HERNANDEZ v. STATE (2025)

OPINION

Appellant was convicted of evading arrest or detention with a motor vehicle and was sentenced to two years’ confinement, probated for three years’ community supervision. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and contends that the initial traffic stop was unlawful. We conclude that a rational juror could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that the initial traffic stop was lawful. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and render a judgment of acquittal.

I. Background

a. Trial

On March 17, 2020, at 10:16 p.m., a woman called 9-1-1 to report a suspicious four-door Chevrolet Silverado driving at a slow speed in a rural area of Willacy County. At 10:46 p.m., Officer Marcos Garcia arrived at the area the caller described and noticed only Appellant's pickup truck in the vicinity, driving down a dirt road. Appellant's truck was not a four-door Chevrolet Silverado. Officer Garcia turned onto the same dirt road and activated his emergency lights.¹ Appellant did not stop his vehicle in response to the emergency lights and continued driving down the dirt road at the same slow rate of speed. At 10:50 p.m., Appellant stopped and exited his vehicle to open a gate at the entrance of his brother's property. Officer Garcia also exited his vehicle, approached Appellant with his firearm drawn, and asked Appellant to identify himself. Appellant told Officer Garcia his name but did not provide physical identification. Appellant and Officer Garcia argued for approximately five minutes, and, after Officer Garcia unsuccessfully tried to take Appellant down by force, Officer Garcia tased Appellant and arrested him.

Appellant was charged by indictment with evading arrest or detention with a motor vehicle. Tex. Penal Code § 38.04(a). At trial, Officer Garcia testified that he knew this particular area to have “had a lot of incidences of human smuggling” of late. Officer Garcia also testified that he observed several residences in the area but no vehicles except Appellant's, which was driving on a rural road. Officer Garcia admitted he did not know for certain that Appellant's vehicle was the “suspicious” Chevrolet Silverado described by the 9-1-1 caller, but he “figured” it must be, because there were no other vehicles around, and Appellant was driving a pickup truck, though not a Chevrolet Silverado. Officer Garcia acknowledged that the thirty minutes it took him to arrive at the scene was “a lot of time for a vehicle to move in and out of the area.” Officer Garcia also confirmed that Appellant did not “floor it” after Officer Garcia turned on his emergency lights, and he had not witnessed any “violation of law.”

Appellant did not file a motion to suppress and instead argued that the State could not meet its burden on the “lawful arrest” element.² After the State rested, Appellant moved for a directed verdict on the basis that the State had failed to meet its burden to prove the attempted detention was lawful. The trial court denied Appellant's motion. At the jury charge conference, Appellant did not ask for an Article 38.23 instruction.³ The jury deliberated for several hours and sent eight notes to the trial court during its deliberations, two of which indicated they could not reach a unanimous verdict. The trial court gave the jury an Allen ⁴ charge and sent the jury back for further deliberations. The jury ultimately found Appellant guilty as alleged in the indictment.

b. Appeal

On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed.⁵ Appellant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the detention was lawful.⁶ Relying on Derichsweiler v. State,⁷ the court of appeals found that Officer Garcia's testimony was sufficient for a rational juror to “have found that the detention was lawful beyond a reasonable doubt.”⁸ Specifically, the court of appeals concluded that although Appellant was not driving a Chevrolet Silverado, Officer Garcia's testimony established that Appellant was driving a pickup truck; that Appellant's truck was the only vehicle in the rural area described by the 9-1-1 caller; and that there had been “a lot of incidences of human trafficking” in the area at that time.⁹ The court of appeals also pointed to evidence showing that Appellant fled from Officer Garcia's show of authority—both by vehicle and then on foot prior to the physical struggle—from which a juror could infer that Appellant was involved in criminal activity.¹⁰ “[B]ased on the evidence and reasonable inferences from that evidence,” the court of appeals concluded that the evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the initial detention was lawful.¹¹ We granted Appellant's petition for discretionary review.¹²

II. Applicable Law

a. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Evidence is legally sufficient to support a conviction if, when viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational juror could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. McPherson v. State, 677 S.W.3d 663, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). When conducting a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence admitted at trial. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We do not sit as the thirteenth juror, and we do not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder by reevaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence. Edwards v. State, 666 S.W.3d 571, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023).

The jury is permitted to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence adduced at trial. Metcalf v. State, 597 S.W.3d 847, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). Additionally, the jury may use common sense, common knowledge, personal experience, and observations from life when drawing inferences. Acosta v. State, 429 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

The sufficiency of the evidence is measured against the hypothetically correct jury charge, defined by the statutory elements as modified by the charging instrument. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The hypothetically correct jury charge is one that accurately states the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not increase the State's burden of proof, and adequately describes the offense with which the defendant is charged. Id.

An individual evades arrest “if he intentionally flees from a person he knows is a peace officer ․ attempting lawfully to arrest or detain him.” Tex. Penal Code § 38.04(a). “The text of the statute is plain: it requires proof that an attempted arrest or detention is lawful at the time the person flees.” Day v. State, 614 S.W.3d 121, 127 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). “[W]hen a lawful detention is an element of the crime, a failure of the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the detention was lawful must result in an acquittal of the defendant.” Id. at 125.

b. Investigative Detention

We review de novo whether the totality of circumstances is sufficient to support an officer's reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 48–49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). An investigative detention is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment and is unreasonable unless “supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that ‘criminal activity’ may be afoot.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)); State v. Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d 460, 466–67 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Reasonable suspicion exists when law enforcement has “specific, articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity.” Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 668 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

When determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion for a detention, we look to the totality of the circumstances and “whether there was an objectively justifiable basis for the detention.” Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914. In assessing whether he has reasonable suspicion for a detention, an officer may “draw on [his] own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to [him] that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’ ” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273, 122 S.Ct. 744 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). The information known to the officer at the time of the warrantless detention must support more than a mere hunch. Ramirez-Tamayo v. State, 537 S.W.3d 29, 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).

c. The proper standard of review

In sum, the proper standard of review for whether the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational juror to find that Officer Garcia's traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion is the same as the one we set forth in Long v. State:

In the context of this case, if we are to make a legal determination of [the reasonableness of a detention], we have to rely upon the jury's verdict. For determinations of historical fact, we apply the traditional standard of review for legal sufficiency to determine what the totality of the circumstances are, deferring to the jury's rational factual determinations and inferences. Then, we evaluate de novo the purely legal question of whether [the detention was reasonable].

535 S.W.3d 511, 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (internal citations omitted).¹³

III. Discussion

Appellant first contends that the court of appeals relied on facts that are not supported by the record in reaching its conclusion that a rational juror could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the attempted detention was lawful. Disregarding the unsupported evidence, Appellant argues that no rational juror could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Officer Garcia's detention was lawful. We first examine the contested evidence and then turn to the ultimate sufficiency question.

a. Contested Evidence

In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals relied on the following facts: Officer Garcia was dispatched to a rural area of Willacy County to respond to a 9-1-1 call reporting a suspicious vehicle driving slowly; the 9-1-1 caller described a four-door Chevrolet Silverado driving west; when Officer Garcia arrived at the area, he observed a vehicle “close to the mailbox belonging to the address given by the [9-1-1] caller”; there were no other vehicles in the area; when Officer Garcia activated his emergency lights, Appellant “did not stop his vehicle and continued to drive away from Officer Garcia, turning north on a dirt road”; and Appellant ultimately arrived at a gate and stopped his vehicle.¹⁴ Appellant asserts that the court of appeals’ statements (1) that Officer Garcia observed a vehicle “close to the mailbox belonging to the address given by the [9-1-1] caller”; and (2) that Appellant “did not stop his vehicle and continued to drive away from Officer Garcia, turning north on a dirt road” are not supported by the record.

i. Proximity to the Mailbox

Officer Garcia testified that the vehicle was “in close proximity to the residence” and “in the vicinity that the caller had advised.” But this testimony is not supported by the evidence in the record. The photographic evidence in the record shows that the dirt road that Appellant was driving on was south of “several residences,” and the residence and mailbox belonging to the 9-1-1 caller was the northernmost.¹⁵ As explained by Officer Garcia, State's Exhibit 7 depicts a sign behind which he saw Appellant's taillights as well as two other residences between the 9-1-1 caller's and the dirt road. Furthermore, there was no testimony that Appellant's truck was observed at any time by Garcia to be close to the caller's house or mailbox. Considering all of this evidence, the record does not support the court of appeals’ statement that Appellant's truck was “close to the mailbox belonging to the address given by the [9-1-1] caller.”

ii. Driving Away

Officer Garcia testified that when he arrived at the scene, he observed Appellant's vehicle already on the dirt road. Officer Garcia followed Appellant and activated his emergency lights after he “had already turned onto that road.” The court of appeals noted that flight from an officer before the officer has attempted an arrest or detention can be the “key ingredient justifying the decision of a law enforcement officer to take action.”¹⁶ But the record here belies the applicability of this scenario to the instant case: Appellant's vehicle was already driving down the dirt road, as Officer Garcia testified, and there was no evidence to suggest he intentionally fled the police vehicle before Officer Garcia activated his emergency lights. Given that these facts are not supported by the record, we do not consider them in our analysis.

b. Analysis

The sum total of the evidence known to Officer Garcia at the time of Appellant's detention was as follows: (1) a woman had called 9-1-1 thirty minutes prior to Officer Garcia's arrival and reported a “suspicious” Chevrolet Silverado; (2) there were several residences in the area, but no other cars driving at that time; (3) the area had experienced incidences of human trafficking; and (4) Appellant was already driving down the dirt road when Officer Garcia arrived, but not near the area where the 9-1-1 caller described.

