LANE v. COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE (2025)

Each attorney admitted to practice law in Texas is subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of this Court and the Commission for Lawyer Discipline (CLD), a committee of the State Bar. See Tex. Gov't Code § 81.071. Disciplinary proceedings begin upon the CLD's receipt of an allegation of attorney misconduct. The Rules of Disciplinary Procedure govern the process that unfolds, and one of them—Rule of Disciplinary Procedure 17.06—is the subject of this case.

Rule 17.06(A) prohibits the imposition of discipline for professional misconduct occurring more than four years before the allegation of misconduct is received by the CLD. The issue here is whether and how Rule 17.06(A) operates in “reciprocal” discipline cases, in which a Texas attorney disciplined by another jurisdiction self-reports the foreign jurisdiction's judgment of discipline to Texas, which, in turn, summarily imposes discipline mirroring that imposed by the foreign jurisdiction.

The CLD urges that Rule 17.06(A) is inapplicable and suggests that no statute or rule of limitations governs reciprocal discipline proceedings. Under the CLD's theory, it was therefore proper for Texas to discipline Attorney Nejla Lane in 2023 for sending three intemperate emails to an Illinois federal magistrate judge's chambers in 2017. We reject that reading of Rule 17.06(A) and hold that it applies to reciprocal discipline cases and bars the CLD from imposing discipline in this case. We accordingly reverse the judgment of suspension and dismiss the case.

I. Background

Nejla Lane is an attorney who has practiced law for twenty years, having been licensed in Illinois, Michigan, and her current home state of Texas. In 2014, while representing the husband in a contentious divorce proceeding in Illinois, Lane brought another suit in Illinois federal court alleging that the wife violated federal wiretap law by downloading the husband's emails. That case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Sheila Finnegan. The litigation became heated and, after the judge denied Lane's request for additional time to conduct discovery, Lane sent the first of three emails that ultimately would result in her being disciplined by both the Northern District of Illinois and the Supreme Court of Illinois.

Lane sent the first email in April 2017. After the judge denied her motion for an extension of time to depose the wife, Lane emailed an inbox for proposed orders, claiming Judge Finnegan was favoring opposing counsel:

Today in court no matter what I said to you, you had already made up your mind, and even questioned my sincerity with regard to my preparation for upcoming trial․

[S]ince the beginning you never seem to doubt anything [opposing counsel] says, as you appear to doubt me. Still, I stated to you in open court that “I don't want to be hated” for doing my job, but it sure seems that way, as I never get a break. [Opposing counsel] is the lucky guy who senses same as he can just pick up the phone to call you knowing he will get his way ․

Still, it's not fair that my client (and I) is being treated badly for suing his wife/ex wife, and everyone is protecting [the wife] – why? ․ How am I to prove my case if I am not given a fair chance to do my work, properly. I apologize for this message, Judge Finnegan, but I am under a lot of pressure, too, and it's “I” who is being punished here because it's “I” who has to spend endless hours in the office ․

Again, my sincere apology and I will adhere to your instructions.

Judge Finnegan replied to all counsel explaining that she does not allow attorneys to email her to argue motions or “share their feelings about my past rulings” and that Lane's email was “improper.”

Two months later, Judge Finnegan's law clerk emailed all counsel a copy of the judge's order denying leave for Lane to depose an additional witness. Lane responded with another email to the proposed order mailbox, addressing her email to the clerk. In this email, Lane complained Judge Finnegan had entered an “outrageous” order helping the wife “escape punishment for wrongs she committed.” She also asserted that the judge was “violating [her] client's rights.” Three days later, Lane sent a third email, again addressed to Judge Finnegan's law clerk and including the proposed order mailbox as a recipient. Lane described the order as “fraudulent,” adding that it made her “sick to [her] stomach.” In closing, Lane proclaimed: “What goes around comes around, justice will be done at the end!”

Judge Finnegan then ordered Lane to “immediately cease all email communications with the Court (via the proposed order box or otherwise) and with all members of the Court's staff.” Judge Finnegan's order described the emails as “highly inappropriate” and stated, “The Court will take further action to address the failure to comply with the Court's directive [in April 2017] and the inappropriate content of counsel's two most recent emails in due course.”

After the lawsuit ended, Judge Finnegan reported Lane to the Northern District of Illinois. In January 2018, the Northern District suspended Lane from that court's general bar for six months for violating American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct 3.5(d), which forbids lawyers from “engag[ing] in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal,” and 8.4(d), which prohibits “conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”

In August 2019, the Supreme Court of Illinois's Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission filed a complaint against Lane over the same emails, alleging that Lane violated Rules 3.5(d), 8.2(a), and 8.4(d) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct. Like their ABA counterparts, these rules prohibit “conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal” and “conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”¹

While the Illinois complaint was pending, Lane self-reported the federal suspension to the Texas State Bar. But the CLD's Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Seana Willing, informed Lane that, although a proposed rule change was under consideration, the Disciplinary Rules in effect at the time did not require reporting federal discipline.² Texas took no disciplinary action at the time.

The Illinois Supreme Court ultimately imposed a six-month suspension, followed by six months of probation, in January 2023. As required by Disciplinary Rule 8.03(f), Lane reported this suspension to the Chief Disciplinary Counsel the following month, in February 2023. One month later, the CLD filed a petition for reciprocal discipline with the Board of Disciplinary Appeals (BODA), a body that imposes reciprocal discipline and hears appeals in standard disciplinary matters.

Lane answered and asserted several defenses. She claimed that the Illinois judgment was unsupported by evidence, that she had been deprived of due process, and that imposing the same discipline in Texas would be a “grave injustice.” See Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 9.04(A)–(C). She also alleged that imposing reciprocal discipline would violate the U.S. Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause. Following a hearing, a divided BODA rejected Lane's defenses and issued a Judgment of Partially Probated Suspension, suspending Lane from practicing law in Texas for six months with a subsequent three-month probation period.

BODA made three relevant conclusions of law regarding Rule of Disciplinary Procedure 17.06(A). BODA first concluded that Lane waived any limitations issue by failing to plead it in her written response. Next, it concluded that Rule 17.06(A) would not apply to reciprocal discipline cases even absent a waiver. Finally, BODA reasoned that if Rule 17.06(A) applied to reciprocal discipline cases, it would not bar discipline here because the four-year limitations clock started when Lane was disciplined by the Supreme Court of Illinois in 2023, not when she emailed Judge Finnegan's chambers in 2017.

