Stephanie Muth, in her official capacity as Commissioner of the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, and the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Petitioners, v. PFLAG (2026)

I agree with the Court that the injunctions in these consolidated cases, which this Court long ago stayed, must now be dissolved in their entirety. I also agree with the Court that the families' claims are moot and that PFLAG lacks standing. In my view, however, Dr. Mooney likely has standing sufficient for at least some of her case to proceed against the Department of Family and Protective Services. I would therefore reach the question of Mooney's probable right to relief on the merits and would vacate the injunctions because the merits point firmly in the other direction.

As a licensed psychologist, Mooney is subject to the mandatory child-abuse reporting regime administered by DFPS. See 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 707.451–.471. Her portion of the suit challenges, in part, DFPS's decision to make the administration of “gender-transition” therapy to children reportable as child abuse. Mooney—who has a history of counseling people considering these treatments—takes the position that DFPS's changed view of the matter violates the law. Although I do not think she is right about that, I am inclined to view imposition by the government of an increased reporting burden of this nature as an injury sufficient to confer standing. It seems to be an injury to which Mooney remains subject, despite intervening developments in the case.

I would nevertheless fully vacate the injunctions. Since these cases were initiated, the conduct at issue—“gender-transition” treatments for children—has been outlawed in Texas. Both this Court and the U.S. Supreme Court have upheld such bans against constitutional attack. State v. Loe, 692 S.W.3d 215, 239 (Tex. 2024); United States v. Skrmetti, 605 U.S. 495, 525 (2025). Thus, since the time of the injunctions, the law has developed in a way that forecloses the legal theories animating this litigation, including Mooney's portion of it. In light of those developments, the sweeping temporary injunctions are plainly improper on the merits. I therefore concur in the Court's decision to vacate the injunctions.

James D. Blacklock Chief Justice