As Officer Garcia himself testified, driving a truck driving slowly on a dirt road at night is not on its own suggestive of criminal activity. Furthermore, Officer Garcia testified that he did not witness Appellant violate any law. And Appellant's conduct was not “bizarre” so as to suggest “someone who was looking to criminally exploit some vulnerability.” Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 917. In fact, Officer Garcia testified on cross-examination that there were residences as well as ranch land down the dirt road where the traffic stop was initiated, and that it would not be uncommon for people to go out to that area.¹⁷ Furthermore, Officer Garcia also testified that the road was not the smoothest of roads and that it would not be uncommon for someone to drive slower on an unpaved road like the one Appellant's vehicle was on.

Officer Garcia needed to establish “specific, articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity.” Wade, 422 S.W.3d at 668. As Officer Garcia admitted at trial, he arrived on scene thirty minutes after the 9-1-1 call which would have been “a lot of time for a vehicle to move in and out of the area.” Furthermore, Appellant's vehicle did not match the specific description provided to Officer Garcia by the 9-1-1 caller. In sum, there was nothing to link Appellant's vehicle to any criminal activity.¹⁸

A seminal case on point is Derichsweiler, which we called “admittedly a close call” on the issue of reasonable suspicion. 348 S.W.3d at 917. There, a 9-1-1 caller and his wife reported that a man pulled up next to them in the drive-thru lane at McDonald's “kind of grinning ․ and looking straight at us.” Id. at 909. The man lingered and then drove off but returned minutes later acting in the same way. Id. The couple felt “threatened” and “intimidated” by the man's conduct, so they called 9-1-1. Id. As the husband called, the couple observed the man leaving the McDonald's parking lot and driving to the adjacent Wal-Mart, “pulling up beside at least two parked cars ․ and tarrying there.” Id. at 910. We concluded that the defendant's conduct “was bizarre to say the least,” and that “the repetition of similar, apparently scrutinizing, behavior directed at parked cars in the adjacent Wal–Mart parking lot reasonably suggests a potential criminal motive.” Id. at 917. This was so because the conduct “reasonably suggests someone who was looking to criminally exploit some vulnerability—a weak or isolated individual to rob or an unattended auto to burgle.” Id.

We found the evidence in other cases to be weaker than the “close call” in Derichsweiler. Id. at 917. For example, in Arguellez v. State, 409 S.W.3d 657 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013), “a male subject in a tan Ford Taurus” was observed by a 9-1-1 caller “taking photos at the city pool ․ parked beside the fence.” Id. at 659 (cleaned up). Officers responded and saw a vehicle fitting that description “pulling away from the side of the pool.” Id. at 659–60. The 9-1-1 caller even confirmed that the patrol car was behind the correct vehicle. Id. at 660. On appeal, the defendant challenged whether there was reasonable suspicion to justify his stop and investigative detention. Id. at 661. We concluded:

The totality of circumstances, including the cumulative information known to the cooperating officers at the time of the stop, was that an unknown male in a described vehicle was taking photographs at a public pool. Photographs are routinely taken of people in public places, including at public beaches, where bathing suits are also commonly worn, and at concerts, festivals, and sporting events. Taking photographs of people at such public venues is not unusual, suspicious, or criminal.

The generally matching description of the vehicle simply connects appellant to the “suspicious” photography, but does not in any way suggest that, by taking pictures in a public place, appellant was, had been, or soon would be, engaged in criminal activity. And since there was no indication of crime being afoot, leaving the scene of such photography does not constitute flight or evasion. Likewise, the fact that the pool manager remained in contact with the dispatcher and confirmed that the initial officer was behind the suspect vehicle does not in any way indicate that crime was afoot.

Id. at 664.

Likewise, in Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), “the police dispatcher radioed that an anonymous caller reported that a male driving a blue Ford pickup truck stopped at [an intersection], put two bicycles into the back of the truck, and drove away westbound.” Id. at 922. The officer, who was on patrol in the general area, “spotted a green Ford F-250 truck that ‘looked like it was blue’ approximately three quarters of a mile away from the site of the reported incident.” Id. The officer trailed the truck for four blocks without observing any traffic violations, then stopped the vehicle. Id. After stopping the vehicle, the officer observed evidence of driving while intoxicated. See id. While we noted that the activity described was “unusual,” we concluded that “[m]ore than the officer's opinion that an activity is ‘suspicious’ was needed to relate the activity to a criminal act.” Id. at 925. To reach this conclusion, we emphasized that “there was neither a complainant nor a report of stolen bicycles. The anonymous caller did not report contextual factors that reasonably connected the unusual activity to a theft.” Id. We further emphasized had that the officer had “very little information, corroborated or otherwise,” to connect the defendant to unusual activity “other than the fact that [the defendant] was driving a Ford pickup truck, similar in color to the described truck, close to the time that the unusual activity occurred, and within three quarters of a mile west of the reported incident.” Id. We distinguished Derichsweiler and held that the officer in Martinez “had significantly less, and less reliable, information: a minimal, somewhat inaccurate description of the suspect vehicle, an anonymous caller, a larger search area, and no suspicious behavior observed by the officer.” Id. at 926.

In sum, the evidence in both Arguellez and Martinez fell short of the “admittedly ․ close call” that was Derichsweiler. 348 S.W.3d at 926. The evidence in this case falls even shorter.¹⁹ Like in Arguellez, there was nothing “unusual, suspicious, or criminal” about an individual driving slowly on a dirt road at night. See 409 S.W.3d at 664. Nor was there any evidence that “[A]ppellant was, had been, or soon would be, engaged in criminal activity.” See id.²⁰ And like in Martinez, the same “significantly less, and less reliable, information” is evidenced here. See 348 S.W.3d at 926. Prior to initiating the traffic stop, Officer Garcia made no attempt to verify whether the vehicle in question matched the description of the vehicle described by the 9-1-1 caller. In fact, as Officer Garcia testified, he saw a vehicle's taillights and initiated a traffic stop. Even if we were to credit Officer Garcia's conclusion that Appellant's vehicle was driving suspiciously, “[m]ore than the officer's opinion that an activity is ‘suspicious’ was needed to relate the activity to a criminal act.” See id. at 925. That evidence is lacking from the record.

To the extent that the State relies on Officer Garcia's personal knowledge that this particular area was known for human trafficking, that argument is not persuasive. If that were sufficient, any vehicle driving slowly in an area with known activity of human trafficking could be detained on suspicion that that vehicle was engaged in human trafficking. There were no “specific articulable facts” that Officer Garcia could rely upon to distinguish the ordinary driver on the dirt road from the one possibly engaged in human trafficking. See Wade, 422 S.W.3d at 668. And the 9-1-1 call does not move the needle: all it describes is a “suspicious” vehicle but provides no indication that human trafficking was at play. Worse for this theory, the 9-1-1 caller identifies a vehicle that ultimately was not the vehicle that Officer Garcia stopped. Put plainly, the facts necessary to support reasonable suspicion are not in the record.

Examining the record as a whole, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to sustain Appellant's conviction for evading arrest. The record is devoid of evidence upon which Officer Garcia could have reasonably concluded that Appellant was, had been, or soon would be engaged in criminal activity.²¹

IV. Conclusion

We conclude that no rational juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Officer Garcia's attempted detention of Appellant was supported by reasonable suspicion. Because the evidence is insufficient to sustain the lawful-arrest element of Appellant's conviction, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and render a judgment of acquittal.

Appendix A

CONCURRING OPINION

I join the Court's opinion and write separately to discuss the unique nature of the statute in this case, which effectively requires the jury to make a legal determination. See Tex. Penal Code § 38.04 (Evading Arrest or Detention).

To prove that a defendant is guilty of evading arrest or detention, the State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the attempted arrest or detention was lawful. See Tex. Penal Code § 38.04(a) (“A person commits an offense if he intentionally flees from a person he knows is a peace officer ․ attempting lawfully to arrest or detain him.”). As the Court discussed, the lawfulness of the detention in this case turns on whether Officer Garcia had reasonable suspicion to execute a traffic stop.

I. The Jury is Asked Even More than Usual in Evading Cases

It is exceedingly rare that the question of whether reasonable suspicion exists is decided by the jury. This is one of those rare cases because the lawfulness of the detention was an element of the charged offense. Most of the time, the lawfulness of a detention is not an element but an evidentiary issue that can be raised pretrial through a motion to suppress and resolved by the trial court. But even if the trial court resolves the question pretrial, the jury might still be asked to make a reasonable suspicion determination at trial, pursuant to an Article 38.23 instruction. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.23(a); see Chambers v. State, 663 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022).

An Article 38.23 instruction tells the jury to disregard any evidence that the jury “finds was unconstitutionally or illegally obtained.” Chambers, 663 S.W.3d at 4. Such an instruction is only proper if there is a contested issue of “specific historical fact” for the jury to decide “that is material to the legality of obtaining the evidence.” Holmes v. State, 248 S.W.3d 194, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). An Article 38.23 instruction must provide the jury with guidance as to what facts to consider in making a reasonable suspicion determination.¹ See id. at 200. In other words, in a proper 38.23 instruction, the trial court tells the jury which facts to consider, and what the outcome must be if the jury believes those facts to be true.

In making such a determination, the jury cannot be asked to apply the law to the facts—rather, “the jury decides facts” and “the judge decides the application of the law to those facts.” Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). This is because a jury is ill-equipped to “ ‘wrestle with’ the legal determination of whether certain facts do or do not constitute ‘reasonable suspicion.’ ” Id. at 513 (citing Garza v. State, 126 S.W.3d 79, 86 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)).