Two BODA members disagreed with the judgment of suspension. Member Jason Boatright concluded that Rule 17.06(A) barred BODA from disciplining Lane because she sent the offending emails in 2017, which was more than four years before the CLD learned of her Illinois suspension in 2023. Another BODA member dissented without opinion.

Lane appealed to this Court. We granted her request for oral argument, and BODA stayed the suspension judgment pending our disposition.

II. Relevant Law

The Supreme Court of Texas has inherent power to administer and regulate the practice of law in Texas. Webster v. Comm'n for Law. Discipline, 704 S.W.3d 478, 490 (Tex. 2024). The State Bar Act provides a statutory framework within which the Court exercises this power. Id. at 491 (citing Tex. Gov't Code § 81.011(b)). Central to this framework are the Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, which this Court promulgates to “define proper conduct for purposes of professional discipline.” Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof'l Conduct Preamble ¶ 10. To complement these rules, the Court also promulgates the Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, which “establish the procedures to be used in the professional disciplinary and disability system for attorneys in the State of Texas.” Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 1.02. In interpreting these rules, we apply principles from the statutory-construction context, considering the text as a whole and giving effect to all words and provisions. In re Caballero, 272 S.W.3d 595, 599 (Tex. 2008).

This case turns on the applicability and meaning of Rule of Disciplinary Procedure 17.06(A), which prohibits discipline for misconduct that occurred more than four years before the CLD's Chief Disciplinary Counsel receives notice. Before turning to its text, however, some context regarding the overall disciplinary process proves helpful.

Disciplinary proceedings typically begin when the Chief Disciplinary Counsel receives a “Grievance,” i.e., a written allegation that an attorney has committed misconduct. See Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 1.06(R). In ordinary discipline cases, which are governed by Part II of the Rules, the Chief Disciplinary Counsel investigates the allegation and may classify it as warranting an evidentiary hearing. Id. R. 2.10, 2.12. After a hearing and judgment, either side may appeal that judgment to BODA. Id. R. 2.23.

In contrast, “compulsory discipline” and “reciprocal discipline” cases are governed by different rules, which are in Parts VIII and IX of the Rules, respectively. Both compulsory and reciprocal discipline cases are summary proceedings insofar as they bypass the process in which a Grievance is classified, investigated, and adjudicated in an evidentiary hearing. Reciprocal discipline proceedings are initiated when the Chief Disciplinary Counsel receives and files another jurisdiction's disciplinary judgment directly with BODA:

Upon receipt of information indicating that an attorney licensed to practice law in Texas has been disciplined in another jurisdiction, including by any federal court or federal agency, the Chief Disciplinary Counsel shall diligently seek to obtain a certified copy of the order or judgment of discipline from the other jurisdiction, and file it with [BODA] along with a petition requesting that the attorney be disciplined in Texas.

Id. R. 9.01. In reciprocal discipline cases, BODA does not conduct an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the allegations because, with few exceptions, the Rules give preclusive effect to the foreign jurisdiction's judgment of discipline:

A certified copy of the [other jurisdiction's] order or judgment is prima facie evidence of the matters contained therein, and a final adjudication in another jurisdiction that an attorney licensed to practice law in Texas has committed Professional Misconduct is conclusive ․, subject to the defenses set forth in Rule 9.04 below.

Id.

Rule 9.04, which is located in Part IX of the Rules, identifies five potential defenses that may be asserted in reciprocal discipline cases:

A. That the procedure followed in the other jurisdiction on the disciplinary matter was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process.

B. That there was such an infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct in the other jurisdiction as to give rise to the clear conviction that [BODA], consistent with its duty, should not accept as final the conclusion on the evidence reached in the other jurisdiction.

C. That the imposition by [BODA] of discipline identical, to the extent practicable, with that imposed by the other jurisdiction would result in grave injustice.

D. That the misconduct established in the other jurisdiction warrants substantially different discipline in this state.

E. That the misconduct for which the attorney was disciplined in the other jurisdiction does not constitute Professional Misconduct in this state.

Id. R. 9.04. These defenses must be pleaded, id.; notably, none resembles a rule or statute of limitations.

Compulsory discipline proceedings, like reciprocal discipline cases, are initiated by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel directly with BODA. But, unlike reciprocal discipline, compulsory discipline is based on an attorney's conviction of or order of deferred adjudication for an “Intentional Crime.” Id. R. 8.01, 8.03. That conviction or order is “conclusive evidence of the attorney's guilt.” Id. R. 8.02. In compulsory discipline cases, BODA is tasked only with determining whether the conviction (or order of probation) involves the same person, whether it involves an Intentional Crime, and the appropriate discipline. Id. R. 8.04.

Rule 17.06 appears in Part XVII of the Rules, under the heading “Miscellaneous Provisions.” Rule 17.06(A) sets out a general rule prohibiting discipline for misconduct that occurred more than four years before the Chief Disciplinary Counsel receives a Grievance. Its other subsections describe instances in which the general four-year limitations period does not apply. Because the exceptions to Rule 17.06(A) inform its meaning and scope, we quote Rule 17.06 in its entirety:

17.06. Limitations, Rules and Exceptions:

A. General Rule: No attorney may be disciplined for Professional Misconduct that occurred more than four years before the date on which a Grievance alleging the Professional Misconduct is received by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel.

B. Exception: Compulsory Discipline: The general rule does not apply to a Disciplinary Action seeking compulsory discipline under Part VIII.

C. Exception: Alleged Violation of the Disclosure Rule: A prosecutor may be disciplined for a violation of Rule 3.09(d), Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, that occurred in a prosecution that resulted in the wrongful imprisonment of a person if the Grievance alleging the violation is received by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel within four years after the date on which the Wrongfully Imprisoned Person was released from a Penal Institution.

D. Effect of Fraud or Concealment: Where fraud or concealment is involved, the time periods stated in this rule do not begin to run until the Complainant discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the Professional Misconduct.

Id. R. 17.06. As its text—and its placement in Part XVII, Miscellaneous Provisions—shows, Rule 17.06(A) is generally applicable in all disciplinary proceedings, save for three express exceptions. The first of these is subsection (B), which categorically exempts compulsory discipline cases from Rule 17.06(A)’s application. Id. R. 17.06(B). Compulsory discipline cases, like reciprocal discipline cases, do not undergo either the investigation process or a hearing by a court or evidentiary panel. See id. R. 8.01, 8.04. But, unlike reciprocal discipline cases, compulsory discipline cases arise only if an attorney commits misconduct so grave that it results in a criminal conviction of or probation for an “Intentional Crime” as that term is defined by the Rules.³ Id. R. 8.01, 8.03. Excepting criminal misconduct from Rule 17.06(A) is consistent with provisions of the Penal Code that make limitations inapplicable to certain serious crimes. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 12.01(1) (excepting crimes such as murder and child sexual abuse from a statute of limitations). But neither text nor logic suggests that reciprocal discipline cases are similarly beyond Rule 17.06(A)’s reach merely because they, like compulsory discipline cases, are summary in nature.

The other two exceptions are not categorical. Rather, they describe two circumstances that justify excepting a disciplinary proceeding from the general rule that the four-year limitations clock begins ticking when the underlying misconduct occurs. Rule 17.06(C) governs prosecutorial misconduct that results in wrongful imprisonment and provides that the four-year clock begins only upon the prisoner's release. Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 17.06(C). Likewise, Rule 17.06(D) delays the start of the four-year time period when an attorney hinders discovery of misconduct through fraud or concealment. Id. R. 17.06(D). Taken together, the three exceptions set forth in Rule 17.06(B)–(D) demonstrate that the Rules’ drafters deliberately exempted an entire category of cases—compulsory discipline cases—from Rule 17.06(A)’s reach, but intentionally refrained from excepting reciprocal discipline cases. See Bexar Appraisal Dist. v. Johnson, 691 S.W.3d 844, 854 n.9 (Tex. 2024) (“Just as we give meaning to text where it exists, we must too give meaning to its absence.”). They also show that the default rule is to start the four-year clock upon the occurrence of the misconduct—otherwise, there would be no need for subsections (C) and (D) to except two scenarios for different treatment, i.e., delayed accrual.

III. Analysis

We begin by addressing the CLD's argument that Lane waived Rule 17.06(A)’s application by failing to plead it in response to the petition. BODA concluded that pleading was required because the Rules of Civil Procedure require a party to plead a statute of limitations as an affirmative defense in responsive pleadings, Tex. R. Civ. P. 94,⁴ and BODA's internal procedures require application of the Rules of Civil Procedure “[e]xcept as varied by these rules and to the extent applicable,” BODA Internal Procedural Rules R. 1.03. We disagree.

Like Rule of Civil Procedure 94, Rule of Disciplinary Procedure 9.04 enumerates certain defenses that must be pleaded in response to a petition seeking reciprocal discipline. But Rule 9.04 is silent about the need to plead Rule 17.06(A). BODA's reliance on Rule of Civil Procedure 94 is therefore misplaced as the Rules of Disciplinary Procedure establish their own pleading requirements for reciprocal discipline cases and thus “var[y]” the requirements for a responsive pleading.

We recognize that Rule 17.06(A) at least resembles a statute of limitations, which typically must be affirmatively pleaded to avoid waiver. But the rationale that supports finding limitations to be waived if not raised in a trial court does not apply here. In typical litigation, judicial efficiency forbids a party from presenting issues on appeal that were not properly presented to and ruled upon by a lower court. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). But this is not a typical appeal—the CLD filed its petition for reciprocal discipline directly with BODA, meaning that BODA was not acting as a court of appeals. Because Rule 9.04, which expressly governs this proceeding, does not require limitations to be pleaded, we are reluctant to find waiver based on the failure to plead. This is particularly true where, as here, BODA plainly was aware of Rule 17.06(A)’s potential application, as evidenced by the discussion of that rule in both the judgment of suspension and Member Boatright's reasoned writing supporting Rule 17.06(A)’s application.⁵

Although we conclude there was no waiver, we do not hold that Rule 17.06(A) implicates subject matter jurisdiction such that a final disciplinary judgment could be rendered void for imposing discipline outside Rule 17.06(A)’s four-year window. Rule 17.05 identifies various “mandatory” time periods in the Rules, which do not include Rule 17.06(A), and then states that “[a]ll other time periods herein provided are directory only and the failure to comply with them does not result in the invalidation of an act or event by reason of the noncompliance with those time limits.” Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 17.05 (emphasis added). Accordingly, a disciplinary judgment is not void merely because the proceeding ran afoul of the four-year limitation in Rule 17.06(A).

Having concluded that Lane did not waive Rule 17.06(A)’s application, we address Lane's contention that Rule 17.06(A) bars the CLD's proceeding against her. The CLD argues, and BODA agreed, that Rule 17.06(A) does not apply because the rule requires discipline to be imposed within four years of a “Grievance” and a reciprocal discipline case involves no “Grievance.” We disagree with this cramped reading of the defined term.

A “Grievance” is “a written statement, from whatever source, apparently intended to allege Professional Misconduct by a lawyer ․, received by the Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel.” Id. R. 1.06(R). In standard discipline cases, the CLD begins the disciplinary process by determining whether a Grievance constitutes a “Complaint.” Id. R. 2.10. The CLD then investigates the Complaint to determine if there is just cause for discipline. Id. R. 2.10, 2.12. If the CLD moves forward, the Complaint may be heard either in a district court or before an appointed evidentiary panel. Id. R. 2.15; see also id. R. 2.17 (describing the procedure for an evidentiary panel hearing). Decisions by the panel are appealed to BODA, id. R. 2.23, and then to this Court, id. R. 2.27, 7.11.

Here, the CLD argues that Lane's 2023 email informing the CLD and its Chief Disciplinary Counsel about her Illinois suspension and attaching a copy of the Illinois Supreme Court's judgment was not a Grievance because it was not subject to the classification and investigation process employed in the usual disciplinary proceeding. We disagree and conclude that Lane's 2023 email falls within the scope of Rule 1.06(R)’s definition of a Grievance. The email and the attached judgment are of course “written statements.” It is inconsequential that Lane self-reported the misconduct, as a Grievance can derive “from whatever source.” And the email and attachments plainly include and incorporate the allegations of Lane's misconduct that led to her suspension in Illinois. In short, there is no requirement that a written statement be classified and investigated under the rules governing typical disciplinary proceedings in order to constitute a Grievance.

