INFANT CALDERA INFANTE CALDERA LONNIE CALDERA v. THE STATE OF TEXAS (2017)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In 2014, appellant, Infant Caldera a/k/a Infante Caldera a/k/a Lonnie Caldera, pleaded guilty to five counts of injury to a child, a third-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). The trial court deferred adjudication of guilt and placed Caldera on community supervision. In 2016, the State filed a motion to revoke Caldera's community supervision based on allegations that he had violated various conditions. Caldera pleaded “true” to the all of the State's allegations that he violated the conditions of his community supervision. A hearing was held, and the trial court found that the State's allegations were true, revoked community supervision, and sentenced him to two years' incarceration. This appeal followed. Caldera's court-appointed counsel has filed an Anders brief. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We affirm.

I. ANDERS BRIEF

Pursuant to Anders v. California, Caldera's court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that her review of the record yielded no grounds of reversible error upon which an appeal can be predicated. See id. Counsel's brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”) (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), Caldera's counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no reversible error in the trial court's judgment. Caldera's counsel has also informed this Court that Caldera has been (1) notified that counsel has filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw; (2) provided with copies of both pleadings; (3) informed of his rights to file a pro se response, to review the record preparatory to filing that response, and to seek discretionary review in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals if this Court finds that the appeal is frivolous; (4) provided with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record with instructions to file the motion in this Court. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 319–20; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. More than an adequate period of time has passed, and Caldera has not filed a pro se response.¹

II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW

Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record and counsel's brief, and we have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See id. at 827–28 (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW

In accordance with Anders, Caldera's attorney has asked this Court for permission to withdraw as his counsel. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779–80 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) (“[I]f an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.”) (citations omitted)). We grant counsel's motion to withdraw. Within five days of the date of this Court's opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of this opinion and this Court's judgment to Caldera and to advise him of his right to file a petition for discretionary review.² See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “the pro se response need not comply with the rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered. Rather, the response should identify for the court those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the case presents any meritorious issues.” In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting Wilson v. State, 955 S.W.2d 693, 696–97 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no pet.)).

2.   No substitute counsel will be appointed. If Caldera seeks further review of this case by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or timely motion for en banc reconsideration that was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. A petition for discretionary review must be filed with the clerk of the Court of Criminal Appeals. See id. R. 68.3. Any petition for discretionary review should comply with the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 68.4. See id. R. 68.4.

ROGELIO VALDEZ Chief Justice