For example, the appellant in Madden wanted a jury instruction on whether the “totality of the facts that [the officer] listed constituted ‘reasonable suspicion.’ ” Madden, 242 S.W.3d at 512. This Court found the proposed instruction improper because it “focused only on the law” and “did not set out any specific historical fact that the jury was to focus upon” in determining whether the officer had reasonable suspicion. Id. at 512 (explaining proposed instruction failed to point to observations listed by officer, such as trembling face, shaking hands, fumbling for wallet, etc.). A jury “cannot be expected to decide whether the totality of certain facts do or do not constitute ‘reasonable suspicion’ under the law.” Id. at 511.

In this case, the jury was instructed to determine whether the State proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that “the attempted arrest or detention was lawful.” The only guidance the trial court provided on how to assess the lawfulness of the detention was the following, included in the “Definitions” section of the jury charge:

Lawful Attempted Detention

A brief detention of a person by a peace officer is lawful if the officer has “reasonable suspicion.” “Reasonable suspicion” means facts known to the officer that would lead a reasonable law enforcement officer to reasonably suspect that a specific person has engaged in criminal activity, is engaging in criminal activity, or is about to engage in such activity.

Although this was not an Article 38.23 instruction but rather part of the definitions section of the jury charge, it would not withstand scrutiny had it been offered as an Article 38.23 instruction. This is because it asks the jury to do precisely what this Court held impermissible in Madden—to determine whether the totality of the facts gave rise to reasonable suspicion. See Madden, 242 S.W.3d at 511. If the jury is not equipped to make such a determination in the context of an Article 38.23 instruction, I do not see how a jury can be expected to make such a determination when deciding whether the State has met its burden in proving an essential element of an offense.

To submit the “lawful detention” element to the jury was not error of course, as the jury was required to determine whether the State had met its burden on each element. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 522–23, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995) (explaining a criminal defendant's right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, his or her guilt of every element of the crime charged). Nor do I mean to suggest that the Legislature should eliminate the requirement that a detention or arrest be lawful for someone to be convicted of evading. The requirement is a vital constitutional safeguard. By requiring that the detention or arrest be lawful, the Legislature commendably seeks to eliminate the possibility that a person might be convicted for evading an arrest or detention that violates the person's constitutional rights.

Moreover, conducting traffic stops is one of the most dangerous activities in which law enforcement engages. To require officers to have at least reasonable suspicion to detain fellow citizens is not merely a matter of liberty—it promotes the safety of officer and motorist alike.

While I believe that determining the lawfulness of a detention or arrest is a task best left to judges, the fact remains that it is an element of the offense. The detention's lawfulness therefore must be submitted to the jury.

II. Going Forward

When the lawfulness of a detention is an element of the offense itself, there is no pretrial opportunity for the trial court to weigh in on the reasonable suspicion determination. This is because the lawfulness of a detention cannot be brought up in a pretrial suppression motion when the detention's lawfulness is an element of the offense. Woods v. State, 153 S.W.3d 413, 415 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). A defendant charged with evading will also never be entitled to an Article 38.23 instruction regarding the lawfulness of the arrest or detention, as the lawfulness is no mere evidentiary issue but an element of the offense itself. For the trial court to include a 38.23-style instruction in the jury charge in an evading case would infringe upon the jury's exclusive province as factfinder.²

When the lawfulness of a detention is an element of the offense, there is only one instance when the judge can intervene and find that the State has not met its burden in proving the element. That moment is after the State rests, assuming the defendant moves for a directed verdict. So to the chorus of trial judges in this state who ask, “Now what?” I say, “Ask yourself at the close of evidence, when the defendant moves for a directed verdict: Could a juror armed with an accurate understanding of the meaning of ‘reasonable suspicion’ find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the officer in this case had reasonable suspicion to arrest or detain the defendant?”

In other words, I would encourage trial judges to take extra care when determining the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the “lawful detention” element, and to define the “rational juror” as someone with a basic understanding of the applicable law. This is not an ideal remedy, but it is the most workable option. Whether reasonable suspicion exists is a question that even lawyers who pass the bar exam fail to get right (and maybe some judges). A jury's answer to that same question therefore calls for a more exacting review than would, say, a jury's fact determination.

III. Conclusion

With these thoughts, I join the Court's opinion in full.

The facts that were known to the officer in this case are comparable to, but significantly less than, those known to the officer in Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 395, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014).

In Navarette, an anonymous 911 caller reported that a silver Ford F-150 pickup truck swerved and ran her off the road on Highway 1, at mile marker 88. Id. She reported the truck's exact license plate number and said the driver was headed southbound. Id. About twenty minutes later, an officer spotted a silver Ford F-150 pickup truck with the exact same license plate number headed southbound on Highway 1, near mile marker 69. Id. Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop based on these facts. Id. This was largely because the 911 caller personally observed the defendant commit a dangerous traffic violation. Id. at 403, 134 S.Ct. 1683.

The factual scenario presented in this case is distinct from the one in Navarette. There, the officer pulled over a truck that precisely matched the 911 caller's description, down to the color and license plate number. See id. at 395, 134 S.Ct. 1683. Here, the 911 caller specifically reported seeing a four-door Chevrolet Silverado pickup truck and Mr. Hernandez was driving a two-door pickup truck.³ In Navarette, the caller personally witnessed the driver commit a dangerous traffic violation. See id. Here, the 911 caller reported conduct that was not inherently suspicious, let alone illegal—she witnessed a pickup truck driving slowly on a dirt road around 10:15 p.m., in a partly-residential area. On the stand, Officer Garcia testified that it was common to see pickup trucks in the area, and that it is normal to drive slowly on dirt roads.⁴

Even if Officer Garcia could have reasonably believed that Mr. Hernandez's vehicle was the truck that the 911 caller described, the 911 caller did not witness any illegal activity. If Officer Garcia himself had witnessed Mr. Hernandez commit a single traffic infraction, the stop would have been valid. See Navarette, 572 U.S. 393, 412, 134 S.Ct. 1683 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Had the officers witnessed the petitioners violate a single traffic law, they would have had cause to stop the truck.”). But before activating his emergency lights, Officer Garcia did not witness Mr. Hernandez commit any traffic violation nor did he observe Mr. Hernandez deviate from normal driving behavior.

Accordingly, I join the Court's opinion. The record simply does not establish facts sufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion.

DISSENTING OPINION

The majority concludes no rational juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt the initial traffic stop of Appellant, Israel Garcia Hernandez, could be reasonable as a matter of fact within the meaning and sweep of the Fourth Amendment. I disagree. I would instead conclude we are obliged to give deference to a rational jury's factual findings ¹ and to uphold the trial court's judgment by implementing that verdict on any basis supported by the record. I believe that the evidence is more than sufficient to show that Deputy Garcia had reasonable suspicion for the initial traffic stop. Alternatively, I conclude a jury might have reasonably found the community caretaking doctrine applicable to the initial stop. Either conclusion would compel affirmance here.

BACKGROUND

In this case, a resident 911 caller described what she believed to be a Chevrolet Silverado driving slowly through Willacy County, a sparsely populated area of South Texas not far from the Texas-Mexico border. I take judicial notice that Willacy County covers almost 600 square miles and held a population of approximately 20,000 residents during the time the facts of this case played out.  ²

Half an hour later, Deputy Garcia arrived where the caller reported the vehicle. At trial, the prosecutor's closing argument noted that on evenings such as the date of the call, “there's only four units on patrol on any given night on a good night, sometimes only two.” See 3 RR 113. Upon arrival to the general location described by the caller, Deputy Garcia spotted Hernandez behind the wheel of a slow-moving truck sporting similar characteristics to the truck the caller described.³ He spotted no other vehicles on the road.

At this point in the fact pattern, I agree with Judge Parker that Deputy Garcia could have reasonably believed Hernandez was driving the same truck the caller described, as he testified at trial. Regardless, the fact that the jurors credited his testimony would be adequate and reasonable to support the trial's outcome, as jurors are entitled to rely on common knowledge of the proliferation of mid-size pickup trucks and the similarity among them. Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d 756, 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023).

In all events, given the truck's slow movement and isolated presence on a road in close proximity to the 911 call's report of a potentially suspicious pick-up truck, Deputy Garcia reasonably surmised—or a fact finder could readily so find—Hernandez's truck may have either (1) been engaged in criminal activity, including but not limited to, human smuggling common to the area, or (2) was experiencing a medical or other emergency resulting in its apparent slow motion.

After spotting Hernandez's vehicle, Deputy Garcia turned down the same road as Hernandez and activated the emergency lights. Hernandez drove on for what his brief tells us is a period of four minutes, paying no mind to the emergency lights. When Hernandez finally stopped at what later proved to be his brother's property, Deputy Garcia attempted to detain him. Hernandez refused to comply. When Hernandez's defiant behavior escalated into a physical altercation, Deputy Garcia then arrested Hernandez.

DISCUSSION

The majority ignores the escalation leading to the actual arrest, focusing instead on Deputy Garcia's initial decision to signal Hernandez to stop. While I agree the stop requires legal justification, Deputy Garcia did not originally seek to arrest Hernandez when he arrived and illuminated his lights, only to inquire into the apparent connection between Hernandez and the 911 call. Probable cause is not necessary for an officer to reasonably seek to inquire of whether criminal activity was afoot or whether a vehicle's slow movement signaled a need for medical or mechanical assistance. Deputy Garcia testified at trial the 911 caller only expressed concern over the lingering vehicle; he did not elaborate on whether the concern involved fears of something criminal or care for whether the vehicle's driver encountered a medical or mechanical problem. See 3 RR 55.

For purposes of a Terry stop when crime may be afoot, only a reasonable suspicion—amounting to a “ ‘less demanding’ standard” than the probable cause standard required for other types of police action—is required. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); see also Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 380, 140 S.Ct. 1183, 206 L.Ed.2d 412 (2020); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990). The existence of reasonable suspicion also ultimately depends “upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.” Id. at 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412.

