COCKRELL v. STATE (2025)

Appellant was convicted of injury to a child by omission after his dogs attacked a young child. Tex. Penal Code § 22.04. But the court of appeals reversed that conviction—holding that the State failed to show that Appellant had a statutory duty to protect the child. The issue before this Court, now, is whether Section 822.042(a) of the Texas Health and Safety Code can serve as the source of a “statutory duty to act” for purposes of satisfying the elements of injury to a child by omission. Tex. Penal Code § 22.04; Tex. Health & Safety Code § 822.042(a). We conclude that Section 822.042(a) of the Texas Health and Safety Code can serve as the statutory duty for purposes of injury to a child by omission. We therefore reverse the judgement of the court of appeals.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

Appellant lived outside the city limits of Texarkana on some property he owned. He also owned numerous pit bulls that he kept on that same property. Curiously, while he lived in a make-shift tent on the property, his dogs resided inside a trailer that he also kept there.

The property was enclosed by a fence. But the fence was insufficient to contain the dogs. So, on several occasions in 2021 and 2022, the dogs escaped the property—attacking both people and animals alike.

After one instance, when the dogs attacked a neighbor's horse, a deputy from the Bowie County Sheriff's Office (BSCO) issued Appellant a written “DOGS DANGEROUS TO ANIMALS DOG OWNER'S NOTIFICATION.” The notice referenced Chapter 822 of the Texas Health and Safety Code. During this interaction, Appellant acknowledged that his dogs were dangerous.¹ This occurred on July 13, 2021.

Even after that incident, Appellant's dogs continued their attacks. Just one month later, in August of 2021, the dogs attacked a woman who had been driving a scooter past Appellant's property. That same day, they again attacked the neighbor's horse. Then, in May of 2022, they attacked a girl as she walked past Appellant's home—biting her and stripping her of her clothing.

A few weeks later, Appellant's dogs entered a different neighbor's yard and killed that neighbor's dog. In August of 2022, the dogs again entered that same neighbor's yard. This time, the neighbor contacted BCSO. When officers arrived, the dogs charged at the officers—forcing the officers to shoot at the dogs, which caused the dogs to retreat back to Appellant's property.

On September 5, 2022, the dogs attacked N.S., and that event served as the factual basis for the indictment in this case. N.S., who was just ten years old at the time of trial, had gone for a swim with his cousins and older sister at a nearby pond. While N.S. was walking home to his grandparents’ house, Appellant's dogs surrounded and attacked him. His sister attempted to fend off the dogs by beating them with a stick. Meanwhile, one of the cousins called his father for help.

The father arrived in his truck and helped N.S.’s sister to fend off the dogs before driving all of the children home. Ultimately, an ambulance arrived and transported N.S. to the hospital, where N.S. underwent surgery to repair injuries caused by Appellant's dogs. According to the surgeon, N.S. suffered “serious” injuries from multiple dog bites.

B. The Trial

Appellant was indicted for committing an offense defined by Section 22.04(a) of the Penal Code.² The indictment alleged that Appellant “intentionally or knowingly by omission, cause[d] serious bodily injury to [N.S.]” when he had a duty to act pursuant to Texas Health and Safety Code Section 822.042(a) and/or Section 822.042(b). The indictment also specified that Appellant failed to restrain or enclose his dangerous dogs. Following a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of injury to a child by omission, a first-degree felony, and sentenced to confinement for thirty-five years. See Tex. Penal Code § 12.32(a) (“An individual adjudged guilty of a felony of the first degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for life or for any term of not more than 99 years or less than 5 years.”).

C. The Appeal

Appellant argued on appeal “that the State neither alleged nor proved the statutory elements of the offense.”³ Cockrell v. State, No. 06-23-00230-CR, 2024 WL 3709879, at *1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Aug. 8, 2024) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The court of appeals agreed. Id. It explained that an omission, under Section 22.04(a) of the Penal Code, is an offense only if “(1) the actor has a legal or statutory duty to act; or (2) the actor has assumed care, custody, or control of a child.” Id. at *2 (emphasis added) (quoting Tex. Penal Code § 22.04(b)). It highlighted the State's concession that every court opinion addressing an injury to a child case so far has looked to the Texas Family Code to supply the “statutory duty[,]” and it suggested that importing a duty from a statute outside of the Family Code would allow such things as traffic violations to impose first-degree felony liability for injury to a child. Id. at *3.

The court of appeals also determined that the State's interpretation—that any outside statute could supply a duty—was unsupported by any court precedent. Id. Because Section 822.042 itself does not expressly (1) provide that omissions under that section are an offense or (2) contain a statutory duty specifically directed to the child, the court of appeals determined that Appellant had no statutory duty to act to protect N.S. Id. Accordingly, it decided that the State did not allege or prove the necessary elements to support the conviction. Id. It reversed the trial court's judgment and rendered a judgment of acquittal. Id.

In dissent, Justice Rambin argued that the plain language of Section 22.04(b)(1) does not limit what duties may be imported. Id. at *4 (Rambin, J., dissenting). He argued that, in the context of injury to a child by reckless act, liability has previously been upheld by a court of appeals even when an actor does not know the child. Id. at *5–6 (citing Durkovitz v. State, 771 S.W.2d 12, 13–14 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1989, no pet.)). He explained that he would modify the conviction to reckless injury to a child by omission, a second-degree felony—which carries a maximum sentence of twenty years—and remand the case to the trial court to re-assess punishment. Id. at *7.

The State sought discretionary review, but we granted review on our own motion to address the following question: “Can the duty of an owner of dangerous dogs to restrain or securely enclose them, Tex. Health & Safety Code § 822.042(a), be imported to serve as a statutory duty for purposes of injury to a child by omission?”⁴

II. Relevant Statutory Provisions

A. The Penal Offense at Issue

As relevant in this case, Section 22.04(a) of our Penal Code establishes that a person “commits an offense if he ․ intentionally [or] knowingly ․ by omission, causes to a child ․ serious bodily injury[.]” Tex. Penal Code § 22.04(a)(1) (emphasis added). An “omission” is elsewhere defined as a “failure to act.” Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(a)(34). Section 6.01(c) of the Penal Code further provides that “[a] person who omits to perform an act does not commit an offense unless a law as defined by Section 1.07 provides that the omission is an offense or otherwise provides that he has a duty to perform the act.” Tex. Penal Code § 6.01(c) (emphasis added). And Section 1.07 defines “law” in pertinent part as “a statute of this state[.]” Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(a)(30).

The statute at issue in this case—under which Appellant was prosecuted—explains in relevant part that an intentional or knowing “omission that causes [serious bodily injury] is conduct constituting an offense ․ if: (1) the actor has a legal or statutory duty to act[.]” Tex. Penal Code § 22.04(b) (emphasis added). As a result, the State was required to prove in this case, among other things, that Appellant had a legal or statutory duty to act. Tex. Penal Code § 22.04(b)(1). We have also described the offense at issue here as “a result-oriented offense.” Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Alvarado v. State, 704 S.W.2d 36, 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). This means that proving a violation of the statute requires evidence that the accused possessed a mental state that relates to “the result of that conduct[,]” rather than simply to the conduct itself (or in this case, the lack of conduct). Id. (emphasis added). In this context, the State's burden was to show that Appellant had a statutory duty to act, he failed to act, and in failing to act, he either: (1) intended serious bodily injury to be caused, or (2) knew serious bodily injury would be caused, but he still failed to act. See Tex. Penal Code § 22.04.

B. The Statutory Duty at Issue

Our Texas Health and Safety Code provides that, once an individual learns that he owns a dangerous dog, certain duties are imposed upon him. Section 822.042(a) specifically provides that:

Not later than the 30th day after a person learns that the person is the owner of a dangerous dog, the person shall: (1) register the dangerous dog with the animal control authority for the area in which the dog is kept; (2) restrain the dangerous dog at all times on a leash in the immediate control of a person or in a secure enclosure; (3) obtain liability insurance coverage or show financial responsibility in an amount of at least $100,000 to cover damages resulting from an attack by the dangerous dog causing bodily injury to a person and provide proof of the required liability insurance coverage or financial responsibility to the animal control authority for the area in which the dog is kept; and (4) comply with an applicable municipal or county regulation, requirement, or restriction on dangerous dogs.

Tex. Health & Safety Code § 822.042(a). Essentially, Subsection (a) requires a person who learns that he owns a dangerous dog to (1) register the dog; (2) restrain the dog on a leash or in a secure enclosure; (3) obtain liability insurance or show financial responsibility; and (4) comply with any local regulation, requirement, or restriction on dangerous dogs. Id. And Subsection (b) requires “[t]he owner of a dangerous dog who does not comply with Subsection (a) [to] deliver the dog to the animal control authority not later than the 30th day after the owner learns that the dog is a dangerous dog.” Tex. Health & Safety Code § 822.042(b) (emphasis added). But section 822.042 does not itself provide that an omission to perform one of these requirements is an offense. So, the question in this case has become whether Section 822.042 nevertheless supplies “a [legal or statutory] duty to perform the act.” Compare Tex. Penal Code § 6.01(c) (“duty to perform the act”), with Tex. Penal Code § 22.04(b)(1) (“legal or statutory duty to act”).

III. Statutory Construction

This case requires us to construe—determine the meaning of—several different statutes. Statutory construction involves deciding pure questions of law. Ramos v. State, 303 S.W.3d 302, 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). And so, we engage in statutory construction de novo—on a non-deferential basis. Id.

When construing statutes, we begin with the language of the statute itself. State v. Hardy, 963 S.W.2d 516, 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Generally, when “the plain language is clear and unambiguous, our analysis ends[.]” Long v. State, 535 S.W.3d 511, 520–21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). The Court has said that we will only depart from such a plain reading of the text when the plain language “leads to absurd results[.]” State v. Cuarenta, 707 S.W.3d 424, 427–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025). And absurd results, we have said, are those results “that the Legislature could not possibly have intended[.]” Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). But this exception has been described as a “narrow” one because we assume the Legislature does not act in absurd ways. Id.

Mere disagreement with a policy decision does not equate to an absurd result. Getts v. State, 155 S.W.3d 153, 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (quoting Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 542, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004)) (“It is beyond our province to rescue Congress from its drafting errors, and to provide for what we might think ․ is the preferred result.”). Indeed, we may not “construe [a] statute in a manner that substitutes what we believe is right or fair for what the [L]egislature has written.” Ex parte Kibler, 664 S.W.3d 220, 233 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). Simply put, we do not disturb policy decisions of the Legislature. Id.

IV. Analysis

A. A Statutory Duty

The Texas Code Construction Act provides that the word shall “imposes a duty.”⁵ Tex. Gov't Code § 311.016(2). It explains that, “unless the context in which the word or phrase appears necessarily requires a different construction or unless a different construction is expressly provided by statute[,]” shall should be construed to impose a duty. Tex. Gov't Code § 311.016. Indeed, this Court has also said that the word shall generally indicates a mandatory duty. In re Guerrero, 710 S.W.3d 798, 804 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025) (citing Luquis v. State, 72 S.W.3d 355, 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)).

As relevant here, Section 822.042(a) explicitly utilizes the word shall immediately preceding the list of requirements imposed on a person who learns they are the owner of a dangerous dog; no statute dictates a different construction; and the context in which the word appears does not require a different construction. Indeed, the title of Section 822.042 also reads: “Requirements for Owners of Dangerous Dogs.” Tex. Health & Safety Code § 822.042 (emphasis added). And a requirement is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as “[s]omething that must be done because of a law or rule; something legally imposed, called for, or demanded; an imperative command.” Requirement, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). It follows, then, that section 822.042 imposes a requirement, which is just another way of describing a duty to act. Moreover, nothing within the text requires that Section 822.042 not be read to impose a mandatory duty.

