UNITED STATES v. MORALES AKA AKA (2018)

SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant-Appellant Hector Morales appeals from the February 4, 2015 judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Sharpe, J.), imposing a sentence of principally 360 months imprisonment and 20 years of supervised release. Morales challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s quantity determination that he was responsible for 280 grams or more of cocaine base (“crack”) under 28 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the remaining underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

“We review sufficiency of evidence determinations de novo.” United States v. Leslie, 103 F.3d 1093, 1100 (2d Cir. 1997). In doing so, we ask

whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But this inquiry does not require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Put another way, a court may enter a judgment of acquittal only if the evidence that the defendant committed the crime alleged is nonexistent or so meager that no reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Barret, 848 F.3d 524, 534 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Temple, 447 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2006) ). We have previously described this standard of review as “exceedingly deferential.” United States v. Hassan, 578 F.3d 108, 126 (2d Cir. 2008).

There was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Morales was guilty of participating in a conspiracy involving 280 grams or more of crack. The evidence at trial included testimony from a cooperating government witness regarding Morales’ personal involvement with 150 grams of crack, as well as audio recording of Morales himself bragging to a government informant about his many drug sales, with quantity specifications ranging from “100, 200 grams” as an estimate of his usual sale in Plattsburgh, to a specific statement of having sold 90 grams just prior to one phone conversation. These quantities referred only to “grams” and did not distinguish whether Morales was referring to powder or crack cocaine, but the specific evidence regarding the 150 grams of crack indicated that his modus operandi was to “cook” half the powder cocaine into crack. A rational juror could apply that pattern to the numbers Morales specified and determine that over the course of the relevant period he was responsible for 280 grams or more of crack.

We have considered the remainder of Morales’ arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the order of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED.