IN RE: JAMES R. HARRIS (2017)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Relators, James R. Harris, in his capacity as President and Chairman of the Board of South Bay Corporation and Lamb Oil & Gas, Inc., South Bay Corporation, and Lamb Oil & Gas, Inc., filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the above cause on December 6, 2016. Through this original proceeding, relators seek to compel the trial court to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its October 25, 2016 order disqualifying relators' counsel. This Court requested and received a response to the petition for writ of mandamus from the real parties in interest, Jeffery Scott Harris, Suzette Harris, William Harris, Christiana Harris, Frances Harris, and Andrew Harris. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.2, 52.4, 52.8.²

To obtain relief by writ of mandamus, a relator must establish that an underlying order is void or a clear abuse of discretion and that no adequate appellate remedy exists. In re Nationwide Ins. Co. of Am., 494 S.W.3d 708, 712 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839–40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court's ruling is arbitrary and unreasonable, made without regard for guiding legal principles or supporting evidence. In re Nationwide, 494 S.W.3d at 712; Ford Motor Co. v. Garcia, 363 S.W.3d 573, 578 (Tex. 2012). Similarly, a trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to analyze or apply the law correctly. In re Nationwide, 494 S.W.3d at 712; In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 226 S.W.3d 400, 403 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding). We determine the adequacy of an appellate remedy by balancing the benefits of mandamus review against the detriments. In re Essex Ins. Co., 450 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 136.

Findings of fact and conclusions of law are required upon request in any case tried in the district or county court without a jury. Gene Duke Builders, Inc. v. Abilene Hous. Auth., 138 S.W.3d 907, 908 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 296, 297. For purposes of rule 296, a case is “tried” to the court when there is an evidentiary hearing before the court upon conflicting evidence. See Black v. Shor, 443 S.W.3d 154, 166 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2013, pet. denied).

A trial court is required to enter findings and conclusions only on ultimate or controlling issues. In re M.J.G., 248 S.W.3d 753, 763 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.). “While findings in certain pretrial and post-trial matters may be helpful, they are not required.” Chandler v. Chandler, 991 S.W.2d 367, 388 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, pet. denied). Under an abuse of discretion standard of review, findings of fact and conclusions of law are neither appropriate nor required. IKB Indus. (Nigeria) Ltd. v. Pro-Line Corp., 938 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Tex. 1997). As a general rule, the trial court's failure to make findings and conclusions can be attacked on direct appeal. See, e.g., In re Schindler Elevator Corp., No. 05-16-01172-CV, 2016 WL 5884943, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 10, 2016, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (denying mandamus relief on grounds relator had an adequate remedy by appeal regarding the trial court's failure to make findings and conclusions); In re Morgan, No. 08-16-00126-CV, 2016 WL 4013777, at *1 (Tex. App.—El Paso July 27, 2016, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (same).

The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus, the response filed by the real parties, the reply, and the applicable law, is of the opinion that relators have not shown themselves entitled to the relief sought. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(a); Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839–40. Accordingly, we DENY relators' petition for writ of mandamus.

FOOTNOTES

2.   See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case,” but when “denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not required to do so.”); TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).

GINA M. BENAVIDES, Justice