IN THE INTEREST OF AND CHILDREN v. << (2017)

MEMORANDUM OPINION 1

Appellant D.V. (Mother) appeals the trial court's final order in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship appointing the Department of Family and Protective Services (Department) as permanent managing conservator of E.P. and L.V., her children. The order granted Mother visitation rights with the children “as agreed, arranged, and supervised by the [Department].”

Mother's court-appointed appellate attorney has filed an Anders brief stating that after diligently reviewing the record, he believes that an appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967); see also In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776–77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (holding that Anders procedures apply in parental termination cases). The brief meets the requirements of Anders by presenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal. Although given the opportunity, Mother has not filed a response.

As the reviewing appellate court, we must independently examine the record to decide whether counsel is correct in determining that an appeal in this case is frivolous. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d 618, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.). Having carefully reviewed the record and the Anders brief, we agree with counsel that the appeal is frivolous. See K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d at 619. We find nothing in the record that might arguably support Mother's appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Mother's counsel referred to a motion to withdraw filed concurrently with his brief, but we did not receive any such motion.² In any event, to the extent Mother's counsel seeks to withdraw, we deny such motion in light of In re P.M. because his brief does not show “good cause” other than counsel's determination that an appeal would be frivolous. No. 15-0171, 2016 WL 1274748, at *3–4 (Tex. Apr. 1, 2016) (“[A]n Anders motion to withdraw brought in the court of appeals, in the absence of additional grounds for withdrawal, may be premature.”); In re A.M., 495 S.W.3d 573, 582–83 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (noting that since In re P.M. was handed down, “most courts of appeals affirming parental termination orders after receiving Anders briefs have denied the attorney's motion to withdraw”). The supreme court has held that in cases such as this, “appointed counsel's obligations [in the supreme court] can be satisfied by filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” In re P.M., 2016 WL 1274748, at *3.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

2.   The court attempted to contact Mother's counsel regarding this issue but was not able to reach him.

BONNIE SUDDERTH JUSTICE