Though Terry also explains “in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion,” we employ a “totality of the circumstances” analysis in deciding whether the facts of an individual case before the Court amount to “an objectively justifiable basis for the stop.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868; Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); see also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) (“Terms like ‘articulable reasons’ ․ are not self-defining; they fall short of providing clear guidance dispositive of the myriad factual situations that arise. But the essence of all that has been written is that the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture—must be taken into account.”). This test involves pointing to “specific, articulable facts ․ combined with rational inferences from those facts, [which] would lead [law enforcement] to reasonably conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity.” Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 668 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

Neither controlling statutes nor case law include the requirement an officer specify (or know the name of) the particular Penal Code section(s) he suspects an individual to have violated—only that the facts give rise to suspicion of some “criminal activity.” See Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 916. In Terry, for example, Officer McFadden observed two men repeatedly walking past stores in Cleveland and conversing with each other. Terry, 392 U.S. at 6, 88 S.Ct. 1868. He later testified their unusual movement over ten to twelve minutes drew his suspicion, and while he was “unable to say precisely what first draw his eye to them,” as he put it, “ ‘I get more purpose to watch them when I seen their movements.’ ” Id. at 5-6, 88 S.Ct. 1868. He did not know whether the men were “casing” the store for a subsequent burglary (a property crime) or a “stick up,” i.e., a robbery; still, he “considered it his duty as a police officer to investigate further.” Id. at 6, 88 S.Ct. 1868. The Warren court overwhelmingly (8-1) agreed and supported his decision not only to stop his suspect, as Deputy Garcia attempted here by turning on his lights, but to put hands on him for purposes of searching for a weapon.

The totality of the circumstances analysis does not emphasize the existence of any specific fact or fact category; instead, it considers the impact of all things known to and playing out before the officer, including his knowledge of the area and the cause for his presence there. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7–8, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). The fact that a neighbor in this sparsely populated area called to report suspicious lingering is significant in the case before us. The fact that the vehicle appeared to remain thirty minutes hardly detracts from that picture—if anything, it adds to the suspicion that prompted the call.

To the extent the law might require Deputy Garcia point to the specific articulable facts contributing to the reasonable suspicion required to pull Hernandez over, I would assert these facts, combined with his knowledge of smuggling in the area as per his trial testimony, suffice to initiate a brief stop.⁴ See 3 RR 31.

But whether, in the case at bar, Deputy Garcia suspected smuggling of people or drugs, what type of drugs might be suspected, and whether he was observing a “meet” or slowly studying the field next to an unusually slow-moving vehicle to uncover a “drop,” is not controlling. What matters to the case before us is that even without the underlying knowledge of smuggling contributing to his suspicion, a totality of the circumstances test is at play here, and particularly after what appeared to be more than thirty minutes of loitering on an isolated stretch of rural road arousing suspicion of local inhabitants, any reasonable officer would have shared Deputy Garcia's concern that some form of criminality might be afoot. Given Deputy Garcia's testimony regarding the presence of one sole vehicle on the road upon his arrival (which took approximately thirty minutes), a reasonable factfinder could have concluded these facts formulated the reasonable suspicion necessary to initiate a stop. See 3 RR 29-31.⁵ Long compels the Court to defer to all such factual determinations. Long, 535 S.W.3d at 519.

Additionally, an officer's reasonable suspicion is not negated in the case the activity giving rise to concern later turns out to be innocent.⁶ See Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 403, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014); see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (a reasonable suspicion “need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct”). Rather, the inquiry reflects the reality that, in addition to an officer's present observations, his knowledge of circumstance surrounding the events facing him and his past experiences in the field also matter. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273, 122 S.Ct. 744 (2002); see also Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418, 101 S.Ct. 690 (1981) (permitting officers to draw from “objective observations, information from police reports ․ and consideration of the modes or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers.”).

The Supreme Court's decisions in Terry and its progeny tell us not to parse those officers’ judgments with tweezers and microscopes so long as the stop lasts no longer than is reasonably necessary to ascertain whether the cause for reasonable suspicion is ill-founded.⁷ Therefore, in my view, the only question in the case before us is whether the jury (or trial court decision to embrace the jury's wisdom) could have found the facts sufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion. I frankly do not see that as a difficult question, once the facts are accounted for in light of the record and our obligation to yield to the reasonable inferences it supports at the moment Deputy Garcia made the decision to initiate what should have been a brief stop.

While the majority opinion properly includes Arvizu among its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on detention—including to explain how, in developing reasonable suspicion, officers may utilize their “own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available”⁸ —it abruptly veers from the basis of the holding towards a focus on the extent and specifics of a situation contributing to the totality of the circumstances.⁹ Whether it is jurors or courts called upon to second-guess officers’ observations, their review must account for the officers’ judgment in the moment. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273, 122 S.Ct. 744; Westerman v. State, No. PD-1314-05, 2006 WL 2694388, at *4 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 20, 2006) (Yeary, J., dissenting) (not designated for publication) (explaining appellate courts are not authorized to engage in “Monday morning quarterbacking”). Instead, it is important in this context and others that we assume a more modest posture accepting that “we are, at best, systemically secondary in an already slow and expensive process (and have a grossly unfair advantage of time over the trial courts) ․ [and that] we cannot function like an instant replay booth.” McPherson v. Rudman, No. 05-16-00719-CV, 2018 WL 3062447, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 21, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); see also Jaganathan v. State, 479 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (explaining “there is a difference between what an officer sees during an ongoing event and what we see when reviewing a video,” and applying this consideration to a fact pattern involving an officer's decision to pull a driver over.).

To adopt a rule requiring specific behavior or permitting only certain factors for consideration in the totality analysis essentially seeks to reanimate the corpse of the Ninth Circuit's ruling the Supreme Court disavowed in Arvizu, disarming police officers of their basic authority and providing criminals a recipe for evading detection. See Jennifer Pelic, United States v. Arvizu: Investigatory Stops and the Fourth Amendment, 93 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1033, 1052 (2002-2003). The intent of the “totality of the circumstances” test is to consider the individual facts of each case as a whole, not to examine each case before us to ferret out whether it contains specific circumstances adding up to reasonable suspicion.

In this case, a 911 caller familiar with the area requested an officer on site due to something amiss ¹⁰ on a rural road in South Texas where human trafficking was common.¹¹ Just as we are obliged to accept Deputy Garcia's knowledge of the area, he was at least entitled to rely on the 911 caller's familiarity with the neighborhood. Regardless of the 911 caller's knowledge, when Deputy Garcia arrived thirty minutes later, the same or a similar vehicle appeared to remain lurking in that same vicinity, driving very slowly as the patrol car approached.

The majority stresses how it took thirty minutes for Deputy Garcia to arrive and encounter Hernandez's truck. This is hardly surprising or helpful to its conclusion. First, Willacy County covers a wide swath of rural land, lacks a large population, and did not deploy a large number of law enforcement units on any given evening. Second, I strongly disagree with the majority's emphasis on the half hour it took Deputy Garcia to arrive on scene as an indication the reasonable suspicion was lacking. Rather, the fact that the same vehicle appeared to remain present in close proximity to the 911 call increased suspicion that its operator was possibly engaged in human smuggling or other illegal activity.

Dismissing Deputy Garcia's choice to make the initial traffic stop not only ignores the jury's evaluation of the witnesses, the trial court's judgment and the unanimous court of appeals decision, but it largely begs the question of the proper standard of review.¹²

The majority's decision also ignores that law enforcement officers, while often first on the line in fighting crime, additionally serve a community caretaking function requiring officers to act within a duty to protect the welfare of an individual or the community. See Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148, 153 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see also State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (noting general rule requiring appellate court to affirm on any lawful basis supported by the record). Police officers patrolling remote portions of our State do not travel with lawyers or judges and will often encounter unusual situations or dangerous circumstances requiring they exercise informed judgment about whether to engage at all. An officer may therefore, at times, find it appropriate to pull over a driver without suspicion of criminal activity,¹³ if, as here, the driver or a passenger appeared to potentially require medical or mechanical assistance. See Wright, 7 S.W.3d at 153.

While the majority stresses how Deputy Garcia testified he was unable to recall by name law enforcement's official “community caretaking function,” this Court has not created any rule requiring an officer be aware of terminology or delegation of duties in order to assist someone in need. See Byram v. State, 510 S.W.3d 918, 920-921 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); see also ABA Standards For Criminal Justice §§ 1-1.1,1-2.2 (1980).¹⁴ Deputy Garcia is not required to be a lawyer or to please judges with awareness of labels of doctrines. He is required to act reasonably in view of his function and in compliance with the constitutional command to the same effect.

In determining a proper stop pursuant to the community caretaking function, this Court considers (1) the nature and level of distress the detained individual expressed, (2) the detained individual's location, (3) whether the individual had access to assistance without the officer, including whether he was completely alone, and (4) to what extent the detained individual would present a danger to others or himself without the officer's involvement. Id. at 151-52. We explained in Corbin v. State, 85 S.W.3d 272, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002):

Because the purpose of the community caretaking exception is to allow an officer to “seize” and assist an individual whom he reasonably believes is in need of help, the first factor is entitled to the greatest weight ․ This is not to say that the weight of the first factor alone will always be dispositive ․ A particular level of exhibited distress may be seen as more or less serious depending on the presence or absence of the remaining three factors.

Id.

A vehicle traveling slowly may, but does not always, signal criminal activity. Slow speeds might also signal distress. For instance, as the Court described in Corbin, a police officer might reasonably exercise his community caretaking function upon encountering a driver traveling very slowly because he had two flat tires. See Corbin, 85 S.W.3d at 278 (citing Lebron v. State, 35 S.W.3d 774, 776-77 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. ref'd)).

