JEFFORY BLACKARD v. KENT SCHAFFER IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY BRIAN WICE IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY NICHOLE DEBORDE IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY COLLIN COUNTY JUDGE KEITH SELF IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY COMMISSIONER SUSAN FLETCHER IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY COMMISSIONER CHERYL WILLIAMS IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY COMMISSIONER CHRIS HILL IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY COMMISSIONER DUNCAN WEBB IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AND AUDITOR JEFF MAY IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY (2017)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

We reinstate this appeal.

Jeffory Blackard brought this suit challenging the legality of an order rendered by the 416th Judicial District Court that directed payment of attorney's fees by the Auditor of Collin County, following presentment to and approval by the Collin County Commissioners Court, to the attorneys pro tem in State of Texas v. Warren Kenneth Paxton, Jr., Case Nos. 416-81913-2015, 416-82148-2015, 416-82149-2015 (the Paxton cases). Blackard asserted standing to bring the challenge as a taxpayer seeking to enjoin the illegal expenditure of public funds and filed an application for a temporary restraining order in the trial court below. The court denied the application for temporary restraining order concluding it had no jurisdiction to grant the relief requested. In its conclusions of law, the court stated the denial was “with prejudice to Mr. Blackard seeking the same relief via an injunctive action.” The court did not, however, dismiss either Blackard's claims for injunctive relief or his claims for declaratory relief.

On January 30, 2017, Blackard filed this interlocutory appeal, a petition for writ of injunction, and an emergency motion for temporary relief. That same day, at Blackard's request, this Court issued an order staying the Collin County Commissioners Court from “any consideration or approval of the payment or payments subject to the district court's Second Order on Payment of Attorney's Fees to Attorneys Pro Tem.” Blackard requested this stay as necessary to prevent his challenge to the payment of attorney's fees from becoming moot. See Blackard v. Schaffer, No. 05-16-00408-CV, 2017 WL 343597, *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 8, 2017, pet. filed) (Blackard I) (concluding challenge to fee order moot after fees paid). On February 10, we consolidated appellant's request for a stay with this appeal and ordered the stay on the Commissioners Court remain in place. We further stayed “all efforts to enforce and/or execute on that order.”

On May 17, we lifted the stays previously imposed for the purpose of allowing the Commissioners Court to consider and act on the Second Order on Payment of Attorney's Fees to Attorneys Pro Tem or, in the event the Commissioners Court did not act, for dismissal of this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The appeal was abated for a period of thirty days or until we received a supplemental clerk's record containing evidence of a Commissioners Court vote on the issue of payment.

On May 22, the Commissioners Court voted to reject the invoice payment and further voted to “authorize counsel to challenge” the Second Order on Payment of Attorney's Fees to Attorneys Pro Tem. A supplemental clerk's record was filed on June 2 containing the Commissioners Court's order reflecting its vote.

Blackard's suit alleges that the payment ordered by the district court was illegal because it failed to comply in both timing and amount with the Collin County Local Rules and the Texas Fair Defense Act. His standing, if any, was solely as a taxpayer seeking to enjoin the illegal expenditure of public funds. See Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 556 (Tex. 2000). Because the Commissioners Court has rejected the invoice and has authorized counsel to challenge the district court's order, no pending “illegal” expenditure of public funds currently exists for Blackard to seek to enjoin.

Blackard has moved this Court to continue to abate his suit indefinitely based on the possibility that the Commissioners Court may, at some point in the future, approve payment of a fee invoice at a time and in an amount that he contends is illegal. As we stated in our earlier opinion, for jurisdiction to exist, a matter must be ripe for resolution. See Blackard, 2017 WL 343597 at *8. Although a claim need not be fully ripened at the time suit is filed, the facts must be sufficiently developed to determine that an injury has occurred or is likely to occur. See Robinson v. Parker, 353 S.W.3d 753, 755 (Tex. 2011). At this point, Blackard's alleged injury is speculative. See Scarborough v. Metro. Transit Auth. of Harris Cnty., 326 S.W.3d 324, 338 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). Blackard has not shown, and this record does not indicate, when or in what amount the Commissioners Court is likely to approve a payment. Because Blackard's alleged injury depends on the occurrence of contingent future events that may not occur, there is no subject matter jurisdiction over his claims for injunctive relief. Although the trial court denied Blackard's request for injunctive relief, the proper disposition is to dismiss those claims for want of jurisdiction. See Patterson v. Planned Parenthood of Houston and Se. Tex., Inc., 971 S.W.2d 439, 444 (Tex. 1998) (claims not ripe for adjudication due to absence of imminent harm dismissed for want of jurisdiction).

Based on the foregoing, we order the stays imposed by our orders of January 30, 2017 and February 10, 2017 lifted in their entirety. We deny Blackard's motion to abate this appeal. We vacate the trial court's order denying Blackard's request for injunctive relief and dismiss the injunctive relief claims for want of jurisdiction. We express no opinion on the trial court's jurisdiction over the remaining claims for declaratory relief. See Retta v. Mekonen, 338 S.W.3d 72, 76 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) (no authority to consider jurisdiction over other underlying causes of action on appeal from temporary injunction). We remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings.

MOLLY FRANCIS JUSTICE