The fact that Rule 17.06(B) expressly excepts compulsory discipline from the general limitations rule supports this conclusion. Compulsory discipline, like reciprocal discipline, does not begin with classification and investigation of a Grievance. Thus, under the CLD's logic, Rule 17.06(A) would not apply to compulsory discipline cases either. Yet Rule 17.06(B) expressly excepts compulsory discipline from Rule 17.06(A)’s application, indicating that rule would apply but for the exception. Rule 17.06(A) applies to reciprocal discipline cases, but, unlike compulsory discipline cases, reciprocal discipline cases are not excepted. We therefore reject the CLD's argument that Rule 17.06(A) is inapplicable for lack of a “Grievance.”⁶

The definition of “Professional Misconduct” also accords with our conclusion that reciprocal discipline against Lane is time-barred. The CLD argues that even if Rule 17.06(A) applies to reciprocal discipline cases generally, it would not preclude the proceedings against Lane because her Professional Misconduct occurred within four years of BODA's judgment of suspension. BODA concluded that, in the context of reciprocal discipline, “Professional Misconduct” refers not to the underlying conduct that resulted in discipline—here, Lane's sending the three emails in 2017—but rather to the Illinois Supreme Court's entry of the judgment of discipline in 2023. In BODA's view, Professional Misconduct “does not occur until the lawyer is disciplined in another jurisdiction for misconduct that occurred there” (emphasis added). The CLD echoes this reasoning and argues that Lane's Professional Misconduct occurred in January 2023, when the Illinois Supreme Court suspended her. Lane responds that her Professional Misconduct for purposes of Rule 17.06(A) occurred when she sent the emails in 2017 that ultimately led to her discipline in Illinois. We agree with Lane.

The Rules first define “Professional Misconduct” as “[a]cts or omissions by an attorney, individually or in concert with another person or persons, that violate one or more of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.” Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 1.06(CC)(1). This definition encompasses the conduct for which the CLD initiates standard disciplinary proceedings. In cases of reciprocal discipline, the Rules provide another definition of “Professional Misconduct”: “[a]ttorney conduct that occurs in another jurisdiction, including before any federal court or federal agency, and results in the disciplining of an attorney in that other jurisdiction, if the conduct is Professional Misconduct under the Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.” Id. R. 1.06(CC)(2).⁷ The CLD and our dissenting colleague emphasize one phrase in this second definition to insist that Professional Misconduct in reciprocal discipline cases does not occur until it “results in the disciplining of an attorney in that other jurisdiction.” We reject this strained reading of the text. The requirement that there be resulting discipline in another jurisdiction is merely a limitation on the scope of conduct to which the rules governing reciprocal discipline apply. In other words, Rule 1.06(CC)(2) circumscribes the type of conduct that is actionable in Texas, but it does not alter Rule 17.06(A)’s focus, which is on when the misconduct occurred. We do not ignore Rule 1.06(CC)(2)’s distinct requirement that misconduct in another jurisdiction be accompanied by discipline before reciprocal discipline may be imposed—indeed, we wholeheartedly agree. But we disagree that this is relevant in interpreting the meaning of Rule 17.06(A).

Subsections (C) and (D) of Rule 17.06, which expressly delay the start of the four-year window so that it begins upon an event other than the occurrence of the attorney conduct itself, also support this reading. See id. R. 17.06(C) (the four-year period begins on the prisoner's release, not at the time of prosecutorial misconduct), (D) (the four-year period does not begin until the discovery of misconduct that was concealed).⁸ Had the Rules’ drafters intended for reciprocal discipline cases to accrue upon a foreign jurisdiction's entry of a judgment of discipline, Rule 17.06(C) and (D) prove that they would have said so expressly.

Other textual clues buttress our conclusion. In the context of compulsory discipline, the Rules separately define “Professional Misconduct” to include “[c]onviction of an Intentional Crime, or being placed on probation for an Intentional Crime with or without an adjudication of guilt.” Id. R. 1.06(CC)(8) (emphasis added). Rather than refer to the conduct that results in a conviction, Rule 1.06(CC)(8) deliberately defines Professional Misconduct as the later-occurring conviction itself. The Rules could have similarly defined Professional Misconduct in the reciprocal discipline context—by expressly pointing to the later-occurring order or disciplinary judgment of another jurisdiction. Instead, the definition of Professional Misconduct in the reciprocal discipline context refers to the conduct that results in a judgment of discipline.

Here, Lane's conduct that resulted in discipline by Illinois is readily identifiable: it was sending three discrete emails to a federal magistrate judge and her clerk on three distinct occasions in 2017. This is the conduct that resulted in the discipline imposed by Illinois in 2023, i.e., the Professional Misconduct referred to in Rule 17.06(A). Because that misconduct occurred more than four years before the CLD's Chief Disciplinary Counsel received the Illinois Supreme Court's judgment of suspension in 2023, Rule 17.06(A) forbade the CLD from filing a complaint against Lane with BODA at that time.⁹

Our dissenting colleague argues that, under our interpretation, Lane's judgment of suspension would be timely under Rule 17.06(A) because she first reported her misconduct and the resulting Illinois federal suspension in 2020. Post at –––– (Busby, J., dissenting). But while Lane's 2020 report constituted a “Grievance,” it is not the operative Grievance for purposes of Rule 17.06(A). This is because the CLD chose to take no action upon receiving the report of Lane's federal suspension. The CLD decided to discipline Lane only after a second—much later—report of the same underlying misconduct, which makes the second report the operative “Grievance” under Rule 17.06(A). The rule neither states nor implies that the limitations period begins on receipt of a Grievance upon which the CLD takes no action. To read Rule 17.06(A) this way would lead to the absurd result that the CLD could impose discipline based on a Grievance received decades after the underlying misconduct so long as some other report about that same conduct was received within four years of the misconduct. See Carreras v. Marroquin, 339 S.W.3d 68, 73 (Tex. 2011) (“We ․ interpret statutes to avoid an absurd result.”); Caballero, 272 S.W.3d at 599 (applying statutory-construction principles when interpreting the Rules of Disciplinary Procedure).

