BROWNE v. HYNES (2018)

SUMMARY ORDER

Kendall Browne appeals from the March 29, 2017 memorandum and order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Vitaliano, J.; Mann, M.J.) dismissing his complaint, which sought to have certain New York state sentencing laws declared unconstitutional. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6), accepting all factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor. Cayuga Nation v. Tanner, 824 F.3d 321, 327 (2d Cir. 2016) (Rule 12(b)(1) ); Biro v. Conde Nast, 807 F.3d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 2015) (Rule 12(b)(6) ). The complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Although a court must accept as true all the factual allegations in the complaint, that requirement is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

In 2013, Browne pleaded guilty in state court to a violent felony. He was sentenced as a second violent felony offender because of a prior conviction for a violent felony. He then brought this federal lawsuit, challenging New York’s statutory scheme for enhanced sentences as unconstitutionally vague, and seeking various forms of relief. We agree with the district court that Browne’s claims are barred by prosecutorial and Eleventh Amendment immunity, and that Browne lacks standing to bring suit on these claims. On appeal, Browne primarily challenges the district court’s application of Eleventh Amendment immunity. At this juncture, he seeks only prospective declaratory and injunctive relief, but lacks standing to do so.

To have Article III standing, a party must show that (1) he “ha[s] suffered or [is] imminently threatened with a concrete and particularized ‘injury in fact’ ” (2) that is “fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant” and (3) that is “likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1377, 1386, 188 L.Ed.2d 392 (2014) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) ). “A plaintiff seeking injunctive or declaratory relief cannot rely on past injury to satisfy the injury requirement but must show a likelihood that he or she will be injured in the future.” Deshawn E. by Charlotte E. v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 344 (2d Cir. 1998). Browne offers little more than speculation that he will suffer some future injury, i.e., that he will again commit a violent felony, again be prosecuted for that felony, and again be subjected to New York’s statutory scheme for enhanced sentences. This is insufficient to demonstrate an “injury in fact.”

We have considered the remainder of (appellant’s) arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the order of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED.