IN THE INTEREST OF AND CHILDREN v. << (2017)

MEMORANDUM OPINION 1

Appellants C.J. (Mother) and R.D. (Father) appeal the trial court's order terminating C.J.'s parental rights to her children T.J.-F, A.J.-F, R.J.-F, and K.J.-D and terminating R.D.'s parental rights to his child K.J.-D. As to both Mother and Father, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that termination was appropriate under subsections (D) and (E) of family code section 161.001(b)(1) and that termination was in the children's best interests. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (2) (West Supp. 2016).

Both Mother's and Father's court-appointed appellate attorneys have filed motions to withdraw as counsel and briefs in support of those motions, averring that after diligently reviewing the record, they believe that the appeals are frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967); see also In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776–77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (holding that Anders procedures apply in parental termination cases). The briefs meet the requirements of Anders by presenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal. Although given the opportunity, neither Mother nor Father filed responses.

As the reviewing appellate court, we must independently examine the record to decide whether the attorneys are correct in determining that the appeals are frivolous. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d 618, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.). Having carefully reviewed the record and the Anders briefs, we agree that the appeals are frivolous. We find nothing in the record that might arguably support either appellant's appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Therefore, we affirm the trial court's order terminating the parent-child relationship between Mother and the children and between Father and K.J.-D. However, we deny the motions to withdraw because they do not show “good cause” separate and apart from their accurate determination that there are no arguable grounds for appeal. See In re P.M., No. 15-0171, 2016 WL 1274748, at *3 (Tex. Apr. 1, 2016) (holding that the right to counsel under family code section 107.013(a)(1) extends to proceedings in the supreme court and that in the absence of additional grounds for withdrawal, an Anders motion to withdraw brought in the court of appeals may be premature); In re C.J., 501 S.W.3d 254, 255 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pets. denied).

FOOTNOTES

1.   See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

BILL MEIER JUSTICE