EX PARTE THOMPSON v. << (2025)

ORDER

Applicant pleaded guilty and was convicted of delivery of a controlled substance less than one gram and sentenced to six months’ imprisonment in state jail. Applicant filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded it to this Court. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07.

Applicant contends that the State presented false evidence and that his plea was involuntary because he did not know of the bad acts of the officer who implicated him in this alleged offense. Ex parte Mathews, 638 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022); Ex parte Coty, 418 S.W.3d 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). However, Applicant has failed to show that the officer's false evidence was material to his 2008 guilty plea. Ex parte Barnaby, 475 S.W.3d 316, 325–326 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). Relief is denied.

CONCURRING OPINION

Applicant pled guilty to delivery of cocaine. The case against him was built on an offense report written solely by Gerald Goines, a disgraced former Houston police officer who is tainted by an inference of falsity. See Ex parte Mathews, 638 S.W.3d 685, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). The only remaining issue is materiality, and Applicant fails to show that he would have insisted on trial if he had known of Goines's dishonesty. See Ex parte Barnaby, 475 S.W.3d 316, 325-26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (per curiam) (establishing materiality standard in guilty-plea cases). Accordingly, I agree with the Court's decision to deny relief.

Applicant claims that he would have insisted on trial if he had known about Goines's dishonesty. He asserts that (1) he was in jail when he pled guilty, (2) waiting for trial would have subjected him to more time in jail, and (3) a trial might have yielded greater punishment than the six months in TDCJ that he was offered for his guilty plea. But these assertions conflate his guilty plea and his plea of true, and the record contradicts them.

The actual events were the following:

• September 24, 2008: Applicant signed paperwork waiving his right to a jury and accepting a plea agreement for deferred adjudication;

• September 29, 2008: the trial court deferred a finding of guilt and ordered community supervision conditioned on Applicant's remand to a custodial substance-abuse-treatment program;

• April 18, 2011: the trial court adjudicated Applicant guilty and assessed a sentence of six months in the state jail.

Contrary to his assertions, Applicant was not offered jail time for his guilty plea—he was offered and received deferred adjudication. And he was not in jail when he pled guilty, either. The judgment of guilt granted him credit for time served during periods that excluded his guilty plea.

Given these facts, would Applicant have insisted on trial? On the one hand, an accused man on bond is better positioned to insist on trial than one who is in jail, especially if, like Applicant, he has no prior felony convictions to enhance punishment. But on the other hand, an accused man on bond with no prior felony record might opt against the hassle of a lengthy pretrial supervision and the risk of a felony conviction.

So, Applicant's materiality claim is debatable, at best, and the rationale he cited in support of it is contradicted by the record. Accordingly, he has not met his burden, and I join the Court's decision to deny relief.

CONCURRING OPINION

This is another Gerald Goines case. Applicant pleaded guilty and was given three years deferred adjudication probation. He was later adjudicated guilty and sentenced to confinement in the state jail. Applicant claims that the State presented false evidence and that his plea was involuntary because he did not know of Officer Goines’ bad acts. The Court correctly denies Applicant habeas relief. I agree with Judge Keel's concurring opinion where she explains how Applicant fails to meet his burden to show materiality. I write separately to explain why the Court could simply sidestep the merits of Applicant's claims and instead dismiss Applicant's habeas application because Applicant cannot show confinement.

I. Factual Background

On June 1, 2008, Officer Gerald Goines was undercover in an unmarked vehicle in the area of Ella Boulevard and Northborough. Officer Goines—along with other members of the pharmaceutical unit of the narcotic division—was conducting investigations of street narcotic sales.

After driving into the parking lot of an apartment complex located at 14403 Ella Boulevard, Officer Goines was approached by a black male, later identified as Jermiya Jeffery. Officer Goines told Jeffery that he needed a “twenty”—a term for $20 worth of crack cocaine. Officer Goines gave Jeffery a twenty-dollar bill for the transaction. Jeffery walked to another black male, later identified as Applicant, in the parking lot, gave the suspect the $20 bill, and received a small rock-like substance in return. Jeffery then walked back to Officer Goines and gave Officer Goines the crack cocaine.

Officer Goines then left the parking lot and relayed the physical descriptions of both Applicant and Jeffery to other arresting officers. Both suspects were arrested after being positively identified by Officer Goines. Applicant was searched and the $20 bill used for the drug buy was found in Applicant's front left pants pocket. The arresting officers also found a tablet of ecstasy in Applicant's front right pants pocket. Both items were recovered by Sergeant Skeen, another member of the narcotics division.

On August 1, 2008, a grand jury indicted Applicant of the felony charge of delivery of a controlled substance, specifically cocaine “weighing by aggregate weight, including any adulterants and dilutants, less than [one] gram.” Applicant was also indicted of the second-degree felony charge of possession of less than one gram of a penalty group two substance.

On September 29, 2008, while represented by counsel, Applicant and the State entered into a plea bargain agreement in which Applicant pleaded guilty to delivery of cocaine of less than one gram. In exchange for Applicant's plea of guilty, the State recommended that Applicant be placed on three years deferred adjudication probation with a $300 fine. The trial court deferred adjudicating guilt and placed Applicant on deferred adjudication probation as recommended by the State. The possession of ecstasy charge was dismissed the same day.