Appellant argues, contrary to what seems to be the general rule (i.e., that the word shall imposes a mandatory duty), that Subsection (a) of Section 822.042 (requiring an owner to, among other things, restrain a known dangerous dog by leash or enclosure) merely provides a conditional or alternative duty. To support his argument, he suggests that Subsection (b) of Section 822.042 permits the owner of a dangerous dog to simply deliver the dog to animal control rather than to comply with Subsection (a). In essence, Appellant argues that one could choose under the law either to comply with Subsection (a) or Subsection (b), but one need not comply with both. This, he contends, strips Subsection (a) of any true, mandatory duty to restrain.

But, contrary to Applicant's suggestion, Subsections (a) and (b) do not impose alternative duties. Tex. Health & Safety Code § 822.042. Subsection (a) utilizes mandatory language, indicating a mandatory—not an alternative—duty. Id. Subsection (b)’s requirement to deliver the dog to animal control does not in any way negate Subsection (a)’s requirement to, among other things, restrain one's dog. Id. Instead, it imposes an additional, mandatory requirement for an owner who “does not comply” with the duty imposed in Subsection (a). Id. (“The owner of a dangerous dog who does not comply with Subsection (a) shall ․”). In other words, Subsection (b) is the section that functions as a kind of conditional duty that is triggered by the failure to comply with the mandatory requirements set forth in Subsection (a).⁶ Id.

To clarify, Subsection (a) still imposes a mandatory duty. Compliance with Subsection (a) is not optional. Subsection (b) merely provides a fail-safe in the event that an owner of a dangerous dog fails to comply with Subsection (a).

Appellant argues that the State alleged in the indictment that he failed to restrain or enclose the dogs, but he contends the State did not allege that he failed to turn them over to animal control. In this argument, he points again to what he suggests is the conditional nature of Subsection (a)’s requirements. He contends that because of the conditional nature of Subsection (a), the State was required to allege in its indictment, and the Court was required to include in its jury charge, both of the requirements found in Subsections (a) and (b).⁷ But this is really an argument that concerns the adequacy of the pleadings and propriety of the charge—not whether Section 822.042(a) imposes mandatory duties.⁸

We conclude that Section 822.042(a) plainly imposes a mandatory duty to act.

B. Importing the Duty

Having confirmed that Section 822.042(a) imposes a mandatory duty to act, we must now decide whether that duty can be imported to the Penal Code to satisfy the statutory duty element contained in Section 22.04(b)(1). Section 6.01 of the Penal Code contemplates, at least with respect to omissions, that outside duties may be imported into Penal Code offenses. It plainly states that an omission constitutes an offense if a law provides a duty to perform an act. Tex. Penal Code § 6.01(c). According to the Penal Code, law includes a “statute of this state[.]” Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(a)(30). Because the Penal Code broadly defines law to include statutes of this state, it follows that Section 822.042(a)—a statute of this state—can supply a duty to act sufficient to satisfy the statutory duty element in Penal Code Section 22.04(b)(1). Cf. Chase v. State, 448 S.W.3d 6, 14–15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (allowing the importation of an extra-Penal-Code defense to a Penal Code offense).⁹

After all, the plain language of the statute at issue here does not impose a limitation. It simply requires that “the actor has a legal or statutory duty to act[.]” Tex. Penal Code 22.04(b)(1). And, in other contexts, this Court has previously suggested that it could look outside a penal statute to find a duty to act. State v. Guevara, 137 S.W.3d 55, 56–57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (citing Billingslea v. State, 780 S.W.2d 271, 273–75 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)) (“This duty to act could be contained within the same statute that proscribes the offense ․ Or the duty to act could be found in a different statute[.]”). As discussed above, the relevant provisions of Texas’ dangerous dog law impose a statutory duty to act, and 22.04(b)(1) does not plainly limit what statutory duties from outside the Penal Code can form the basis for liability under the statute. Accordingly, we conclude that the provisions of 822.042(a) can serve as the statutory duty to act for purposes of Section 22.04(b).¹⁰

C. No Absurdity

The court of appeals expressed concern that a plain interpretation of this statute might allow for the importation of duties embedded in, for example, the Texas Transportation Code, and it suggested that such an interpretation is unsupported by “caselaw.” Cockrell, 2024 WL 3709879, at *3. Thus, without explicitly saying so, the court of appeals implicitly hinted that an interpretation not previously adopted in a court opinion is absurd. But the absurdity doctrine, itself, only applies if the Legislature could not possibly have intended the result. Cuarenta, 707 S.W.3d at 427–28 (“If the language of the statute is plain, we follow that language unless it leads to absurd results that the Legislature could not have possibly intended.”). And we are not persuaded that the Legislature “could not possibly have intended” that individuals who cause serious bodily injury, even by omission, to vulnerable groups of people—like children—are subject to greater criminal liability. See Schlittler v. State, 488 S.W.3d 306, 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981)) (noting “a compelling governmental interest in the protection of children”). That decision is within the purview of the Legislature, and we are bound not to encroach upon its policy decisions.¹¹

D. Duty Need Not Be Owed to a Particular Person

Additionally, the court of appeals concluded, and Appellant now echoes, that the imported statutory duty must be to the child. But again, that is not how the statute reads.¹² Very easily, the Legislature could have written that “the actor has a legal or statutory duty to act [to/for the child.]” Indeed, it explicitly references “a child” in Penal Code Section 22.04(b)(2)—showing that it knows how to add clarifying language regarding a particular child. Tex. Penal Code § 22.04(b)(2); see Cadena Comercial USA Corp. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 518 S.W.3d 318, 329 (Tex. 2017) (citing R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water, 336 S.W.3d 619, 628 (Tex. 2011)) (“When the Legislature uses a word or phrase in one part of a statute but excludes it from another, the term should not be implied where it has been excluded.”). So, its decision not to utilize that language in Section 22.04(b)(1) of the same law should be construed as purposeful. For us to unilaterally add it amounts to an act of judicial amendment of the statute to suit our own policy concerns. We cannot do that. Instead, “if [the Legislature] enacted into law something different from what it intended, it should amend the statute to conform [it] to its [true] intent.”¹³ Cuarenta, 707 S.W.3d at 428 (citing Getts, 155 S.W.3d at 158).

