EX PARTE CAMERON MICHAEL MOON v. << (2023)

We recently reiterated in Ex parte Sheffield that a habeas corpus proceeding has always been regarded as separate from a criminal prosecution.¹ As we explained:

A habeas corpus action is, in theory, a different litigation than the criminal prosecution ․ When habeas corpus is used as a vehicle for raising matters pretrial in a pending criminal prosecution, the difference between the pending prosecution and the habeas corpus proceeding is both more subtle and more significant. An order denying relief on the merits is a final judgment in the habeas corpus proceeding.2

Yet in this case, as Appellant points out, we treated the appeal as an interlocutory appeal of a transfer order rather than an appeal from a final order on a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Those are two different things. Yet, we relied upon former Article 44.47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to hold that a juvenile transferred to adult court could not appeal an order denying habeas corpus relief when the plain text of Article 44.47 did not include a prohibition of appeals of orders denying habeas corpus relief.³ Thus, in our original opinion, we failed to adhere to the literal text of former Article 44.47.

We justified this departure from the plain text with almost no analysis because “it would be anomalous to nevertheless permit what amounts to an interlocutory appeal from an adverse ruling on a pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus that challenges the jurisdiction of the criminal court based on an alleged defective juvenile transfer order.”⁴ But we already recognize this distinction and haven't found it to be particularly anomalous. In Ex parte Smith we explained:

Although there is sometimes little difference between a pretrial writ of habeas corpus and a pretrial motion as a vehicle to raise legal issues in the trial court, there is a vast difference between the two in terms of appellate rights. The denial of relief on a pretrial writ of habeas corpus may be appealed immediately, but the denial of a pretrial motion may be appealed only after conviction and sentencing.⁵

We seem to accept the anomaly that a defendant may not appeal a denial of a motion to quash until after conviction, but he may appeal a denial of a pretrial petition for habeas corpus relief even when both are based on the same legal arguments. I remain unpersuaded that this type of anomaly allows us to add text to a statute prohibiting an appeal of an order denying habeas corpus relief.

As our recent decision in Sheffield illustrates, our original opinion dismissing the appeal conflicts with the traditional view that a habeas corpus proceeding is distinct from the underlying criminal proceeding.⁶ I would grant rehearing in this case to correct that conflict by holding there was jurisdiction to consider the appeal of the order denying habeas corpus relief. Then, the Court could address the ground we granted on our own motion, namely whether the words “adjudication” and “adjudication hearing” as used in section 54.02(j)(3) of the Family Code are restricted to the context of juvenile proceedings. Because the Court does not, I respectfully dissent to the denial of the motion for rehearing.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ex parte Sheffield, No. PD-1102-20, 2023 WL 4092747, at *11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (citing Greenwell v. Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth Judicial Dist., 159 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)).

2.   Id. (quoting Greenwell, 159 S.W.3d at 649-50).

3.   Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 44.47(b) (West 2003) (repealed by Acts 2015, 84th Leg., ch. 74, § 4 (eff. Sept. 1, 2015)).

4.   Ex parte Moon, 667 S.W.3d 796, 804-05 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023).

5.   Ex parte Smith, 178 S.W.3d 797, 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

6.   Sheffield, 2023 WL 4092747, at *11.

NEWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which HERVEY, RICHARDSON and WALKER, JJ., joined.