Over a year later, on October 14, 2009, the State moved to adjudicate Applicant's guilt in the underlying delivery case based on multiple violations of the terms and conditions of his community supervision. Specifically, the State alleged the following violations:

1)  Applicant failed to report to his Community Supervision Officer for the months of July, August, and September 2009.

2)  Applicant failed to obtain suitable employment.

3)  Applicant failed to submit to random urine specimen analyses on twelve different occasions.

4)  Applicant failed to pay supervision fees.

5)  Applicant failed to pay the fine and court costs.

6)  Applicant failed to pay the laboratory processing fee.

7)  Applicant failed to pay an Offender Identification Card fee.

8)  Applicant failed to pay a Crime Stoppers fee.

9)  Applicant failed to pay an Assessment.

10) Applicant failed to participate in Substance Abuse Treatment Facility Specialized Caseload as directed by the trial court.

Applicant pleaded “true” to the State's motion to adjudicate guilt and was sentenced to six months’ confinement in the state jail.

In March of 2019, the Harris County District Attorney's Office sent a letter to Applicant, disclosing that Officer Goines had been relieved of duty and was under criminal investigation. In June 2024, five years after receiving that letter, Applicant filed this application for writ of habeas corpus.

Applicant alleges two grounds for post-conviction habeas relief: (1) he “was denied due process when the State used material[,] false evidence to induce his guilty plea”; and (2) his guilty plea was involuntary. First, Applicant alleges that Officer “Goines was the State's sole witness against [him, and] the State cannot rebut the inference that [Officer] Goines provided false information regarding the allegations in this case, either by providing other witnesses or supporting evidence.” Applicant contends that the offense report was material, thereby entitling him to relief. Second, Applicant alleges that Officer Goines's undisclosed pattern of falsifying evidence in official police reports and court documents rendered his plea involuntary because had he known of that conduct, he would have insisted on going to trial. Applicant's unsworn declaration asserts that he did not “commit this offense,” “possess any drugs on June 1, 2008,” or “give any drugs to Gerald Goines or anyone else.”

The habeas court adopted the State's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and recommended denying relief.

II. Collateral Consequences

Article 11.07 provides that “it shall be the duty of the convicting court to decide whether there are controverted, previously unresolved facts material to the legality of the applicant's confinement.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07, § 3(c) (emphasis added). “Confinement means confinement for any offense or any collateral consequence resulting from the conviction that is the basis of the instant habeas corpus.” Id.; see also Ex parte Harrington, 310 S.W.3d 452, 457 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). “Thus, a showing of a collateral consequence, without more, is now sufficient to establish ‘confinement’ so as to trigger application of [Article] 11.07.” Harrington, 310 S.W.3d at 457.

Applicant was convicted for the state-jail felony offense of delivery of less than one gram of cocaine. Applicant's only allegation of current confinement in his unsworn declaration is his claim that “[t]his conviction has also made it hard to find employment and housing.”

However, at the same time as he was convicted of possession of a controlled substance, Applicant was also convicted in the 339th Judicial District Court in Cause Number 127924901010 of the felony offense of Aggravated Robbery with a Deadly Weapon. Applicant was sentenced to ten years’ confinement in prison.

Applicant's unsworn declaration fails to explain why the state-jail felony drug conviction, as opposed to the felony aggravated robbery conviction, “made it hard to find employment and housing.” There is no evidence in the record, other than Applicant's unsworn declaration, to support his claim that the collateral consequences “result[ ] from the conviction that is the basis of the instant habeas corpus.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07, § 3(c).

As we observed in Harrington, while “the trial judge is the original factfinder in habeas corpus proceedings,” and we are the “ultimate factfinder ․ in most circumstances, we will defer to and accept a trial judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law when they are supported by the record.” 310 S.W.3d at 457 (citing and quoting Ex parte Reed, 271 S.W.3d 698, 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)). In the instant case, the habeas court found that Applicant failed to establish confinement. Consequently, this Court could defer to that finding as it is supported by the record and simply dismiss Applicant's habeas application without reaching its merits. See Ex parte Cooke, 471 S.W.3d 827, 832 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).

III. Conclusion

In sum, this Court correctly denies relief because Applicant fails to establish materiality. However, the Court does not need to reach the merits of Applicant's claims and could instead dismiss Applicant's habeas application because Applicant fails to establish confinement. His complained-of “collateral consequences” cannot be independently traced to Applicant's delivery conviction when he was simultaneously convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and sentenced to ten years’ confinement in prison. The habeas court found that Applicant failed to establish confinement and, alternatively, concluded that relief should be denied. The habeas court's findings are supported by the record, and the Court is correct to support them. With these thoughts, I join the Court's order denying relief.

Per curiam.

Keel, J., filed a concurring opinion in which Yeary and Parker, JJ., joined. Finley J., filed a concurring opinion in which Parker, J., joined.