Also, the cases the court of appeals relied on to suggest that the duty must be to the child are distinguishable.¹⁴ For instance, the court of appeals discussed Billingslea v. State for the proposition that the statutory duty must be to a particular individual. Cockrell, 2024 WL 3709879, at *1 (citing Billingslea, 780 S.W.2d at 276). But Billingslea analyzed a pre-amendment version of Section 22.04 that is strikingly different from the version that exists today. Billingslea, 780 S.W.2d at 271–72. There, the Appellant was charged with injury to an elderly person by omission under Section 22.04, but the State did not allege a statutory duty to act. Id. at 271. At one point, the Court suggested that there must be a statutory duty “to care for an elderly person.” Id. at 276. However, even assuming that were true, it is not controlling given that the Court decided the case pursuant to the pre-amendment version of the statute. Id. at 271–72.

At the time that Billingslea was decided, Section 22.04 did not address what sort of omission would count as conduct constituting an offense, as it does today. Id. at 271–72. So, the Court was not addressing statutory language—like that present in the statute applicable here—that explicitly provides that an omission is an offense if “the actor has a legal or statutory duty to act[.]”¹⁵ Tex. Penal Code § 22.04(b)(1). As a result, an application of Billingslea’s supposed requirement that the duty must go to a particular individual is questionable at best—it stems from the pre-amendment version of the statute.

Furthermore, in Guevara, this Court suggested that Billingslea does not require that the duty be owed to any particular individual. See State v. Guevara, 137 S.W.3d at 56–57. The Court explained there that “[w]e concluded that we would have to look outside the ‘injury to a child or elderly individual’ statute to find a duty to act.” Id. at 57 (citing Billingslea, 780 S.W.2d at 274). Indeed, the State failed to establish the omission offense in Billingslea precisely “because it could not show that the defendant had a duty to act.” Id. (citing Billingslea, 780 S.W.2d at 276). So, contrary to the court of appeals decision, Guevara did not read Billingslea to require a duty to a particular person or child—it simply read it to require a duty to act, period.

As recently as 2022, this Court described Billingslea in precisely that way. See Cyr v. State, 665 S.W.3d 551, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (quoting Billingslea, 780 S.W.2d at 274) (“[A]n omission is punished only when there is ‘a corresponding duty to act.’ ”). Properly read, Billingslea simply highlights that, “in order for there to be an omission [that will satisfy Section 22.04(b)(1)], there must be a corresponding duty to act.” Billingslea, 780 S.W.2d at 274. And current Section 22.04(b)(1), which existed when Billingslea was decided, but was not addressed there, does not dictate that the duty to act must be owed to any particular person.

V. Conclusion

The Court concludes that Section 822.042(a) of the Health and Safety Code constitutes a “statutory duty to act” for purposes of Section 22.04(b)(1) of the Penal Code. The case is remanded to the court of appeals to reconduct its sufficiency of the evidence analysis and, if necessary, to address any other points of error raised on appeal.

OPINION

I agree with the majority's faithful application of the statutes’ plain language as enacted by the Legislature. It is accurate that no provision expressly prohibits importing a mandatory statutory duty from the Health and Safety Code into the Penal Code.

I write separately to underscore a broader concern – one that Justice Gorsuch has addressed – regarding the need for legislative clarity to ensure that criminal liability does not arise unexpectedly or unfairly. See generally Neil M. Gorsuch, Over Ruled: The Human Toll of Too Much Law (2024).

The court below rightly noted the troubling consequences that can arise from importing duties into the criminal code without clear notice that a particular action or inaction could lead to prosecution. Given the hundreds of offenses in the Texas Penal Code and the thousands of duties embedded throughout other statutory codes, the potential combinations are nearly infinite. While ignorance of the law is no defense, the sheer volume and complexity of modern statutory schemes risk creating a minefield for the unwary, the unpopular, the unfortunate, or the politically disfavored. As has been cynically observed: “Show me the man and I'll show you the crime,” or “This was terrible, we must do something! This is something; therefore, we must do it.”

Although the Rule of Lenity, which directs courts to construe ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of the accused, is not directly at issue here, the sentiment underpinning the rule remains instructive. Criminal laws should be written with precision, so both the courts and the public clearly understand what conduct is criminalized. Otherwise, as James Madison warned in Federalist 62:

“It will be of little avail to the people that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are promulged, or undergo such incessant changes that no man who knows what the law is to day can guess what it will be to morrow [sic]. Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is little known and less fixed?”

I hope this case serves not only as an affirmation that plain and unambiguous statutory language will be honored by this Court, but also as a prompt to the Legislature to state clearly and specifically the conduct it intends to punish. With these thoughts in mind, I join in the Court's judgment.

DISSENTING OPINION

As the State Prosecuting Attorney herself posits, the State's interpretation is a “novel extension” of the Injury to a Child statute. See State's Pet. for Discretionary Review at 2. I decline to endorse such an interpretation. Our discussion of statutory duties in Billingslea v. State ¹ and its progeny resolves this case. I would interpret “legal or statutory duty to act” in Section 22.04(b)(1) as a duty that is specific to the victim, rather than a duty to the general public. Because the Court does not, I respectfully dissent.

I. Analysis

a. The evolution of Texas's injury to a child by omission statute.

To understand the proper scope of Section 22.04, it is appropriate to return to the statute's inception. As first enacted, Section 22.04 provided:

A person commits an offense if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence engages in conduct that causes serious bodily injury, serious physical or mental deficiency or impairment, or deformity to a child who is 14 years of age or younger.

Tex. Penal Code § 22.04 (West 1974).