Ultimately, under the CLD's interpretation of the Rules, no limitations period would govern reciprocal discipline cases, and the CLD would be authorized to file a complaint based on stale—even decades-old—misconduct whenever it sees fit. The CLD assures us it would be judicious in exercising its authority to bring cases in perpetuity. While that may be true, the text of Rule 17.06 along with the definitions of “Grievance” and “Professional Misconduct” compel us to reject the CLD's argument.

IV. Conclusion

Lane was twice suspended for sending admittedly improper emails to an Illinois federal judge and her staff. The CLD sought to discipline Lane for a third time in 2023 for the same three emails she sent nearly six years earlier. We hold that Texas Rule of Disciplinary Procedure 17.06(A) applies and bars the CLD from proceeding on the basis of Lane's 2023 report of her discipline by the Supreme Court of Illinois. We therefore reverse BODA's Judgment of Partially Probated Suspension and dismiss the disciplinary proceedings against Lane.

The Court holds that Nejla Lane did not waive Rule 17.06's limitations defense by failing to plead it because Rule 9.04 “is silent about the need to plead Rule 17.06(A).” Ante at ––––. But Rule 9.04 does more than “identif[y] five potential defenses that may be asserted in reciprocal discipline cases.” Id. at 9 (emphasis added). To the contrary, it lists the defenses an attorney “shall allege, and thereafter be required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, ․ to avoid the imposition of” reciprocal discipline. Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 9.04 (emphases added). The Rule's plain language makes clear that an attorney who fails to allege and prove at least one of the listed defenses cannot avoid reciprocal discipline. Rule 9.04, in other words, lists the only defenses an attorney can plead and prove to “avoid the imposition of” reciprocal discipline.

Because Rule 9.04's list of defenses does not include limitations under Rule 17.06, limitations under Rule 17.06 is not a defense an attorney can raise “to avoid the imposition” of reciprocal discipline. In short, Rule 9.04—which applies specifically and only to reciprocal-discipline cases—makes it clear that the “[m]iscellaneous” Rule 17.06 simply does not apply to reciprocal-discipline cases. See id. Part XVII (“Miscellaneous Provisions”).

Unless, of course, Rule 9.04's list is not exclusive. But if it is not, then it is not exclusive as to defenses an attorney must allege as well as those she must prove. If Rule 9.04's list is not exclusive, then the Rules do not (as the Court asserts) “establish their own pleading requirements for” all “reciprocal discipline cases.” Ante at –––– – ––––. If Rule 9.04 merely lists and addresses some of the defenses an attorney can assert to avoid the imposition of reciprocal discipline, then the Rule only “ ‘var[ies]’ the requirements for a responsive pleading” that asserts a defense listed in Rule 9.04. Id. at ––––. If that is the case, then (1) Rule 9.04 does not vary the requirements for pleading limitations under Rule 17.06, (2) Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 94 thus required Lane to plead a limitations defense, and (3) Lane waived that defense by failing to plead it. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 94 (requiring parties to “affirmatively” plead limitations); BODA Internal Procedural Rules R. 1.03 (requiring application of the Rules of Civil Procedure in proceedings before the Board of Disciplinary Appeals “[e]xcept as varied by these rules”).

To avoid that obvious result, the Court makes the remarkable conclusion that limitations—at least limitations under Rule 17.06—is not a “defense” at all. Ante at –––– n.––––. Instead, the Court suggests, limitations under Rule 17.06 “independently” prevents the Board “from imposing reciprocal discipline regardless of whether the Rule has been pleaded.” Id. So, somehow, in the Court's view, a “statute of limitations” provides an affirmative defense, but a “rule of limitations” does not. Nothing, however, supports that illogical distinction.

Like a statute of limitations, the effect of Rule 17.06 is to afford the Board “a reasonable time to present [its] claims” while protecting respondents, the Board, and the courts “from having to deal with cases in which the search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents or otherwise.” Murray v. San Jacinto Agency, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 826, 828 (Tex. 1990). And as with statutes of limitations, Rule 17.06 provides an affirmative defense because it permits the responding attorney to assert “facts and arguments that, if true, will defeat the plaintiff's or prosecution's claim, even if all the allegations in the complaint are true.” Zorrilla v. Aypco Constr. II, LLC, 469 S.W.3d 143, 155–56 (Tex. 2015) (quoting Affirmative Defense, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2009)). Treating a rule of limitations as anything other than an affirmative defense upends all the work this Court has done to clarify the burden the defendant or respondent bears to obtain the benefits of limitations. See Draughon v. Johnson, 631 S.W.3d 81, 88 (Tex. 2021) (confirming that the defendant bears the “burden to establish her affirmative defense of limitations at trial” and explaining when and how the burden shifts on summary judgment). Limitations, by its very “nature,” is an affirmative defense. Regency Field Servs., LLC v. Swift Energy Operating, LLC, 622 S.W.3d 807, 821 (Tex. 2021).

If it seems to the Court that this result is overly harsh or unworkable, we should engage in the proper procedural process of amending the rules to produce a different result. We should not judicially amend the rules in a case-specific opinion that ignores or rewrites the very language we have adopted and approved.

I respectfully dissent.

Petitioner Nejla Lane, a licensed Texas attorney, sent emails in 2017 to a federal judge in Illinois that: called the judge's rulings “outrageous” and “fraudulent,” said the judge “ha[d] done [her] wrong” and was “in this to delay and deny justice for [her] client,” exclaimed “[h]ow dare you do that to me?!”, and threatened “[w]hat goes around comes around.” The federal Northern District of Illinois and the Supreme Court of Illinois suspended Lane from their bars in January 2018 and January 2023 respectively, concluding that her conduct was intended to disrupt a tribunal and prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of their disciplinary rules.

Lane reported her federal suspension and underlying emails to the Chief Disciplinary Counsel of respondent Texas Commission for Lawyer Discipline (CLD) in July 2020. She also reported her Illinois suspension in February 2023. The following month, the Chief Disciplinary Counsel sought to impose on Lane a reciprocal suspension from the State Bar of Texas. We are asked to decide whether this action was timely.