In this case, Hernandez was the only vehicle in the vicinity, Hernandez was alone in his pick-up truck, and the truck appeared to be alone on the same isolated stretch of rural road for a period long enough to prompt a 911 call and a further thirty minutes to respond. Independent of any possibly criminal situation, the vehicle's continued presence and its slow speed might evidence need of further inquiry to determine whether some form of assistance was required. To be sure, Deputy Garica's effort to inquire was met with evasion that suggested defiance more than a stroke or a broken axle. While that evasion no longer suggested a need for assistance, it dramatically escalated the extant suspicion of criminality attributed to reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop as discussed above.

CONCLUSION

I believe the jury, considering all the evidence and reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom, could have rationally found beyond a reasonable doubt that Deputy Garcia had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. And, even if not, the jury could have reasonably inferred Deputy Garcia acted appropriately in accordance with the community caretaking function of law enforcement due to the lingering vehicle's slow speeds.¹⁵ Because the majority would not uphold either conclusion, I dissent.

I join Judge Parker's dissenting opinion. There is no dispute about the meaning of “reasonable suspicion” in this case. The jury charge accurately defined it for the jury: “ ‘Reasonable suspicion’ means facts known to the officer that would lead a reasonable law enforcement officer to reasonably suspect that a specific person has engaged in criminal activity, is engaging in criminal activity, or is about to engage in such activity.” Moreover, “[i]t is enough to satisfy ․ reasonable suspicion that the information [known to the officer] is sufficiently detailed and reliable—i.e., it supports more than an inarticulate hunch or intuition—to suggest that something of an apparently criminal nature is brewing.” Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 917 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

The court of appeals identified sufficiently detailed and reliable information to satisfy this standard:

Officer Garcia testified that although appellant was not driving a Chevy Silverado, he was driving a truck; his truck was the only vehicle in the very rural area; the truck was “in the vicinity that the caller had advised” and “in close proximity to” the mailbox of the 911 caller; the truck “was the only vehicle out there in the dirt road”; and there had been “a lot of incidences of human smuggling” in that area. The jury was allowed to consider Officer Garcia's experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to him that might well elude an untrained person such as his knowledge of the human trafficking in that area. * * * Officer Garcia may have relied on the 911 caller's use of the term “suspicious” and inferred that the caller suspected that the driver of the truck appeared to be engaged in criminal activity or would soon be engaged in criminal activity. See Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 917. Furthermore, the jury may have reasonably inferred that Officer Garcia properly determined that criminal activity was afoot based on appellant's proximity to the 911 caller's mailbox late at night after the 911 caller saw a suspicious truck driving slowly by his rural residence. See id. at 914. Officer Garcia was not required to articulate that a particular crime had occurred. See id. Instead, the State needed to merely provide evidence showing beyond a reasonable doubt that Officer Garcia had a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot. See id.1

Hernandez v. State, No. 13-24-00036-CR, 2025 WL 555779, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi, Feb. 20, 2025) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

In overturning the court of appeals’ judgment, the majority seems to parse out each fact and then to state that, alone, each fact would not support a jury's rational finding that the detention was lawful. See Majority Opinion at –––– (“Officer Garcia himself testified, driving a truck slowly on a dirt road at night is not on its own suggestive of criminal activity.”); id. at –––– – –––– (“Like in Arguellez, there was nothing ‘unusual, suspicious, or criminal’ about an individual driving slowly on a dirt road at night.”); id. at –––– – –––– (“To the extent that the State relies on Officer Garcia's personal knowledge that this particular area was known for human trafficking, that argument is not persuasive. If that were sufficient, any vehicle driving slowly in an area with known activity of human trafficking could be detained on suspicion that that vehicle was engaged in human trafficking.”); id. at –––– (“And the 9-1-1 call does not move the needle: all it describes is a ‘suspicious’ vehicle but provides no indication that human trafficking was at play.”).

Thus, the majority seems to highlight each inconsistent fact that might undercut the conclusion that the officer developed reasonable suspicion sufficient to detain Appellant. However, this is not consistent with our clearly defined standard of review for analyzing legal sufficiency of the evidence. See Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (courts reviewing legal sufficiency “must not engage in a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy but must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence”). The appropriate standard of review requires the consideration of all the evidence in light most favorable to the jury's verdict—not each piece of evidence evaluated individually and in a light most likely to undermine the jury's verdict. Id. at 732. The focus should be on what the evidence does show—cumulatively, not on the weaknesses of individual and isolated pieces of evidence or on what might be missing. Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (“ ‘appellate courts are not permitted to use a “divide and conquer” strategy for evaluating sufficiency of the evidence’ because that approach does not consider the cumulative force of all the evidence.”). The court of appeals conducted an appropriate analysis, and this Court should not second-guess it.

It is also arguable that the majority is mistaken to rely on Long v. State, 535 S.W.3d 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017), as authority for the proposition that our review of the jury's reasonable suspicion determination should be de novo. The Court in Long was endeavoring to construe statutory language, and to then assess whether, by a proper understanding of that statutory language, the evidence in that case was sufficient to allow the jury to draw the required conclusions about the defendant's guilt. Id. at 520. Of course, the proper construction of the statute at issue in Long was a pure question of law, subject to our de novo review. Here, in contrast, the definition of reasonable suspicion is undisputed; what is in dispute is simply whether the facts in their totality are sufficient to meet that definition. There is no statute that needs to be interpreted. Thus, this is not a purely legal question, as in Long, but a mixed question of law and fact.

In the context of a pretrial motion to suppress based upon a claim that reasonable suspicion to detain is lacking, such a mixed question of law and fact is subject to de novo review on appeal—at least once all questions of historical fact and credibility have been resolved in the light most favorable to the convicting court's ruling. E.g., Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 913. But the same is not necessarily true when reviewing courts examine the legal sufficiency of the evidence to show reasonable suspicion (and therefore a lawful detention) for purposes of a prosecution for evading arrest.

In the context of legal sufficiency of the evidence following a jury trial, this Court's prior decisions have recognized that reviewing courts must afford some degree of latitude to jurors in applying the law to the facts. See Vernon v. State, 841 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (“Words not specifically defined by the Legislature are to be understood as ordinary usage allows, and jurors may thus freely read statutory language to have any meaning which is acceptable in common parlance. Accordingly, when determining the sufficiency of evidence to support a jury verdict, reviewing courts must not employ definitions of relevant statutory words which are different or more restrictive than the jurors themselves were legally entitled to use.”).

Here, “reasonable suspicion” was defined for the jury in the jury charge using non-technical terms. It is arguable that we owe greater deference to a jury's assessment of “reasonable suspicion” in a legal sufficiency context than we would owe to a convicting court judge in the context of its ruling on a motion to suppress. The kind of de novo appellate review of a trial judge's assessment of “reasonable suspicion” (once it has resolved all issues of credibility and historical fact) appropriate in a pretrial motion to suppress context may be inappropriate in appellate review of a jury's determination whether “reasonable suspicion” existed in deciding the elemental question: whether a detention was “lawful” in an evading arrest prosecution. The Court may need to explain why it is not paying greater deference to the jury's “reasonable suspicion” determination in this case.

I agree with Judge Parker—and Presiding Judge Schenck—that the court of appeals judgment should be affirmed. And I am disappointed in the Court for what seems to me to be its usurpation of the appropriate authority of a jury of our state's citizens in determining the Appellant's guilt for evading detention. For these reasons, and for the other reasons I have set out in this opinion as well, I respectfully dissent.

DISSENTING OPINION

Although the court of appeals erred to consider events occurring after Officer Garcia activated his emergency lights, I would conclude that the information possessed by him before that time was sufficient to confer reasonable suspicion to stop. An officer found Appellant in an area in close proximity to the 911 caller's residence, in a vehicle that generally matched the caller's description, late at night on a work day in a sparsely populated county. The area had “a lot” of incidences of human smuggling at the time of the stop, and the 911 caller's description of the scene could have reasonably indicated an imminent trespass. An experienced patrol sergeant could find that all these circumstances combined suggested criminality. Consequently, I would hold that the evidence was sufficient to show the “lawful” detention element of the offense of evading detention.

I. Relevant Facts

Because the only contested issue in this case is whether Officer Garcia had reasonable suspicion to effectuate the stop, the only facts relevant to this inquiry are those up until Officer Garcia activated his emergency lights.

At 10:16 PM, on Tuesday March 17, 2020, Officer Garcia received a call from dispatch. A 911 caller reported a suspicious four-door Chevrolet Silverado driving at a slow rate in a rural area of Willacy County.¹ At the time of the call, Officer Garcia, a patrol sergeant of 12 years, was in Sebastian, Texas, about 10 to 12 miles from the 911 caller's residence. It took Officer Garcia about 30 minutes to reach the 911 caller's residence, and he did not see another vehicle for “maybe miles” before he arrived on scene. At 10:46 PM, Officer Garcia saw a four-door pickup truck,² though not a Chevrolet Silverado, near the caller's residence on a dirt road off the highway in front of the caller's house. The proximity of the dirt road to the caller's mailbox is evidenced by a sign directly in front of that road being visible from the caller's mailbox.³ The rear side of the caller's home was visible from the dirt road where Officer Garcia activated his emergency lights. Officer Garcia also testified that, “at the time, we had a lot of incidences of human smuggling. In that area, human smugglers would go out there and pick up illegal aliens and transport them up North.” Officer Garcia activated his emergency lights one minute after turning onto the dirt road.