In Ronk v. State, this Court confronted a “fundamentally defective indictment” that alleged injury to a child by omission under Section 22.04. 544 S.W.2d 123, 124 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). The State alleged that the Ronkses “caused serious bodily injury” to a child less than fifteen years old, when they “failed and refused to secure proper medical treatment for the [complainant] after the [complainant] received burns to his body which required medical treatment.” Id. We first turned to Section 22.04 and then looked at Section 6.01 of the Penal Code, the “General Principles of Criminal Responsibility.” Id. Section 6.01(c) provided, “A person who omits to perform an act does not commit an offense unless a statute provides that the omission is an offense or otherwise provides that he has a duty to perform the act.” Id. (quoting Tex. Penal Code § 6.01(c) (West 1974)). We reasoned that an offense involving the failure to provide medical care for a child requires, as an essential element of the offense, that the defendant to have a duty to provide the care. Id. at 125. Under then-Section 12.04 of the Family Code, only the child's parents had that duty. Id. Because the indictments failed to allege a relationship between the Ronkses and the complainant that statutorily imposed a duty upon them to secure medical treatment for the complainant, the indictments did not allege an offense. Id. The indictments could not support the Ronkses’ convictions, so we reversed and ordered the prosecutions to be dismissed. Id.

In 1977, the Legislature amended Section 22.04. See Acts 1977, 65th Leg., p. 2067, ch. 819, § 1, eff. Aug. 29, 1977. The statute now read:

(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence, by act or omission, engages in conduct that causes to a child who is 14 years of age or younger:

(1) serious bodily injury;

(2) serious physical or mental deficiency or impairment; or

(3) disfigurement or deformity.

Tex. Penal Code § 22.04 (West 1977) (amendments emphasized). The act or omission amendment expanded the offense's scope and provided that injury to a child could be committed by either an act or an omission.

Two years later, the Legislature amended the statute again. See Acts 1979, 66th Leg., p. 365, ch. 162, § 1, eff. Aug. 27, 1979. The Legislature was concerned that “[i]n many child abuse cases where a parent beats a child, the offense does not qualify as serious bodily injury.” House Comm. on Crim. Jur., Bill Analysis, S.B. 394, 66th Leg., R.S. (1979). To “protect children from abuse by their parents or other individuals,” id., the Legislature amended Section 22.04 to criminalize acts or omissions that cause “bodily injury,” see Tex. Penal Code § 22.04 (West 1979). The statute now read:

(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence, by act or omission, engages in conduct that causes to a child who is 14 years of age or younger:

(1) serious bodily injury;

(2) serious physical or mental deficiency or impairment;

(3) disfigurement or deformity; or

(4) bodily injury.

Id. (amendments emphasized).

In 1981, the Legislature once more amended the statute and made two changes. The first change modified the offense levels for certain mental states (e.g., intentional or knowing injury to a child was increased from a felony in the second degree to a felony in the first degree). See Acts 1981, 67th Leg., p. 472, ch. 202, § 4, eff. Sept. 1, 1981. The second change, however, was substantive: the Legislature added a new class of protected individuals. See Acts 1981, 67th Leg., p. 2397, ch. 604, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1981. Recognizing that “elderly people often cannot defend themselves against attack,” and that “[t]he criminal justice system should be able to discourage [crimes against elderly persons] by imposing a heavier punishment for [them],” the Legislature decided that persons sixty-five years of age or older “deserve[d] the same protection” as children. House Comm. on Crim. Jur., Bill Analysis, H.B. 1459, 67th Leg., R.S. (1981). Consequently, Section 22.04 now read:

(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence, by act or omission, engages in conduct that causes to a child who is 14 years of age or younger or to an individual who is 65 years of age or older:

(1) serious bodily injury;

(2) serious physical or mental deficiency or impairment;

(3) disfigurement or deformity; or

(4) bodily injury.

Tex. Penal Code § 22.04 (West 1981) (amendments emphasized).

This leads us to this Court's opinion in Billingslea, which exposed a flaw in the 1981 version of Section 22.04. There, the appellant was convicted of injury to his ninety-four-year-old mother. Billingslea, 780 S.W.2d at 271–72. The appellant and his family lived with his mother in her home. Id. at 272. Adult Protective Services was called to perform a wellness check on his mother and found her “lying in bed, moaning and asking for help.” Id. A part of her heel, hip, and back were eaten away by bedsores. Id. A medical examination at a hospital revealed that she was severely cachetic,² was suffering from near total disorientation, and had second degree burns and blisters “on her inner thighs, caused by lying in pools of her own urine.” Id. at 272–73. “Maggots were festering in her open bedsores.” Id. at 273. She later died. Id.

While alleging horrific conduct, the indictment in Billingslea, as in Ronk, was fundamentally defective because it did not allege a complete offense. Id. at 275–76. This Court recognized that there was no statutory duty of care for an adult child to their elderly parent. Id. at 276. To reach this conclusion, we made several observations. Regarding the aforementioned Section 6.01(c) of the Penal Code, for an omission to be penalized, “(1) a statute must provide that an omission is an offense, or (2) a statute otherwise prescribes a duty to act, and a subsequent failure to act pursuant to that duty is an offense.” Id. at 274. Even though Section 6.01(c) is stated disjunctively, we observed that “only the second clause is substantive.” Id. “Logic dictates that in order for there to be an omission, there must be a corresponding duty to act.” Id. The practice commentary and our prior case law confirmed that a statutory duty must exist between the defendant and the complainant to criminalize the omission. See id. at 274–75; see also id. at 274 (“[A] niece's failure to feed her invalid aunt, who starves to death as a result, is not guilty of criminal homicide because the niece has no statutory duty of support.” (quoting the Practice Commentary to Section 6.01(c)); Smith v. State, 603 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980) (concluding that the allegation “by then and there denying the said [complainant] of food and nourishment and adequate medical attention” alleged omissions and that the “omissions” portion of the indictment was defective because it failed to allege a statutory duty to act under the Family Code); Lang v. State, 586 S.W.2d 532, 533–34 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979) (holding that an indictment was fundamentally defective for failing to state that the victim was a child 14 years of age or younger because the duty under Section 4.02 of the Family Code was limited to children 14 years old or younger). Because the appellant lacked a statutory duty of care for his elderly mother, he lacked a legal duty to act, which rendered the indictment fundamentally defective. Billingslea, 780 S.W.2d at 276.

