HOLLANDER v. Gwendolyn L. Ifill, Defendant. (2018)

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Roy Den Hollander (“Hollander”), an attorney proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss his complaint. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

Hollander sued seven television and print news organizations and 17 journalists associated with them. He alleged that these news organizations are “enterprises” within the meaning of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (“RICO”). He alleges that these organizations and journalists violated RICO § 1962(c) by reporting false information related to the 2016 United States presidential election—and each piece of false information was a predicate act of wire fraud supporting a claim of racketeering. Defendants moved to dismiss under Fed R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(1) and (12)(b)(6), arguing that 1) Den Hollander’s claim violated the First Amendment; 2) Den Hollander lacked standing to assert his claim; and 3) Den Hollander failed to adequately allege a viable civil RICO claim. The District Court granted their motion, stating that “each of these arguments is meritorious.”

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for lack of standing or failure to state a claim. See Allco Fin. Ltd. v. Klee, 805 F.3d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 2015). When evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations set out in [a] plaintiff’s complaint, draw inferences from those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and construe the complaint liberally.” Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 510 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted).

We conclude that the District Court properly granted defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of standing, as Hollander did not suffer any particularized injury. Because we affirm the District Court’s decision to grant the motion to dismiss on this ground, we need not reach the other elements of defendants’ motion to dismiss.

However, dismissal for subject matter jurisdiction must be without prejudice, and here the District Court granted Hollander’s motion to dismiss with prejudice. See Hernandez v. Conriv Realty Assoc., 182 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 1999).

We have reviewed all of the arguments raised by plaintiff on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the judgment and REMAND with instructions to the District Court to enter a judgment of dismissal without prejudice.