UNITED STATES v. HUNTLEY (2018)

Defendant-appellant Joseph Huntley appeals from a May 5, 2017 judgment convicting him, following a guilty plea, of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), as well as the same court’s judgment revoking supervised release. On appeal, Huntley argues that the government steered his firearms offense case to the judge presiding over his supervised release violation, which undermined the basic fairness of the proceedings and violated due process because that judge had already warned that Huntley would be treated harshly. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

To begin, the appellant lacks standing to appeal an assignment decision by the Assignment Committee of the Southern District of New York. As the government explains, the preamble to the Rules for the Division of Business Among District Judges for the Southern District of New York (“Rules for the Division of Business”) states that “[t]hese rules are adopted for the internal management of the case load of the court and shall not be deemed to vest any rights in litigants or their attorneys ․” Id. at 101.

Even if Huntley had standing to appeal the assignment of his firearms offense to Judge Sullivan, the government did not violate any of the Court’s Local Rules. Rather, the government’s July 21, 2016 letter advised the court of the overlapping nature of Huntley’s two cases, as is common practice for the government. See e.g., United States v. Borker, No. 10-CR-1266 (RJS), No. 17-CR-391 (PGG) (June 22, 2017 letter). Contrary to Huntley’s assertions, the government made clear that the cases were not related for the purposes of Rule 13 of the Rules for the Division of Business, nor did the Assignment Committee treat the cases as such. The firearms offense case was reassigned to Judge Sullivan for efficiency reasons, and done under Rule 14 of the Rules for the Division of Business.

Huntley’s allegation that the perceived unfairness of the proceedings violated his due process rights rests on the false premise that the government improperly steered the firearms offense to a specific judge. Huntley deems it suspicious that the July 21, 2016 letter was dispatched immediately after Judge Sullivan warned Huntley that he would have to face the consequences of violating his parole. But, as noted, such letters constitute a common practice; as Huntley’s own brief concedes: “[i]t is common for a sentencing Judge to warn a defendant of harsh consequences for any violation of supervised release.” Appellant’s Br. at 13.

Accordingly, the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.