The statutory defect illuminated in Billingslea was short-lived due to the Legislature's 1989 amendments to Section 22.04. While the amended statute did not apply in Billingslea (the appellant's offense was committed in 1984), the Legislature amended Section 22.04 to cover factual scenarios like the one presented in Billingslea. See Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 357, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1989. Section 22.04 now read:

(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence, by act or intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly by omission, engages in conduct that causes to a child, elderly individual, or invalid individual:

(1) serious bodily injury;

(2) serious physical or mental deficiency or impairment;

(3) disfigurement or deformity; or

(4) bodily injury.

(b) An omission that causes a condition described by Subsections (a)(1) through (a)(4) of this section is conduct constituting an offense under this section if:

(1) the actor has a legal or statutory duty to act; or

(2) the actor has assumed care, custody, or control of a child, elderly individual, or invalid individual.

* * *

(d) The actor has assumed care, custody, or control if he has by act, words, or course of conduct acted so as to cause a reasonable person to conclude that he has accepted responsibility for protection, food, shelter, and medical care for a child, elderly individual, or invalid individual.

Tex. Penal Code § 22.04 (West 1989) (amendments emphasized).³ As we said in Billingslea, “the amendments to § 22.04 clearly suggest that the Legislature perceived the paradoxical futility of applying the former law: there could never be a failure to perform that which no one had a statutory duty to perform in the first place.” 780 S.W.2d at 276–77. For the appellant in Billingslea, had his conduct occurred after the 1989 amendments, his conduct would have been prosecutable under Section 22.04(b)(2) because he had “care, custody, and control” over his elderly mother.⁴

But the 1989 amendments were not the last legislative amendments to Section 22.04. In 1991, the Legislature deleted the phrase “engages in conduct that” in subsection (a). See Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch. 497, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1991; Tex. Penal Code § 22.04(a) (West 1991). And in 1993, the Legislature established a new felony category, the state-jail felony, and reclassified Section 22.04 offenses accordingly. See Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994 (e.g., reclassifying recklessly causing bodily injury to a child to a state-jail felony offense level).

Then in 2005, the Legislature made its first substantive change to Section 22.04 since the 1989 amendments. See Acts 2005, 79th Leg., ch. 268, § 1.125(a), eff. Sept. 1, 2005. The amendment added criminal liability for owners, operators, or employees of care facilities who, by omission, caused injury to protected individuals:

(a-1) A person commits an offense if the person is an owner, operator, or employee of a group home, nursing facility, assisted living facility, intermediate care facility for persons with mental retardation, or other institutional care facility and the person intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence by omission causes to a child, elderly individual, or disabled individual who is a resident of that group home or facility:

(1) serious bodily injury;

(2) serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury;

(3) bodily injury; or

(4) exploitation.

Tex. Penal Code § 22.04(a-1) (West 2005). Subsection (b), which defines when an omission is “conduct constituting an offense” under Section 22.04, was also amended to include the new (a-1) language. See id. § 22.04(b) (West 2005). “Exploitation” was removed from subsection (a-1) six years later in 2011. See Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., ch. 620 (S.B. 688), §§ 5, 11, eff. Sept. 1, 2011.

In 2015, the Legislature amended Section 22.04 to redefine “disabled individual” to include intellectual and development disabilities (and other disabilities), as well as amending the statute to create an affirmative defense if the actor did not know or could not have reasonably known the complainant was a disabled individual. See Acts 2015, 84th Leg., ch. 719 (H.B. 1286), §§ 1, 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2015. In 2017, the Legislature amended subsection (a-1) to include “boarding home” facilities and added a new definition to “disabled individual” under subsection (c)(3). See Acts 2017, 85th Leg., ch. 361 (H.B. 3019), §§ 1, 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2017. And in 2021, the Legislature amended subsection (d), which describes how an actor assumes care, custody, or control over a child, elderly individual, or disabled individual. See Acts 2021, 87th Leg., ch. 187 (S.B. 1354), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2021.

The preceding foray into the almost-fifty-year-long legislative history of Section 22.04 serves an important purpose: Absent from this historical review is any mention of duties that are not familial- or care-oriented. The duties which Section 22.04 imports are restricted to those between an actor (the defendant) and an identifiable, specific individual or class of individuals. All of the legislative amendments to Section 22.04 since its codification in 1974 have all criminalized offenses committed by family members or persons having care over others. The Legislature spelled out the purpose behind the 1989 amendments: “Non-parental situations in which a person's negligent care led to the harm of another are not circumscribed by law and do not come within the purview of Section 22.04.” See S. Comm. on Crim. Just., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 1154, 71st Leg., R.S. (1989). The Legislature solved that issue by adding the “care, custody, and control” language. Section 22.04’s injury by omission covers the factual scenarios such as when the parent causes injury to the child, or the child to the elderly parent, or the nurse to the patient, or the caregiver to the caretaker.