When an attorney licensed in Texas commits professional misconduct in another jurisdiction, our Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct (Disciplinary Rules) and Rules of Disciplinary Procedure (Procedural Rules) provide two pathways for discipline relevant here. First, if the CLD receives notice of conduct in another jurisdiction that constitutes professional misconduct under our Disciplinary Rules, the Chief Disciplinary Counsel handles the allegation as a “Grievance” using the multi-step process for ordinary discipline cases in Part II of the Procedural Rules. See Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof'l Conduct R. 8.05(a); Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 1.06(R), 1.06(CC)(1), 2.10, 2.11(A), 2.12 et seq. Second, if the CLD receives notice of professional misconduct under our rules that occurs in another state and results in discipline in that state, the Chief Disciplinary Counsel files the discipline order and a petition for reciprocal discipline with a different tribunal using the abbreviated process outlined in Part IX of the Procedural Rules. See Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 1.06(CC)(2), 9.01-9.04.

The CLD disciplined Lane using the second pathway. The question before us is whether doing so violated the following rule, which is entitled “Limitations”: “No attorney may be disciplined for Professional Misconduct that occurred more than four years before the date on which a Grievance alleging the Professional Misconduct is received by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel.” Id. R. 17.06(A).

I would hold that even if this limitations rule applies here and was not waived, as the Court concludes, Lane's reciprocal discipline complied with the rule. The predicate “Professional Misconduct” relevant under the second pathway was not complete and therefore did not occur until the Supreme Court of Illinois imposed discipline, which happened only one month before the Chief Disciplinary Counsel received the discipline order. But even if Lane had been disciplined under the first pathway, the result would be the same: the emails that the Court identifies as “Professional Misconduct” were sent in 2017 and the Chief Disciplinary Counsel received information about them from Lane fewer than four years later (July 2020), which constituted a “Grievance” under the Court's own reasoning. Because the Court reaches a different conclusion by mixing up the two pathways, and its reasoning leads to the absurd result that reciprocal discipline was barred by limitations before the Chief Disciplinary Counsel could ever have sought it, I respectfully dissent.

* * *

A defendant seeking judgment in its favor based on a limitations defense must “prove (1) when the cause of action accrued, and (2) [when] the plaintiff brought its suit,” which must be not “later than the applicable number of years thereafter.” Draughon v. Johnson, 631 S.W.3d 81, 89 (Tex. 2021). Here, Procedural Rule 17.06(A) defines the two measuring points as (1) when the “Professional Misconduct ․ occurred” and (2) when “a Grievance alleging [that misconduct] is received by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel,”¹ which must be not later than “four years” thereafter. The Procedural Rules provide definitions of both “Professional Misconduct” and “Grievance” that help identify each of these points with precision.

At the relevant time, Procedural Rule 1.06(CC) provided that “ ‘Professional Misconduct’ includes,” as pertinent here: (1) “Acts or omissions by an attorney ․ that violate one or more of the [Disciplinary Rules]”; and (2) “[a]ttorney conduct that occurs in another state ․ and results in the disciplining of an attorney in that other jurisdiction, if the conduct is Professional Misconduct under the [Disciplinary Rules].”² Because Disciplinary Rule 8.05(a) provides that a Texas lawyer “also may be disciplined in this state for conduct occurring in another jurisdiction ․ if it is professional misconduct under Rule 8.04,” violating acts under the first prong of the “Professional Misconduct” definition can include acts in another jurisdiction, which are handled under Part II of the Procedural Rules. See, e.g., Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 2.11(a)-(b) (prescribing venue when “the acts or omissions complained of occurred wholly outside the State of Texas”). Violating acts under the second prong of the definition must also “result[ ] in ․ disciplin[e] ․ in that other jurisdiction,” id. R. 1.06(CC)(2), and those acts are handled under Part IX of the Procedural Rules. See, e.g., id. R. 9.01 (providing procedures for reciprocal discipline when “an attorney licensed to practice law in Texas has been disciplined in another jurisdiction”).

The Procedural Rules define “Grievance” as “a written statement, from whatever source, apparently intended to allege Professional Misconduct by a lawyer ․ received by the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel.” Id. R. 1.06(R).³ Thus, a “Grievance” must appear to allege the relevant type of “Professional Misconduct” for which discipline is being sought.

Here, the relevant type of “Professional Misconduct” for which the Chief Disciplinary Counsel sought to reciprocally discipline Lane falls under the second prong: “Attorney conduct that occurs in another state ․ and results in the disciplining of an attorney in that other jurisdiction, if the conduct is Professional Misconduct under the [Disciplinary Rules].” Id. R. 1.06(CC)(2) (emphasis added). Because the parts of this definition are joined by the conjunctive “and,” the “Professional Misconduct ․ occurred” for limitations purposes when Lane both sent the emails that allegedly violated our Disciplinary Rules and those emails resulted in her discipline in Illinois. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 116 (2012) (explaining that “and” combines items so that all items listed are required). Thus, the first relevant point for Procedural Rule 17.06(A)’s limitations calculation is January 2023, when the Supreme Court of Illinois disciplined Lane. The second point is the “Grievance,” which the Court holds was Lane's February 2023 report of her Illinois discipline. See ante at ––––. Because these points are separated by fewer than four years, Rule 17.06(A) does not bar Lane's reciprocal discipline.

The Court attempts to avoid this plain-text conclusion by dismissing as “strained” the parts of the second prong of the “Professional Misconduct” definition that are relevant to the reciprocal discipline pathway in Part IX. Ante at ––––. In particular, the Court disregards when the resulting discipline occurred, concluding that the only material fact for limitations purposes is “when the misconduct occurred.” Id. at ––––. In other words, the Court treats the second prong as if it reads no differently than the first prong of the “Professional Misconduct” definition, which focuses on the “[a]cts or omissions by an attorney ․ that violate” the Disciplinary Rules. Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 1.06(CC)(1). As explained above, the first prong already makes actionable any acts or omissions in another state that violate those rules. Thus, the Court's reading renders the second prong a nullity.

That cannot be correct; we must give effect to the different wording of these alternative definitions. And if the Court were correct in disregarding the Illinois discipline, this disciplinary proceeding should have been brought using the full procedural safeguards offered by Part II of the Procedural Rules, which it was not. But even indulging the Court's framing that the relevant date of the Professional Misconduct is simply when the violation occurs, as if this were not really a reciprocal discipline case after all, Lane's discipline is not barred by limitations.

According to the Court, Lane's “Professional Misconduct ․ occurred” under Procedural Rule 17.06(A) when she sent the emails to the judge in 2017. Ante at ––––. As discussed, the other relevant date for limitations purposes is specified later in the same sentence of the rule: when “a Grievance alleging the Professional Misconduct”—the very same Professional Misconduct that the rule just said occurred—“is received by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel.” Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 17.06(A) (emphasis added). Applying the Court's own understanding of what constitutes a “Grievance,” the Chief Disciplinary Counsel received allegations of Lane's misconduct from Lane herself in 2020. On July 29, 2020, Lane submitted an electronic contact form to the Chief Disciplinary Counsel disclosing her 2017 emails to the federal judge, the federal discipline, and the ongoing Illinois misconduct investigation. Because this was Lane's first submission that—in the Court's words—“plainly include[s] and incorporate[s] the allegations of Lane's misconduct,” it “falls within the scope of Rule 1.06(R)’s definition of a Grievance.” Ante at ––––. Under this approach, too, the Professional Misconduct occurred fewer than four years before a Grievance alleging that misconduct was received, so Procedural Rule 17.06(A) does not bar Lane's discipline.

The Court attempts to avoid this conclusion as well, but its reasoning is internally inconsistent. It observes that the “Professional Misconduct referred to in Rule 17.06(A)” was Lane's “sending three discrete emails” to the judge in 2017. Ante at ––––. But it holds that the “Grievance alleging the Professional Misconduct was received”⁴ when the Chief Disciplinary Counsel “received the Illinois Supreme Court's judgment of suspension in 2023,” id., despite its earlier statement that “Rule 17.06(A)’s focus ․ is on when the misconduct occurred,” not upon the “resulting discipline.” Id. at ––––. In other words, the Court treats the “Professional Misconduct” as sending the emails for purposes of determining the occurrence date but as imposing the discipline for purposes of determining the grievance date.

This analysis improperly gives two different meanings to the term “Professional Misconduct” in the very same sentence of Procedural Rule 17.06(A). And it mixes up the separate procedural pathways for discipline based on out-of-state Professional Misconduct, using the misconduct at issue in Part II cases—the act or omission violating the Disciplinary Rules—to determine the occurrence date but the misconduct at issue in Part IX cases—the violating conduct and the resulting discipline—to determine the grievance date.

The Court attempts to wave this contradiction away by introducing the concept of an “operative” grievance on which the Chief Disciplinary Counsel takes action. Id. at –––– – ––––. But Procedural Rule 17.06 contains no such concept. Instead, Parts II and IX identify the applicable grievance and when the Chief Disciplinary Counsel must act. For ordinary grievances, the Chief Disciplinary Counsel has thirty days after receipt to classify them and (generally) sixty days to investigate those classified as complaints. See Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 2.10, 2.12(A)(1). For reciprocal discipline under Part IX, the Chief Disciplinary Counsel must act “diligently” “[u]pon receipt of information that a [Texas-licensed] attorney ․ has been disciplined in another jurisdiction” to obtain a certified copy of the disciplinary order and file her petition. Id. R. 9.01. Here, she did so within one month of receiving information about Lane's Illinois suspension. Thus, the Court is simply wrong to suggest that its counter-textual reading of Procedural Rules 1.06(CC) and 17.06 is required to prevent the Chief Disciplinary Counsel from sitting on a grievance for decades. The Court's response also pretends that the Chief Disciplinary Counsel received the very same grievance in 2023 that she did in 2020, but that too is incorrect. Her petition under Part IX makes clear that just as Procedural Rule 9.01 required, she took diligent action after receiving notice of the Illinois judgment—the first information she received that provided a basis for reciprocal discipline.⁵

Finally, the Court's holding today leads to an absurd result: that Procedural Rule 17.06(A) bars the Chief Disciplinary Counsel from performing her duty to pursue reciprocal discipline under Part IX before she could ever have done so. Procedural Rule 9.01 provides that “[u]pon receipt of information indicating that an attorney licensed to practice law in Texas has been disciplined in another jurisdiction ․ the Chief Disciplinary Counsel shall” obtain a copy of the order or judgment of discipline and file it with a petition requesting reciprocal discipline in Texas. Id. (emphasis added). Obviously, the Chief Disciplinary Counsel cannot carry out this duty before an order or judgment of discipline exists. But here, the Court holds that even though the Chief Disciplinary Counsel received the Illinois judgment of suspension within a month of its issuance and filed it promptly, she was too late because the misconduct—which alone cannot provide a basis for reciprocal discipline under Part IX—“occurred more than four years before.” Ante at ––––.

This result is fundamentally at odds with the nature of a statute of limitations. Texas courts, like other American courts, recognize a “strong background presumption” that “a cause of action does not become complete and present for limitations purposes until the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.” Corner Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 603 U.S. 799, 811, 144 S.Ct. 2440, 219 L.Ed.2d 1139 (2024) (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Rincones, 520 S.W.3d 572, 593 (Tex. 2017); Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 221 (Tex. 2003). Although this “standard rule can be displaced such that the limitations period begins to run before a plaintiff can file a suit, [courts] will not infer such an odd result in the absence of any such indication in the text of the limitations period.” Corner Post, 603 U.S. at 811, 144 S.Ct. 2440 (internal quotation marks omitted). There is no such language in Procedural Rule 17.06(A). Yet the Court transforms this rule entitled “Limitations” into a rule of repose,⁶ imposing an absolute time limit on bringing a claim even before a cause of action accrues despite the lack of any textual support for that result.

I recognize, of course, that there is a fundamental policy question underlying today's decision. If the Chief Disciplinary Counsel receives an allegation that a Texas lawyer has committed out-of-state misconduct that violates our Disciplinary Rules, must she pursue that misconduct under Part II of the Procedural Rules? Or may she, in the interest of comity and conservation of scarce resources, await the results of ongoing disciplinary proceedings in the state where the professional misconduct occurred and then, if that state imposes discipline, ask a Texas tribunal to order reciprocal discipline under the abbreviated procedure in Part IX? I can see good arguments on both sides, and I favor amending our Procedural Rules to expressly resolve the question.

But nothing currently in the text of our Procedural Rules suggests that the limitations period of Procedural Rule 17.06(A) can force the Chief Disciplinary Counsel to pursue the Part II pathway and forfeit the Part IX pathway if disciplinary proceedings in the other state take too long. Today's opinion essentially amends our rules to impose that result without notice to the parties or the public, contrary to this Court's long-held view that “we do not revise our rules by opinion.” State Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 241 (Tex. 1992).⁷ Indeed, we may not do so because rule amendments require notice, an opportunity to comment, and—as to rules of disciplinary conduct and procedure—approval by members of the state bar in a referendum. See Tex. Gov't Code §§ 81.0876(a), 81.0878. None of those steps have been taken here.