II. Applicable Law

A. Standard of Review

“In determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a conviction, a reviewing court must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”⁴ When “considering a claim of evidentiary insufficiency, a reviewing court does not sit as the thirteenth juror and may not substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder by reevaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence.”⁵ Since Appellant was convicted of evading detention, “reasonable suspicion”—required for a lawful detention—was effectively an element of the crime. “[W]hen a lawful detention is an element of the crime, a failure of the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the detention was lawful must result in an acquittal of the defendant.”⁶

B. Reasonable Suspicion

An investigative detention must be justified by reasonable suspicion.⁷ In order to have a reasonable suspicion, an officer “must have specific, articulable facts that, combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him reasonably to conclude that the person detained is, had been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity.”⁸ The articulable facts must show “that some activity out of the ordinary is occurring or has occurred, some suggestion to connect the detainee to the unusual activity, and some indication that the unusual activity is related to crime.”⁹ This is an objective standard in which we must disregard the actual subjective intent of the officer and, instead, look to whether there was an objectively justifiable basis for the detention.¹⁰ To satisfy this standard, “the police officer must have some minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.”¹¹ When determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion, we must look to the totality of the circumstances. “[T]hose circumstances may all seem innocent enough in isolation, but if they combine to reasonably suggest the imminence of criminal conduct, an investigative detention is justified.”¹² When an officer or a witness has not witnessed a suspect actually do anything illegal, “[w]e recognize that there may be instances when a person's conduct viewed in a vacuum, appears purely innocent, yet when viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances, those actions give rise to reasonable suspicion.”¹³

Unlike probable cause, “it is not a sine qua non of reasonable suspicion that a detaining officer be able to pinpoint a particular penal infraction.”¹⁴ Absolute certainty from the officer is not required.¹⁵ “It is enough to satisfy the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion that the information is sufficiently detailed and reliable— i.e, it supports more than an inarticulate hunch or intuition—to suggest that something of an apparently criminal nature is brewing.”¹⁶ Due weight must also be given to the specific reasonable inferences that an officer is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.¹⁷

III. Analysis

At the time of the incident, Officer Garcia had been a patrol sergeant for 12 years with the Willacy County Sheriff's Office, overseeing the patrol division. The facts known to Officer Garcia at the time were as follows: (1) it was a Tuesday night in a sparsely populated rural area; (2) a 911 call came in at 10:16 PM describing a suspicious four-door Chevrolet Silverado; (3) in his 30 minute drive on the way to caller's residence, Officer Garcia did not see any other vehicles for maybe miles; (4) Officer Garcia saw one vehicle on a dirt road at 10:46 PM, which was a four-door pickup; and (5) this vehicle was close in proximity to the caller's residence.

The two issues that cut against a finding of reasonable suspicion are the 30 minutes it took for Officer Garcia to receive the call and arrive on scene and the fact that Appellant's pickup truck was not a Chevrolet Silverado as specifically described by the caller. Reasonable suspicion is not a high bar, but only requires more than “an inarticulate hunch or intuition” to suggest “something of an apparently criminal nature is brewing.”¹⁸

A. 30-Minute Delay

30 minutes is a long time for a suspicious vehicle to leave an area. However, a lone four-door pickup truck, very close to where the 911 call originated from, objectively suggests that Appellant's pickup truck was the same truck that the caller spoke of. Officer Garcia also explained that he did not see any other vehicles on the road for “maybe miles.” It would be a reasonable inference that because Officer Garcia did not see any other vehicles driving away from the scene, that this would increase the likelihood that Appellant's truck was the suspicious vehicle the 911 caller spoke of. The suspicion is amplified by the fact that it was 10:46 PM at the time Officer Garcia found Appellant, and it was in a sparsely populated rural area of Willacy County, a small county,¹⁹ on a Tuesday night. Vehicles out late at night on a weekend might not be suspicious, but one lone vehicle out late on a work night could contribute to finding of reasonable suspicion. Lastly, Appellant was on a dirt road, off of the county road, which indicates that he was not simply passing through the area.

B. Specific Description of the Suspicious Vehicle

Appellant and the majority opinion focus on the specific description of the suspicious four-door “Chevrolet Silverado.” When looking at the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict and reasonable inferences therefrom,²⁰ it is reasonable to think that a 911 caller looking out on a road from her house in such a rural area at 10:16 PM would identify the vehicle as a Chevrolet Silverado solely by its shape, and may be mistaken about the make and model. It was late at night in an extremely dark rural area.²¹ Likewise it is reasonable for Officer Garcia to not look for the exact make and model of the vehicle at this time of night but instead look for a shape that resembles a four-door pickup truck. Officer Garcia simply sought to make an investigative detention. “A brief investigative detention constitutes a significantly lesser intrusion upon the privacy and integrity of the person than a full-blown custodial arrest.”²² This is why an investigative detention merely requires reasonable suspicion, more than an inarticulate hunch,²³ rather than probable cause. Officer Garcia did pull over a four-door pickup truck, though not the exact make and model that was reported. Even though Officer Garcia did not find exactly what the caller suggested he would find, he did not take a shot in the dark nor was he acting on a mere hunch. He went exactly where the caller told him a suspicious truck drove slowly by her house and found a truck very close by after driving miles, not seeing any other vehicles on the road.²⁴

C. Officer Garcia's Personal Knowledge

The majority is understandably skeptical of Officer Garcia's reliance on his personal knowledge of human trafficking in the area. However, a reasonable suspicion inquiry must look to the totality of the circumstances. One of those circumstances, which was important to the United States Supreme Court in Terry, is the experience of the officer.²⁵ Here, Officer Garcia had held a position of authority with the Willacy County Sheriff's Office for 12 years, and he explained “at the time, we had a lot of incidences of human smuggling. In that area, human smugglers would go out there and pick up illegal aliens and transport them up North.” This is not an instance where any officer could pull anyone over because they happened to be in an area known to have some human trafficking activity. There was a 911 call, one vehicle in the area very close to the caller's residence, late at night, and a high-ranking experienced officer who knew of an issue peculiar to this area at this time. It was peculiar to this area that human smugglers would pick illegal aliens up and then transport them North. Objectively, this situation could have suggested a “pickup.” It would be reasonable for Officer Garcia to suspect that a smuggler was picking illegal aliens up at a rural home to transport them North.

D. Objective Basis for the Stop

Another explanation could be a possible trespass. Though this was never brought up, this is an objective inquiry.²⁶ The 911 caller explained on the call that the suspicious pickup truck was driving slowly, late at night, which is behavior that a reasonable officer could reasonably suspect to be the “casing” of the caller's home. This would make Appellant's appearance on the dirt road more suspicious to Officer Garcia. The dirt road was connected to the 911 caller's and her neighbors’ backyards by an empty field. Because this is an objective inquiry, we must not be swayed by Officer Garcia's subjective intent.²⁷ If the dirt road was private property, this could have been a trespass in progress. It also could have been suggestive of an imminent trespass because all the driver would have had to do is exit the truck and go across the field into the residents’ backyards. In isolation, Appellant's behavior was not criminal, but when viewed with the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable officer could have reasonably suspected that he had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime.²⁸

IV. Conclusion

Under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Garcia had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot.²⁹ Officer Garcia was an experienced officer who received a call late at night. He did not see any other vehicles on the road for miles until he saw Appellant on a dirt road very close to the caller's home. Appellant's vehicle matched the general description of a four-door pickup truck in an area that had “a lot of” incidences of human smuggling in that area “at that time.” The totality of the circumstances also could have objectively indicated an imminent trespass. Officer Garcia stopped Appellant after receiving a 911 call, at a time of night, on a day of the week, where less people would be driving around, in an area with very few residences. The jury could rationally find that the detention was lawful based on reasonable suspicion.

Because Officer Garcia was acting on more than a hunch when he effectuated Appellant's detention, and because a rational juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Officer Garcia had reasonable suspicion to detain Appellant, I must respectfully dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The unit that Officer Garcia was driving at this time only had interior emergency lights and did not have a dash camera.

2.   We have held that a pretrial motion to suppress is not the proper way to challenge an unlawful detention when lawful detention is an element that the State is required to prove. Woods v. State, 153 S.W.3d 413, 415 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

3.   We have also held that the Texas exclusionary rule is not appropriate in the context of evading arrest, because evidence of evading does not exist before the attempted arrest. An Article 38.23 instruction is appropriate to exclude illegally obtained evidence of a prior crime. Day v. State, 614 S.W.3d 121, 128–29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020).

4.   Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896).

5.   Hernandez v. State, No. 13-24-00036-CR, 2025 WL 555779, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Feb. 20, 2025).

6.   Id. at *1.

7.   348 S.W.3d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (finding reasonable suspicion existed where the appellant's conduct was “not overtly criminal in any way” but was “bizarre to say the least”).

8.   Hernandez, 2025 WL 555779, at *4.

9.   Id. at *3.

10.   Id. at *4.

11.   Id.

12.   Appellant's ground for review states: “Whether the 13th Court of Appeals's [sic] mischaracterization of evidence resulted in an erroneous decision which has ‘so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings ․ as to call for an exercise of the Court of Criminal Appeals’ power of supervision.’ ”

13.   Contrary to Presiding Judge Schenck's contention, the question of the proper standard of review is a “simple” one. Post at –––– n.–––– (Schenck, P.J., dissenting). In Guzman, we held that a reviewing court “should afford almost total deference to a trial court's determination of the historical facts that the record supports,” but we review de novo the application of the law to fact questions. 955 S.W.2d at 89 (emphasis added). When an element of an offense requires a legal determination, we apply the standard set out in Long that requires deference to the historical facts implicitly found by the jury, but no deference to their legal determinations. 535 S.W.3d at 519.Judge Yeary posits that “[i]t is also arguable that the majority is mistaken to rely on Long ․ as authority for the proposition that our review of the jury's reasonable suspicion determination should be de novo.” Post at –––– (Yeary, J., dissenting). This is so, in Judge Yeary's view, because Long was a statutory interpretation case—“a pure question of law, subject to our de novo review”—but “[h]ere, in contrast, the definition of reasonable suspicion is undisputed.” Id. Judge Yeary misrepresents our holding in Long. Certainly, the preliminary question in Long was one of statutory construction: “First, we consider whether the Article 18.20 definition of ‘oral communication’ incorporates the ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ standard.” 535 S.W.3d at 520. But that was not the end of the analysis in Long. Rather, we then turned to the legal determination of “whether the State actually proved that Coach Townsend's speech was ‘oral communication,’ ” in other words, “whether Coach Townsend harbored a subjective expectation of privacy that society is prepared to regard as objectively reasonable.” Id. That, we said, was subject to de novo review. Id. at 519. The same is true here: the legal determination of whether Officer Garcia had reasonable suspicion to effectuate a traffic stop is “subject to our de novo review.” Contra post at 5 (Yeary, J., dissenting).

14.   Hernandez, 2025 WL 555779, at *4–5.

15.   See infra at Appendix A. Appendix A is State's Exhibit 1 admitted at Appellant's trial. The 9-1-1 caller described a suspicious vehicle driving at a slow speed in a rural area of Willacy County, specifically near the area of FM 1420 and FM 498. FM 1420 is a road that runs north-south and is located at the bottom of Appendix A. The dirt road where Officer Garcia turned on his lights runs east-west and is located down the middle of Appendix A. As Officer Garcia testified, Appellant's vehicle was “already on the dirt road” when the traffic stop was initiated. See 3 RR 23. That testimony belies the court of appeals’ assertion that the vehicle was “in close proximity to the residence” of the 9-1-1 caller or “close to the mailbox belonging to the address given by the [9-1-1] caller.”

16.   Hernandez, 2025 WL 555779, at *8–9 (citing Washington v. State, 660 S.W.2d 533, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (determining whether probable cause to search or arrest existed)).

17.   Judge Parker also emphasizes Officer Garcia's testimony that he did not see another vehicle for maybe miles in the thirty minutes on the way to the caller's residence. Post at –––– – –––– (Parker, J., dissenting). Presiding Judge Schenck appears to also emphasize this point. Post at –––– (Schenck, P.J., dissenting) (“He spotted no other vehicles on the road.”); see also id. at –––– (“․ when Deputy Garcia arrived thirty minutes later, the same or a similar vehicle appeared to remain lurking in that same vicinity ․”) (original emphasis). Speculation, unlike a reasonable inference, is not sufficiently based on the evidence to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt. Tate v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). A rational jury could not reasonably infer that Appellant's vehicle was the same vehicle described by the 9-1-1 caller because the absence of vehicles on Officer Garcia's drive to the location of the 9-1-1 call does not provide specific, articulable facts about Appellant's particular vehicle. Moreover, Officer Garcia admitted at trial that thirty minutes was sufficient time for the vehicle in question to have left the scene. Presiding Judge Schenck also asserts that the “fact that the vehicle appeared to remain thirty minutes hardly detracts [from the reasonable suspicion analysis]—if anything, it adds to the suspicion that prompted the call.” Post at –––– (Schenck, P.J., dissenting). But this assertion lacks any foundation in the record. There is simply no record evidence that the vehicle that Officer Garcia saw “appeared to remain thirty minutes” at the scene of the 9-1-1 call.

18.   Judge Parker posits that “[a]nother explanation could be a possible trespass.” Post at –––– (Parker, J., dissenting). Judge Parker asserts that the 9-1-1 caller's description of the vehicle was “behavior that a reasonable officer could reasonably suspect to be the ‘casing’ of the caller's home.” Id. at ––––. Contrary to Judge Parker's argument, there are no specific, articulable facts to suggest that the 9-1-1 caller believed the “suspicious” Chevrolet Silverado was “casing” her home. Second, Officer Garcia never testified that he considered this theory. Nor did either of the parties or the court of appeals consider this theory. And third, as Officer Garcia testified, the dirt roads in this area lead to “ranchland and rural land” where people “go out there ․ for work” and “live.” This case may have been different if, for example, there was evidence of multiple passes by the 9-1-1 caller's home. See infra at –––– (citing Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 917). But without “specific, articulable facts,” there is no support for Judge Parker's assertion that the vehicle that Officer Garcia pulled over was about to or had been trespassing anywhere. See Wade, 422 S.W.3d at 668.

19.   Presiding Judge Schenck analogizes this case to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). Post at –––– n.–––– (Schenck, P.J., dissenting). But Presiding Judge Schenck's recitation of Cortez ignores important facts that were key to the Supreme Court's analysis. To start, the border patrol agents had found sets of human footprints, from 8 to 20 persons, walking in a well-defined path, in the desert, which ended at “an isolated point on Highway 86.” Cortez, 449 U.S. at 413, 101 S.Ct. 690. The footprints would follow Highway 86 until approximately highway milepost 122, where the tracks disappeared “at the road.” Id. This behavior, to the officers, amounted to a “particular pattern of operations.” Id. at 419, 101 S.Ct. 690. The officers also knew that the smuggling only occurred on clear weeknights, id., and the night in question was the only such night on the week in question, see id. The officers staked out a location approximately forty-five minutes from milepost 122 and tracked vehicles that passed them in one direction and, an hour-and-a-half later, returned in the opposite direction. Id. at 419–20, 101 S.Ct. 690. And, based on the number of footprints, only certain vehicles capable of transporting a large number of illegal immigrants could qualify. Id. at 420, 101 S.Ct. 690. It is no wonder than the Supreme Court concluded that reasonable suspicion was met in Cortez. See id. at 421, 101 S.Ct. 690. Put simply, the law enforcement officers in Cortez had a great deal more information about the car in question at their disposal than Officer Garcia had about Appellant's vehicle in this case.

20.   The facts of this case are likely weaker than those in Arguellez: (1) Officer Garcia did not stop the same vehicle that was specifically described in the 9-1-1 call; and (2) Officer Garcia arrived thirty minutes after the 9-1-1 call, rather than while the 9-1-1 caller was still on the phone with dispatch.

21.   Presiding Judge Schenck also argues that Appellant's detention might have been justified under the community caretaking function. Post at –––– (Schenck, P.J., dissenting) (citing Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). This is so because “[s]low speeds might also signal distress.” Id. at ––––. But this recrafts the entire State's case from whole cloth. We have previously held that “a police officer may not properly invoke his community caretaking function if he is primarily motivated by a non-community caretaking purpose.” Corbin v. State, 85 S.W.3d 272, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (citing Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148, 151 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999)). In his testimony at Appellant's trial, Officer Garcia expressly disclaimed community caretaking as a basis for the traffic stop and the State never argued community caretaking either at trial to the jury or to the court of appeals below. Consequently, community caretaking is not a valid basis for the traffic stop in light of the evidence admitted at Appellant's trial.

1.   In Holmes, the Court explained that a 38.23 instruction should sound something like this: “If the jury believes ‘X’ fact (e.g., that [the officer] did not reasonably believe that the defendant was holding a garden hoe) ․ then it should disregard any evidence (such as the crack pipe) obtained by [the officer] as a result of the defendant's arrest and search.” Holmes, 248 S.W.3d at 200.

2.   Even if it were appropriate to provide the jury with a 38.23-style instruction in this case, it is unclear what specific facts the judge could point to, as the facts which the State alleged gave rise to reasonable suspicion were uncontested (e.g., about 30 minutes passed between the 911 call and the stop, Mr. Hernandez was driving slowly, etc.). See Robinson v. State, 377 S.W.3d 712, 719 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“Where the issue ․ [is] only the proper application of the law to undisputed facts, that issue is properly left to the determination of the trial court.”).

3.   Officer Garcia was himself driving a department-issued four-door Chevrolet Silverado pickup truck.

4.   Driving slowly is arguably the only safe way to drive on a dirt road, particularly in the dark.

1.   See McPherson v. State, 677 S.W.3d 663, 664 (Tex. Crim App. 2023) (explaining misapplication of the standard of review involves reweighing evidence, rationalizing it by a hypothesized weaker case than the record presents, and overlooking dispositive distinctions in the case). While the majority cites to Long v. State, 535 S.W.3d 511, 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) urging that our review of the legal decision is de novo, there is no dispute here over the law as governs generally. Rather, as Long makes clear, we are, instead, obliged to defer to all rational determinations that jurors may have made in support of the verdict. Our review of the trial judge's decision to turn aside the request for directed verdict would then track the same pattern as a sufficiency question. See Williams v. State, 937 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)) (“We treat a point of error complaining about a trial court's failure to grant a motion for directed verdict as a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence.”).

2.   Census Bureau statistic compiled by USAFacts. See Our Changing Population: Willacy County, Texas, USAFacts, https://usafacts.org/data/topics/people-society/population-and-demographics/our-changing-population/state/texas/county/willacy-county/ [https://perma.cc/D6C4-L2R6] (last visited Nov. 20, 2025); see also Emerson v. State, 880 S.W.2d 759, 765 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (“[T]aking of judicial notice of a fact outside the record is part of the inherent power and function of every court, whether a trial or appellate tribunal.”), quoting G. Currie, Appellate Courts Use of Facts Outside of the Record by Resort to Judicial Notice and Independent Investigation, 1960 WIS. L. REV. 39.; Bell v. State, 63 S.W.3d 529, 531 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. ref'd) (taking judicial notice that it is 80.9 miles from Dallas to Sulphur Springs).

3.   When asked at trial to recall the make and model of the truck detained, Deputy Garcia equivocated, initially saying it was not a Silverado and later saying he couldn't recall. 3 RR 62.

4.   See United States v Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884-885, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975) (“Any number of factors may be taken into account in deciding whether there is reasonable suspicion to stop a car in the border area. Officers may consider the characteristics of the area in which they encounter a vehicle. Its proximity to the border, the usual patterns of traffic on the particular road, and previous experience with alien traffic are all relevant.”).

5.   At trial, the State questioned Deputy Garcia about what he observed upon arrival. When asked why, when he did not know for certain whether the truck on the scene was the exact truck the caller described, he still sought to initiate a stop, Deputy Garcia replied, “Because it was in the vicinity that the caller had advised our dispatch. And the caller had advised – had described it as a pickup truck. And that area, it's a rural area. There's no other vehicles out there. So when I saw that vehicle there, you know, I figured that was the vehicle.” 3 RR 29. When asked whether the fact the vehicle Deputy Garcia observed was not a Chevy Silverado affected his analysis of the situation, the deputy replied, “No, because it was – the caller described a pickup truck. When I arrived to the area, I observed a pickup truck ․”. 3 RR 30. When the State again asked Deputy Garcia why he sought to initiate a stop, he replied “Because we had gotten a report of a suspicious vehicle in that area. That was the only vehicle out there in the dirt road.” Id.

6.   Not unlike the case at hand, the United States Supreme Court has found reasonable suspicion present where Border Patrol agents who had uncovered evidence of human smuggling into the United States from Mexico encountered a vehicle driving past them with no outright obvious indication of illegal activity aboard, but with the capacity to transport groups of people. When the vehicle again drove by minutes later, the agents conducted a stop, later held to be reasonable, and discovered smuggled individuals inside. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981).

7.   Similarly, as discussed in more detail below, the law permits an officer to stop a motorist to determine if there is need for assistance.

8.   Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273, 122 S.Ct. 744.

9.   See Maj. Op. at –––– – ––––. The majority treats the earlier case of United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) similarly, forgetting the Cortez Court formally adopted the totality of the circumstances test, and not a “specific circumstances” test.

10.   Judge Finley takes issue with my phrasing here, though I am not sure how his misunderstanding of descriptive language translates to a mischaracterization of facts. “Amiss” means “out of place in given circumstances,” according to Webster's third definition of the adjective, and whittles the caller's description down to one word. See Amiss, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/amiss (last visited December 3, 2025). For present purposes it is akin to the observation that a majority opinion is engaged in “jiggery-pokery” or that its treatment of the record is “pure applesauce.” See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 506, 507, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 192 L.Ed.2d 483 (2015) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (employing the phrases).

11.   Such was the case in Arvizu, after all, where law enforcement's observation of a minivan on a rural road and its questionable driving decisions combined with knowledge of the road's use in drug trafficking, among other things, added up to reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. See supra.

12.   This is not a simple question. The issue was presented to the jury, which answered in the State's favor. Ordinarily, reversal would require more than a simple disagreement. See Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). Here, of course, the issue, though submitted to a jury, is a legal one, or at least a mixed question of fact and law. And even so, we would normally defer to the trial court's ultimate disposition by giving near total deference to it insofar as any factual issue presents itself. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Here, by resolving the issue in accordance with the jury's verdict, the trial court's decision is still, in my view, entitled to at least that level of deference. Our decision in Long is not to the contrary, though it does not attempt to untangle the relation between the factual and legal question driving the result. This question is in fact the same as the one that confronted the Supreme Court in Arvizu where Justice Scalia questioned how that Court's articulation of the standard requiring “due weight to inferences drawn from [the] facts by resident judges” squared with de novo review. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 278, 122 S.Ct. 744 (Scalia, J., concurring). Ultimately, as I, like Justice Scalia in Arvizu, find no basis for reversal under any standard, I need not explain my rejection of the findings below, whether of the jury or the judges.

13.   See Chilman v. State, 22 S.W.3d 50, 55 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd) (where a car was stopped at two o'clock in the morning in front of a barricaded entrance to a university); State v. Ross, 999 S.W.2d 468, 470 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999), aff'd, 32 S.W.3d 853 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (where an officer questioned the father of two children were sleeping in a truck parked out front of a bar on a cold evening); Sweeney v. State, 6 S.W.3d 670, 671 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd) (where a driver traveled down a rainy road at 40 miles per hour with a flat tire).

14.   To prove a stop proper pursuant to the community caretaking function, the Court considers “(1) whether the officer was primarily motivated by a community-caretaking purpose; and (2) whether the officer's belief that the individual needed help was reasonable.” Gonzales v. State, 369 S.W.3d 851, 854–55 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Because the Court is not tasked with making this determination in the case at bar, I will not undertake this analysis here.

15.   Had this Court hypothetically been asked to undertake a Fourth Amendment analysis on a trial court denial of a motion to suppress involving these same issues, I believe this Court would uphold that denial on the same basis.

1.   The majority claims that Appellant's proximity to the caller's mailbox or address should not be taken into consideration because there is no testimony to support the fact that “Appellant's truck was observed at any time by Garcia to be close to the caller's house or mailbox.” Majority Opinion at ––––. However, Officer Garcia was asked when he was on the witness stand: “when you arrived, what did you see?” He responded: “I observed a vehicle on a dirt road in close proximity to the residence.” RR Vol. 3, p. 21 (emphasis added). It seems to me that the majority just disagrees with Garcia's idea of what constitutes “close proximity.” And moreover, what constitutes “close proximity[,]” except in the most extreme circumstance, should be left as a question for the jury to resolve. The Court should not simply take that question from the jury and shout in its opinion deciding this case: “No, it wasn't close!” Also, Garcia later responded affirmatively to the question: “Based on that area, did you know whether it was likely that she [the caller] would have seen ․ a vehicle where Defendant's vehicle was seen?” Based on Garcia's affirmative response to this question, a jury could have reasonably inferred that Appellant was close to the caller's address, and hence, her mailbox when Garcia first saw him. And, only a few questions later, Garcia was asked “if 30 minutes later, a vehicle is still kind of driving in the area, how does that play into your analysis?” RR Vol. 3, p. 82. To which Garcia responded, saying: “by me observing a vehicle still in the area, in the same vicinity, as the caller had stated, that is reasonable suspicion for me to attempt to make contact with the occupants of the vehicle[.]” RR Vol. 3, p. 83-84. Thus, in contrast to the Court's chosen negative view of the evidence, it was indeed acceptable for the court of appeals to include Appellant's proximity to the caller's address and mailbox in its sufficiency analysis, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict.

1.   State's Exhibit 1 shows an aerial photograph of the area, and there are no more than four residences near where Officer Garcia first saw Appellant.

2.   Appellant's pickup truck can be seen briefly in Defense's Exhibit 1. It is a four-door, extended cab pickup truck with clamshell rear doors.

3.   State's Exhibit 7 shows a photograph taken from the front of the 911 caller's home, which is across the street from the caller's mailbox. The sign in front of the dirt road can be clearly seen from this location.

4.   Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Whatley v. State, 445 S.W.3d 159, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

5.   Edwards v. State, 666 S.W.3d 571, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023).

6.   Day v. State, 614 S.W.3d 121, 125 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020).

7.   Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

8.   Id.

9.   Meeks v. State, 653 S.W.2d 6, 12 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).

10.   Id.

11.   Foster v. State, 326 S.W.3d 609, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

12.   Meeks, 653 S.W.2d at 12.

13.   Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

14.   Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 916.

15.   Bobo v. State, 843 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).

16.   Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 917.

17.   Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

18.   Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 917.

19.   In 2019, Willacy County had a population of 21,358. PEPANNRES: Annual Estimates of the Resident Population, American Community Survey 10-year Estimates, U.S. Census Bureau (2019), https://www.census.gov/search-results.html?searchType=web&cssp=SERP&q=Willacy% 20County,% 20Texas (last visited 11/17/2025).

20.   Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781; Whatley, 445 S.W.3d at 166.

21.   State's Exhibit 9, Officer Garcia's bodycam footage, shows that it was extremely dark outside. The 911 caller was not in a position to know for sure what the make and model of the pickup truck was.

22.   Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 916.

23.   Id.

24.   While I agree with Judge McClure that this is an unusual case, he misstates several of the facts. Judge McClure says that the 911 caller was anonymous, that the 911 caller only saw the suspicious vehicle driving slowly on the dirt road, and that Appellant drove a 2-door pickup truck. The record reflects that the identity of the 911 caller was known to the police, the 911 caller told dispatch that she saw the suspicious vehicle driving slowly on the paved highway directly in front of her house, and that Appellant's vehicle was a 4-door pickup truck.Also, Judge McClure suggests that Officer Garcia or the 911 caller must see criminal activity before conferring reasonable suspicion. However, reasonable suspicion is present if the police had specific, articulable facts that cause an officer to reasonably conclude that the detainee “is, had been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity.” Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914.

25.   See Terry, 392 U.S. at 23, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (discussing that an officer with as much experience as the officer who effectuated the stop, would have done a poor job if he did not stop Terry).

26.   While the Court takes issue with the fact that Officer Garcia never testified that he considered this theory, I reiterate that the reasonable suspicion analysis is meant to determine “whether there was an objectively justifiable basis for the detention.” Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914 (emphasis added). Officer Garcia's subjective intent is irrelevant; a stop is valid if supported by an objective basis—such as a trespass.

27.   See Meeks, 653 S.W.2d at 12.

28.   See Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 916.

29.   See id.

Finley, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which Richardson, Newell, Keel, Walker, and McClure, JJ., joined.

McClure, J., filed a concurring opinion. Schenck, P.J., filed a dissenting opinion. Yeary, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Parker, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Yeary, J., joined.