Our post-1989 case law confirms this interpretation of Section 22.04. In Hawkins v. State, we granted discretionary review to determine whether the “appellant had no legal duty to remove the infant victim from the abusive parent where appellant had no ‘familial relationship’ with the infant, but had exercised care, custody and control over the infant.” 891 S.W.2d 257, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). The appellant was the live-in boyfriend of the infant victim's biological mother, and on several occasions, the child's mother beat the infant in the presence of the appellant. Id. The appellant stood by and did nothing to stop the abuse. See id. Eventually, the mother “swung her infant by its feet and struck its head against the arm of a couch causing permanent brain damage.” Id. The State alleged that the appellant caused injury to the child complainant “by failing to remove the child from the abusive mother and that he had a duty to remove the child because he had assumed care, custody, and control of the child under Section 22.04(b)(2).” Id. We clarified the difference between Section 22.04(b)(1) and Section 22.04(b)(2). Id. at 258–59. “Section 22.04(b)(1) imposes a duty to act if the actor has a legal or statutory duty to prevent the injury to the child.” Id. at 258. That is, the duty extends to the specific child who is injured. See id. An example of this type of duty “is the case where the actor has a ‘familial relationship’ with the child.” Id. Based on this, we held that subsection (b)(2) did not require a “familial relationship” to show a legal duty to act. Id. at 259 (“We hold the plain meaning of Section 22.04(b)(2) does not require that the actor possess a duty under the Texas Family Code to protect the child victim.” (citing Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991))).

As shown above, our long-standing interpretation of Section 22.04’s omission based criminal liability has required some type of duty directly owed by the actor to the complainant. Billingslea, 780 S.W.2d at 276 (“[T]he indictment could not have alleged a statutory duty for the appellant to act on behalf of his ailing parent because no such duty existed.”); cf. State v. Guevara, 137 S.W.3d 55, 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (noting that the pre-1989 version of Section 22.04 “did not itself assign a duty of care to any particular person”).

b. What it means.

The flaw in the Court's logic is that it overlooks the interplay between subsection (b)(1) and subsection (b)(2). The legal or statutory duty to act covered by Section 22.04(b)(1) is not limitless. It does not cover an unidentifiable, unknown individual. Rather, it is limited to those whom the actor owes a direct, specific legal or statutory duty. Subsection (b)(2) provides a safety net for situations in which the actor did not owe a duty to the individual but nevertheless “assumed care, custody, or control of a child, elderly individual, or disable individual.” Tex. Penal Code § 22.04(b)(2). Section 22.04(b)(1) does not cover the factual scenario in this case where Appellant's conduct, although morally reprehensible, unforeseeably causes injury to a victim to whom he lacked a duty to act, whether familial- or care-oriented.

When writing “legal or statutory duty to act” into Section 22.04(b)(1), the Legislature did not expand Section 22.04 to include every statutory duty codified in law or regulation. If that were the case, then any statute that uses the magical word “shall” could theoretically be imported into Section 22.04 for purposes of an injury to a child prosecution. Maj. Op. at –––– – ––––. The majority's interpretation of Section 22.04 may invite prosecutors to throw spaghetti at the wall and see what sticks.

The Court may respond by saying my concerns should properly be aimed at our legislators and not the Court's opinion. Yet there is little reason to place the Legislature in a reactionary position to the Court's “novel extension” of Section 22.04. See State's Pet. for Discretionary Review at 2. Instead, we should simply interpret the statute in accord with its inherent limitations. Perhaps the Court's opinion today will spark the Legislature to correct us ⁵ and, in my estimation, limit the reach of Section 22.04 to what the Legislature intended: The statutory duties contemplated by subsection (b)(1) are those that extend to a specific class of individuals and cannot be general duties to the public.

II. Conclusion

I would interpret “legal or statutory duty to act” in Section 22.04(b)(1) as a duty that is specific to the victim, rather than a duty to the general public. Consequently, the court of appeals was correct to say that the duties in the dangerous dog statute could not be imported to felony injury to a child by omission. I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. Because the Court does not, I respectfully dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At trial, the deputy testified that Appellant made this acknowledgement. The notification also served to put Appellant on notice that he had dangerous dogs.

2.   Section 22.04(a) provides: “A person commits an offense if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence, by act or intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly by omission, causes to a child, elderly individual, or disabled individual: (1) serious bodily injury; (2) serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury; or (3) bodily injury.” Tex. Penal Code § 22.04(a).

3.   In a companion case, Appellant challenged his separate conviction for the offense of attack by dog causing serious bodily injury. Tex. Health & Safety Code § 833.005(b). He argued there was jury charge error, and the court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment. Cockrell v. State, No. 06-23-00229-CR, 2024 WL 3708996 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Aug. 8, 2024) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

4.   We also granted a second ground for review that, in essence, asked: If the importation of the dangerous-dog duty in Section 822.042(a) is improper for injury to a child by omission, should the case be remanded for the lower court to address the Appellant's act of letting his dogs roam freely as a basis for liability. Because we hold that the importation of the statutory duty from in Section 822.042(a) is permissible, we do not reach that issue.

5.   The Code Construction Act applies to the Health and Safety Code. See Tex. Gov't Code § 311.002.

6.   A conditional duty is “[a] duty that is conditioned on the occurrence of an event other than the lapse of time.” Conditional Duty, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Comply means “to do what is required[.]” Comply, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (emphasis added).

7.   It might be true that, upon compliance with the requirements of Subsection (b), a hypothetical person may be relieved of the mandatory duties imposed by Subsection (a). But there is no sense in which Subsection (b) operates like an exception to the applicability of the requirements imposed by Subsection (a), so that, if not pleaded and proved, the evidence would be insufficient to sustain the judgment for that reason. Cf. Tex. Penal Code § 2.02(a) (“An exception to an offense in this code is so labeled by the phrase: ‘It is an exception to the application of ․’ ”). In any event, that question is not before us, and we do not finally decide the answer to that question today.

8.   Even assuming for the sake of argument that we agreed that Subsection (b)’s requirement had to be included in the pleadings and charge, with respect to the sufficiency claim that Appellant made in the lower court, a jury could certainly have found in this case that he failed to deliver his dogs within thirty days after learning that he owned a dangerous dog. The dogs attacked a person in August of 2021, and May of 2022, before finally attacking N.S. in September of 2022. So, even though Appellant's jury was not tasked with deciding whether he failed to deliver his dogs to the animal control authority within the required timeframe, a rational jury could have decided that the evidence was sufficient to show that he failed to comply with Subsection (b). See Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (“[S]ufficiency of the evidence should be measured by the elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.”). As for any potential inadequacy of the pleadings, that issue is not presently before this Court on discretionary review.