At the very least, when we change the rules after the game has been played, we should give the parties an opportunity to play again under the new rules—for example, by using the Part II pathway to resolve this grievance. See, e.g., Carowest Land, Ltd. v. City of New Braunfels, 615 S.W.3d 156, 158-59 (Tex. 2020) (collecting cases). Because the Court does not, I respectfully dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The text of the relevant Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct is as follows:Rule 3.5(d): “A lawyer shall not ․ engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.”Rule 8.2(a): “A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal officer ․”Rule 8.4(d): “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to ․ engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”Ill. Rules Prof'l Conduct R. 3.5(d), 8.2(a), 8.4(d).

2.   Lane emailed the State Bar in July 2020, shortly after the Texas Bar Journal published a proposed rule change that would require self-reporting of discipline by a federal court. Disciplinary Rule 8.03(f) was amended in 2021 and now requires attorneys to notify the Chief Disciplinary Counsel of discipline by a federal court or federal agency as well as discipline by another state. Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof'l Conduct R. 8.03(f).

3.   “Intentional Crime” includes (1) any “Serious Crime” committed with knowledge or intent and (2) “any crime involving misapplication of money or other property held as a fiduciary.” Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 1.06(V). “Serious Crime” means “barratry; any felony involving moral turpitude; any misdemeanor involving theft, embezzlement, or fraudulent or reckless misappropriation of money or other property; or any attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation of another to commit any of the foregoing crimes.” Id. R. 1.06(GG).

4.   “In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively ․ statute of limitations ․ and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 94.

5.   We agree with our dissenting colleague that Rule 9.04 enumerates the defenses that must be both pleaded and proved to avoid reciprocal discipline. Post at –––– – –––– (Boyd, J., dissenting). But in contrast to the Rules of Civil Procedure, which expressly classify a statute of limitations as an affirmative defense, Tex. R. Civ. P. 94, we see no indication in the text of the Rules of Disciplinary Procedure that Rule 17.06(A) is such a defense. This omission suggests that Rule 17.06(A) independently constrains BODA from imposing reciprocal discipline regardless of whether the rule has been pleaded.

6.   BODA and the CLD cite to another BODA decision in which an attorney sought to dismiss a reciprocal discipline petition as time-barred under Rule 17.06(A). Bd. of Disciplinary Appeals, In re Bruno, Cause No. 65864, 2021 WL 5543655 (Nov. 2, 2021). Because this Court affirmed BODA's judgment of suspension, Bruno v. Comm'n for Law. Discipline, No. 21-0964 (Tex. Sept. 2, 2022), the CLD argues that we should follow BODA's conclusion in that case that Rule 17.06(A) did not apply. This Court's decision to affirm a BODA judgment without a written opinion, however, does not reflect the Court's agreement with the legal conclusions or reasoning reflected in BODA's judgment. See Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 7.11 (“The Court may affirm a decision on [BODA] by order without written opinion.”). In this sense, affirmance of a BODA judgment resembles the Court's denial of a petition for review.

7.   Rule 1.06(CC)(2) was amended in 2021 (with similar changes made to Rule 9.01 and Disciplinary Rule 8.03(f)) to add the current phrase “including before any federal court or federal agency.” Sup. Ct. of Tex., Final Approval and Adoption of Amendments to the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct and the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, Misc. Docket No. 21-0961 (May 25, 2021). The rule previously limited “Professional Misconduct” to “[a]ttorney conduct that occurs in another state or in the District of Columbia.” Id.

8.   We note that there is no hint of fraud or concealment here, as Lane twice self-reported her discipline in other jurisdictions to the CLD, first in 2020 and again in 2023.

9.   We need not and do not address whether the CLD had authority to file a complaint with BODA based on Lane's self-reporting in July 2020 of her suspension by the Illinois federal court before the 2021 amendment to Rule of Disciplinary Procedure 9.01 expressly authorized reciprocal discipline based on discipline imposed by a federal court or federal agency.

1.   In describing the CLD's argument, the Court seems to suggest that the second measuring point is when “discipline [is] imposed.” Ante at ––––. That suggestion is contrary to the plain text of Procedural Rule 17.06(A). Elsewhere, however, the Court acknowledges that it is when a Grievance is “received.” Ante at ––––.

2.   Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 1.06(CC) (emphasis added). As the Court notes, this definition was amended in 2021 to include discipline imposed by a federal court or agency. Ante at –––– n.––––; Sup. Ct. of Tex., Final Approval and Adoption of Amendments to the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct and the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, Misc. Docket No. 21-0961 (May 25, 2021).

3.   “Grievance” is a term used extensively in Part II but not at all in Part IX. Nonetheless, I assume for purposes of argument that the concept has relevance under Part IX as well. Cf. ante at –––– – ––––.

4.   Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 17.06(A).

5.   As previously discussed, our Procedural Rules did not provide for reciprocal discipline based on federal-court disciplinary orders at the time Lane was suspended by the federal court. Ante at –––– n.––––; see also supra note 2.

6.   See Holubec v. Brandenberger, 111 S.W.3d 32, 37 (Tex. 2003); Trinity River Auth. v. URS Consultants, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 259, 263 (Tex. 1994) (“Statutes of repose differ from traditional limitations, of course, in that they potentially cut off a right of action before it accrues.”).

7.   See also Alvarado v. Farah Mfg. Co., 830 S.W.2d 911, 915 (Tex. 1992) (“[W]e are not free to disregard [the rule's] plain language. Nor should we revise the rule by opinion. The Legislature has provided that notice be given before rules amendments become effective. Tex. Gov't Code § 22.004. In addition, this Court has structured the rules-revision process to encourage advice and comment from the bench and bar, and from the public generally ․ While those processes are at work, we adhere to the language of the rule and our consistent precedent.”).

Justice Huddle delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Blacklock, Justice Lehrmann, Justice Devine, Justice Bland, Justice Young, and Justice Sullivan joined.

Justice Boyd filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Busby joined. Justice Busby filed a dissenting opinion.