LI QING QIU v. SESSIONS III (2018)

SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Li Qing Qiu, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a July 21, 2016, decision of the BIA affirming a May 21, 2015, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Li Qing Qiu, No. A205 890 367 (B.I.A. July 21, 2016), aff’g No. A205 890 367 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May 21, 2015). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review are well established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).

Absent past persecution, an applicant may establish eligibility for asylum by demonstrating a well-founded fear of future persecution, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2), which must be both subjectively credible and objectively reasonable, Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004). To establish a well-founded fear, an applicant must show either a reasonable possibility that she would be singled out for persecution or that the country of removal has a pattern or practice of persecuting individuals similarly situated to her. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(i), (iii). “Put simply, to establish a well-founded fear of persecution in the absence of any evidence of past persecution, an alien must make some showing that authorities in [her] country of nationality are either aware of [her] activities or likely to become aware of [her] activities.” Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2008). Qiu failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution in China on account of her intentions to practice her Catholic faith in an unregistered church and proselytize.

The country conditions evidence provides that tens of millions of individuals practice in unregistered churches in China, and that in some areas unsanctioned religious practices are tolerated without interference. The evidence does not discuss any incidents of persecution against Catholics for proselytizing. Therefore, despite evidence of sporadic arrests of religious practitioners and public proselytizers, Qiu did not establish that Chinese officials are likely to become aware of her religious practice (whether worshiping on proselytizing) or a reasonable possibility that she would be persecuted as a result. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(i), (iii); see also Hongsheng Leng, 528 F.3d at 142-43; In re A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 737, 741 (B.I.A. 2005) (defining pattern or practice as “systemic or pervasive” persecution of a group).

Accordingly, the agency did not err in concluding that Qiu failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution on account of her religion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(i), (iii); Hongsheng Leng, 528 F.3d at 142-43. That finding was dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief given that all three claims were based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).