9.   The State suggests that the “Effect of Code” provision in the Penal Code, which states that “provisions of Titles 1, 2, and 3 [of the Penal Code] apply to offenses defined by other laws, unless the statute defining the offense provides otherwise[,]” might provide a basis for importing the duty. Tex. Penal Code § 1.03(b) (footnote omitted). But, as the Court has said before, “[t]he point of § 1.03(b) was to specify when a Penal Code provision would apply to an offense not contained in the Penal Code, not to specify how other laws outside the Penal Code, such as those creating defenses, would apply to Penal Code offenses.” Chase, 448 S.W.3d at 14 (footnotes omitted).

10.   Appellant argues that this interpretation renders Section 22.04 unconstitutionally vague—both facially and as applied. Specifically, he alleges that the Penal Code's definition of law, which now includes common law, is too expansive. But, as Appellant conceded at oral argument, this claim was raised neither at trial nor on appeal. Consequently, it is not properly preserved. See Curry v. State, 910 S.W.2d 490, 496 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (rejecting an unconstitutional-as-applied challenge when the appellant did not object at trial that the statute was vague as applied to his conduct). Nevertheless, as Appellant acknowledges, he was indicted pursuant to a statutory duty, not a common law duty, so the concern that undergirds Appellant's vagueness challenge is not applicable on the facts of his case. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550, 95 S.Ct. 710, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975) (citing United States v. Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 36, 83 S.Ct. 594, 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963)) (“It is well established that vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand.”).

11.   Both in the court of appeals and at oral argument, there was concern regarding the propriety of subjecting individuals to a potential term of ninety-nine years’ imprisonment for violating what might be considered a broad statute. See Tex. Penal Code § 12.32(a) (setting the maximum punishment for a first-degree felony at ninety-nine years). In particular, a concern was expressed about whether the construction of Section 22.04 called for by the State today might potentially subject individuals to heightened criminal liability for commonplace conduct. But the Legislature itself addressed these concerns.A limiting principle is inherently embedded within Section 22.04’s mens rea requirement. Critically, the offense at issue here is a “result-oriented offense[,]” which requires “a mental state that relates not to the specific conduct but to the result of that conduct.” Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750 (citing Alvarado, 704 S.W.2d at 39). So, a mere omission, even when one has a duty to act, does not automatically subject an individual to liability. Instead, “[t]he State must prove that a defendant caused a child's serious bodily injury with the requisite criminal intent.” Id. (citing Cook v. State, 884 S.W.2d 485, 490–92 (Tex. Crim. App.1994)).

12.   The dissent conducts an overview of the legislative history surrounding the injury to a child act, but at no point does it argue that the language of the statute is not plain. And this failure is fatal because, as this Court has said, “the plain language of a statute, not the legislative history behind it, dictates our interpretation of that statute.” State v. Johnson, 939 S.W.2d 586, 587 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

13.   The dissent suggests that this reading might “spark the Legislature to correct us[.]” Dissenting Opinion at 15. But because we are simply applying the plain language that the Legislature enacted, the Legislature would be correcting itself. See Cuarenta, 707 S.W.3d at 428 (citing Getts, 155 S.W.3d at 158). Our job, particularly when the language of a statute is plain, is to enforce the words of the statute, not estimate what the Legislature might have intended through those words. Getts, 155 S.W.3d at 158.

14.   For example, the court of appeals cited Hawkins v. State. Cockrell, 2024 WL 3709879, at *3 (citing Hawkins v. State, 891 S.W.2d 257, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)). But Hawkins involved the construction of Section 22.04(b)(2)—which addresses “care, custody, or control of a child,” not statutory duties. Hawkins 891 S.W.2d at 258. Accordingly, any passing suggestion that Section 22.04(b)(1) required an outside duty to the child was nothing more than dicta.

15.   The court of appeals’ reliance on Florio v. State, Cockrell, 2024 WL 3709879, at *3 (citing Florio v. State, 784 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)), shares the same flaw. See Florio 784 S.W.2d at 417 (analyzing the previous version of Section 22.04).

1.   780 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).

2.   “Clinically, cachexia manifests with excessive weight loss in the setting of ongoing disease, usually with disproportionate muscle wasting.” John E Morley et al., Cachexia: Pathophysiology and Clinical Relevance, 83 Am. J. Clin. Nutr. 735 (2006).

3.   These amendments also added Section 22.04(c), which defines the terms “child,” “elderly individual,” and “invalid individual.” See Tex. Penal Code § 22.04(c) (West 1989).

4.   The Bill Analysis to the 1989 amendments confirms as much:In Texas, criminal liability cannot be imposed if no statutory duty to act exists. An example is the case in 1987 of an 87-year-old Houston woman who was found malnourished, lying in excrement and covered with bedsores in a home she shared with her 55-year-old daughter and grandson in his 30s. The woman died approximately three weeks later. Her relatives could not be prosecuted because, according to Texas statutes, no law had been broken. SB 1154 would ensure that it was no longer be legal [sic] to allow someone to die of neglect. Invalids are just as defenseless, in most cases, as children and the elderly. This bill would give them equal protection from intentional injury, as well as from injury caused by neglect on the part of someone who had recognizably assumed care, custody and control for their well-being.The Family Code gives parents the duty to provide care, protection and medical support to their children. Elderly parents should receive the same protections.House Comm. on Crim. Jur., Bill Analysis, S.B. 1154, 71st Leg., R.S. (1989).

5.   This would not be the first time. See, e.g., Sen. Rsch. Center., Bill Analysis, S.B. 1220, 89th Leg., R.S. (2025) (“The purpose of this bill is to overturn Ex Parte Charette, 2024 WL 4260409 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2024).”).

Yeary, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which Schenck, P.J., and Keel, Mcclure, and Parker, JJ., joined.

McClure, J., filed a concurring opinion in which Keel, J., joined. Richardson, J., concurred in the result. Finley, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Newell and Walker, JJ., joined.