UNITED STATES v. SALDANA (2021)

Jose Saldana, a counseled federal prisoner, appeals following the district court's denial of his amended motion for compassionate release under Section 603 of the First Step Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Saldana and the government have filed a joint motion for summary reversal, asserting that the district court abused its discretion because it denied Saldana's amended motion based on a clearly erroneous factual finding.

Summary disposition is appropriate, in part, where “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the appeal is frivolous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969).

We review a district court's denial of a prisoner's Section 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021). As relevant here, a district court abuses its discretion if it “makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” Id.

District courts lack the inherent authority to modify a defendant's sentence and “may do so only when authorized by a statute or rule.” United States v. Puentes, 803 F.3d 597, 606 (11th Cir. 2015). For example, a district court may reduce a sentence for extraordinary and compelling reasons pursuant to Section 3582(c)(1)(A). 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). In the context of compassionate release, the statute requires exhaustion of remedies and otherwise provides that:

[T]he court, upon motion of the Director of the [BOP], or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment ․ after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C.] section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that—extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction[.]

Id. Additionally, the district court must find that a reduction is consistent with the applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

The policy statements applicable to Section 3582(c)(1)(A) are found in Section 1B1.13. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. The commentary to Section 1B1.13 states that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist under any of the circumstances listed, provided that the court determines that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g), and that the reduction is consistent with the policy statement. See id. § 1B1.13 & cmt. n.1. For example, a defendant's medical condition may warrant a sentence reduction if he is suffering from a serious physical or medical condition that substantially diminishes his ability to provide self-care in prison and from which he is not expected to recover. Id. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)(ii)(I).

Here, as the parties agree, the district court made a finding of fact that was clearly erroneous. Specifically, the district court found that Saldana had indicated that he “ha[d] already contracted and recovered from” COVID-19, even though there was no evidence in his motion, or the remaining record, that he ever had the virus. In fact, Saldana repeatedly argued that he was at a higher risk of severe illness or death “should he contract COVID-19.” Rather, it appears that the district court may have confused his medical history with his brother and codefendant Francisco's history, who did inform it that he had tested positive for COVID-19. In any event, it is undisputed that Saldana never contracted the virus. Thus, the district court abused its discretion in denying his amended motion for compassionate release for this reason. See Harris, 989 F.3d at 911.

Accordingly, because the parties’ position is correct as a matter of law, we GRANT the joint motion for summary reversal and REMAND for the district court to consider whether to grant or deny the motion for compassionate release. See Groendyke Transp., Inc., 406 F.2d at 1162. To be clear, we take no position on whether the court should grant or deny the motion for compassionate release on remand.

PER CURIAM: