QI QING WENG v. SESSIONS III (2018)

SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Qi Qing Weng, a native and citizen of the People's Republic of China, seeks review of a June 20, 2016, decision of the BIA affirming a January 5, 2015, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Weng's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Qi Qing Weng, No. A XXX XX8 578 (B.I.A. June 20, 2016), aff'g No. A XXX XX8 578 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jan. 5, 2015). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both the BIA's and IJ's decisions. Wangchuck v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008).

The agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the circumstances,” base an adverse “credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant” or on inconsistencies or omissions in an applicant's oral and written statements and other record evidence, regardless of whether any such discrepancies “go[ ] to the heart of the applicant's claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64, 166-67. “We defer ․ to an IJ's credibility determination unless ․ it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. The adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence.

We defer to the IJ's conclusion that Weng's demeanor undermined his credibility. Jin Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 426 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir. 2005). Moreover, the record supports the IJ's conclusion that Weng was non-responsive and inconsistent when asked for details of his proselytizing, and when and why he applied for asylum. See Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir. 2006) (“We can be still more confident in our review of observations about an applicant's demeanor where, as here, they are supported by specific examples of inconsistent testimony.”). Nor is Weng's explanation for his silences and inability to recall details compelling because it did not resolve why he was able to answer other questions involving his religious practice. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[A] petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (quotation marks omitted) ).

To the extent Weng raises an issue regarding his competency, we discern no error in the agency's conclusion that he was competent. He was counseled, he submitted no medical evidence, and he testified that he understood his baptism classes. Although the IJ did not explicitly discuss Weng's level of education, his lack of formal education would not explain why he had difficulty answering questions about his own practice of Christianity.

In addition to Weng's lack of responsiveness, his inconsistencies about when and why he applied for asylum undermined the sincerity of his claim. Weng initially testified that he applied for asylum because he was afraid of persecution as a Christian in China, but later acknowledged that he decided to apply for asylum before ever attending a church. This suggests that Weng manufactured his asylum claim and casts the sincerity of his belief into doubt. See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d. Cir. 2013) (“To establish eligibility for asylum, an applicant must show that he or she ․ has a well-founded fear of future persecution, on account of ․ religion.”); id. at 338(noting that particular asylum claims arising from actions taken in the United States “may be especially easy to manufacture”); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42).

Overall, the inconsistencies and lack of responsive testimony provide substantial evidence for the adverse credibility determination, particularly as they undermine the sincerity of Weng's adoption of Christianity. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. Because Weng's asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT claims were all based on the same factual predicate, the adverse credibility determination is dispositive. Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006). Accordingly, we do not reach the agency's alternative rationale that Weng failed to show an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25, 97 S.Ct. 200, 50 L.Ed.2d 190 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.