BRUNO v. CITY OF SCHENECTADY 10 EMS (2018)

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Carmencita Bruno, an attorney proceeding pro se, appeals from a March 2016 judgment dismissing her case with prejudice, which followed (1) a February 2014 order dismissing most of Bruno’s claims against the Defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), see Bruno v. City of Schenectady, No. 1:12-CV-0285 GTS/RFT, 2014 WL 689664 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2014); and (2) a March 2016 order granting summary judgment for the Defendants on the remaining claims, see Bruno v. City of Schenectady, No. 1:12-CV-0285 GTS/RFT, 2016 WL 1057041 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2016). Bruno brought claims against three groups of defendants-appellees: the City of Schenectady and seven of its employees (the “City Defendants” or “City Appellees”), the Village of Scotia and five of its employees (the “Village Defendants” or “Village Appellees”), and the County of Schenectady and two of its employees (the “County Defendants” or “County Appellees”). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss, “constru[ing] the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Capital Mgmt. Select Fund Ltd. v. Bennett, 680 F.3d 214, 219 (2d Cir. 2012). To avoid dismissal, a complaint must contain enough facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).² This Court also reviews de novo the grant of summary judgment, focusing on whether the district court properly concluded that there was no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Sotomayor v. City of New York, 713 F.3d 163, 164 (2d Cir. 2013). In so doing, this Court construes the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in his or her favor. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

Although Bruno pursues a number of claims on appeal, two merit discussion beyond that provided by the district court. First, we agree with the district court that Bruno has not sufficiently alleged, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), that either she or her dogs were improperly “seized.” The Fourth Amendment protects the rights of individuals “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “[A] person has been ‘seized’ ․ only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). “A ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property.” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984). “To determine whether a seizure is unreasonable, a court must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interest alleged to justify the intrusion and determine whether the totality of the circumstances justified the particular sort of seizure.” Carroll v. Cty. of Monroe, 712 F.3d 649, 651 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks, alteration, and ellipsis omitted).

To the extent that Bruno alleges that defendants “seized” her dogs, her complaint does not plausibly allege a Fourth Amendment violation. The dogs were inside her house; she complains instead that defendants who were outside did not go inside to get them. While Bruno herself was plausibly alleged to have been restrained from going into the house, such a seizure of Bruno was not unreasonable. The Supreme Court has held that “[f]ire officials are charged not only with extinguishing fires, but with finding their causes'” and preserving “evidence.” Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 510, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978). Applying these principles here, it was eminently reasonable for fire officials to temporarily prevent Bruno from entering her home while the fire on the premises was still under investigation. The restraint of Bruno outside of her home did not constitute the officials’ seizure of the contents of her home.

On the other hand, we vacate and remand the district court’s conclusion that Bruno has failed to allege a claim of deliberate indifference to her medical condition in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. To state such a claim, a plaintiff must plead facts “show[ing] that she had a serious medical condition and that it was met with deliberate indifference.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). The first element requires “a condition of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain.” Johnson v. Wright, 412 F.3d 398, 403 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). The second element, i.e., that the defendants were deliberately indifferent, has nonetheless evolved over time. In Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2009), we adopted a “subjective” standard for determining whether a defendant was deliberately indifferent, which required the plaintiff to plead that the defendant “disregard[ed] a risk of harm of which he [wa]s aware.” Id. at 65 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994)). In Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2017), however, we recognized that the Supreme Court’s decision in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015) overruled this aspect of Caiozzo and instead mandated that we use an “objective” standard, i.e., whether a “reasonable person” would appreciate the risk to which the detainee was subjected. Id. at 29, 33-35. Accordingly, pursuant to Darnell, an official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner toward an arrestee unless the official “acted intentionally to impose the alleged condition, or recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to mitigate the risk that the condition posed to the pretrial detainee even though the defendant-official knew, or should have known, that the condition posed an excessive risk to health or safety.” Id. at 35 (emphasis added).

The district court’s decision dismissing Bruno’s deliberate indifference claim predated our decision in Darnell and therefore utilized a “subjective” rather than “objective” standard. See Bruno, 2014 WL 689664, at *18. Because this standard focused purely on the mindset of the defendants, rather than on what a “reasonable person” would have believed under the circumstances, it is now erroneous. See Darnell, 849 F.3d at 29, 33-35. We thus vacate and remand the district court’s decision dismissing Bruno’s deliberate indifference claim so that it can be adjudicated under the standard adopted in Darnell.

We note, however, that Bruno has sufficiently alleged the existence of a “serious medical condition.” Johnson, 412 F.3d at 403. In dismissing Bruno’s deliberate indifference claim, the district court reasoned (in part) that she had failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting a serious medical condition because it was “difficult to conclude that such condition was [her] pre-existing [TBI], given that she was well enough to be released from a hospital before the fire.” Bruno, 2014 WL 689664, at *18. While it is true that Bruno was released from the hospital prior to the fire, she has alleged that the police officers’ actions at the fire scene aggravated her prior TBI and placed her once again in “a condition of urgency.” See Johnson, 412 F.3d at 403 (internal quotation marks omitted). Bruno therefore has sufficiently alleged the existence of a “serious medical condition” at the time of her arrest.³

We have reviewed all of Bruno’s other claims and conclude that they lack merit, substantially for the reasons stated by the district court. Accordingly, the VACATE the judgment as to the deliberate medical indifference claim, REMAND for further proceedings on that claim, and AFFIRM the judgment in all other respects.

FOOTNOTES

2.   While the pleadings of pro se litigants are generally construed liberally, pro se litigants who are attorneys ordinarily “cannot claim the special consideration which the courts customarily grant to pro se parties.” Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., Inc., 258 F.3d 62, 82 n. 4 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) Bruno nonetheless asserts on appeal that we should make an exception to this general rule on account of her alleged cognitive impairment. We do not decide today whether to recognize such an exception because the outcome of this appeal remains the same either way.

3.   The City Defendants additionally argue that, because Bruno first made a deliberate indifference claim in her opposition to the City Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the claim should not be considered on appeal. However, although Bruno’s complaint failed to list deliberate indifference as one of her identified causes of action, she listed the claim in her “Causes of Action in Summary” paragraph, referred to the claim throughout her complaint, and repeatedly alleged that the officers at the precinct denied her requests for medical care. We therefore conclude that she has preserved this claim.