure to ․ comply with applicable statutes, rules or regulations.

N.Y. Educ. Law § 3813(4). Cheeseboro asserts that Little Richie should not be entitled to immunity because it chose to send a second school bus rather than ambulances to transport the students to the hospital after the accident. This argument is raised for the first time on appeal, however, and only in unusual cases do we address arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Greene v. United States, 13 F.3d 577, 586 (2d Cir. 1994). Moreover, Cheeseboro identifies no statute, rule, or regulation that Little Richie’s decision violated, nor does she provide any other basis on which to disturb the district court’s immunity ruling. Little Richie was therefore entitled to summary judgment.

We have considered Cheeseboro’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.