UNITED STATES v. BROOKS (2024)

This is the second appeal by Defendant-Appellant Dean Brooks from an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denying his motion to modify a special condition of his supervised release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2). Specifically, the special condition prohibits him from having direct contact with any minor child—including his own children—without permission from the probation office.

In the first appeal, we vacated the order of the district court and remanded pursuant to United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1994), to allow the district court to reconsider Brooks's motion to modify his special condition of supervised release in light of his circumstances, the applicable statutory factors, and governing law. We directed the district court to reconsider Brooks's request for modification and provide an explanation for its rationale by March 28, 2024, within 30 days of the date of our order. See generally United States v. Brooks (“Brooks I”), No. 23-6145, 2024 WL 795982, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 4457 (2d Cir. Feb. 27, 2024).

In this second appeal, Brooks filed a motion on March 28, 2024, requesting that we reinstate his appeal because, to date, the district court has failed to take any action after this Court issued its order. Brooks's motion is GRANTED, and the order of the district court is VACATED AND REMANDED again. Further, we ORDER that the case be reassigned to a different district judge on remand.

DISCUSSION

“[T]he ‘mandate rule’ describes the duty of the district court on remand upon receipt of the mandate, which is the appellate court's direction to the trial court[.] ․” United States v. Ben Zvi, 242 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2001) (some internal quotation marks omitted). Barring exceptional circumstances not applicable here, “the district court ‘must follow the mandate issued by an appellate court,’ and it ‘has no discretion in carrying out the mandate.’ ” Callahan v. County of Suffolk, 96 F.4th 362, 367 (2d Cir. 2024) (quoting Puricelli v. Argentina, 797 F.3d 213, 218 (2d Cir. 2015)). To date, the district court failed to follow our instructions “to reconsider Brooks's request for modification and provide an explanation for its rationale within 30 days of the date of this order.” Brooks I, 2024 WL 795982, at *2, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 4457, at *4.

As this Court explained in Brooks I, in determining whether or how to modify the conditions of supervised release, district courts are required to consider the appropriate “factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7).” Id. 2024 WL 795982, at *1, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 4457, at *2 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)). Although district courts are not required to set forth detailed findings on each statutory factor, see United States v. Gammarano, 321 F.3d 311, 315 (2d Cir. 2003), a district court must “adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review” when considering a motion for a sentence modification, United States v. Halvon, 26 F.4th 566, 570 (2d Cir. 2022) (per curiam) (quoting Chavez-Meza v. United States, 585 U.S. 109, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1965, 201 L.Ed.2d 359 (2018)). This is not a high burden to meet. “The explanation required need not be lengthy,” and must simply provide “some indication of the rationale for the ruling[.]” United States v. Christie, 736 F.3d 191, 196 (2d Cir. 2013).

We GRANT Brooks's motion to reinstate his appeal and again VACATE AND REMAND the order of the district court to allow the district court to reconsider Brooks's motion to modify his special condition of supervised release in light of his circumstances, the applicable statutory factors, and governing law. We ORDER that the case be reassigned to a different district judge on remand “to preserve the appearance of justice.” United States v. Robin, 553 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc) (per curiam).

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTE.  

Per Curiam *: FN* Judge Amalya Kearse, a member of the panel, is temporarily unavailable. This opinion has been resolved by the remaining two members of the panel consistent with the local rules of this Court.