RICHARD DEE WOODS v. THE STATE OF TEXAS (2016)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Arguing the evidence is insufficient to affirmatively link him to the methamphetamine that the police found in the truck he was driving, Richard Dee Woods appeals his conviction for violating the Texas Controlled Substances Act. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.112(a), (d) (West 2010) (creating a first degree felony offense for possessing, with the intent to deliver, a controlled substance that has an aggregate weight of between 4 grams and 200 grams). Because sufficient evidence was admitted during Woods' trial to support the jury's finding that Woods possessed the methamphetamine that police found in the truck he was driving when he was stopped, we affirm Woods' conviction.

To review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a defendant's conviction in a criminal case, the evidence from the trial is assessed, on appeal, in the light that most favors the jury's verdict. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 894-95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In an appeal from a judgment where the jury found the defendant guilty, we evaluate whether the jury, from the evidence that was before it in the trial, could have rationally found the defendant guilty of the essential elements of the crime based on a standard of beyond reasonable doubt. Id. In evaluating the rationality of a jury's verdict using this standard, we are not to substitute our judgment for the jury's; instead, we give the jury the responsibility for resolving whatever conflicts may have existed in the evidence, of deciding how to weigh the evidence in determining if the State met its burden of proof, and for drawing reasonable inferences from the basic facts to the ultimate issue in deciding whether to find the defendant guilty. See Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Viewing the jury's resolution of the case in the light most favorable to its verdict, we must uphold the judgment rendered in Woods' case “unless a reasonable juror must have had a reasonable doubt as to at least one of the elements of the offense.” Runningwolf v. State, 360 S.W.3d 490, 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

In his appeal, Woods contends the evidence does not support the jury's conclusion that he possessed the methamphetamine police found in the truck he was driving when he was stopped. Specifically, Woods argues that reasonable doubt exists as to his guilt because: (1) the evidence did not show he owned the truck where the drugs were found; (2) the evidence established the front-seat passenger, who owned the truck, told police that the methamphetamine in the truck belonged to him, not Woods; (3) the police found the methamphetamine in a bag located within a hidden compartment in the truck's center console; and (4) Woods claims he did not know the compartment existed or that methamphetamine had been hidden there.

Under the Texas Controlled Substances Act, “ ‘[p]ossession’ means actual care, custody, control, or management.” Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.002(38) (West Supp. 2015). “Possession is a voluntary act if the possessor knowingly obtains or receives the thing possessed or is aware of his control of the thing for a sufficient time to permit him to terminate his control.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.01(b) (West 2011). Generally, a person's mere presence at a location where the police find drugs is alone, not enough, to establish that the defendant actually exercised care, custody, or control of the drugs. However, presence or proximity may be sufficient to establish possession when that circumstance, combined with other circumstantial or direct evidence linking the defendant to the controlled substance, proves that the defendant, beyond reasonable doubt, was in possession of the contraband. See Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 162 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

The methamphetamine that Woods was charged with possessing was found in a neoprene bag. The neoprene bag was found in a hidden compartment in the center console of the truck that Woods was driving when he was stopped. It is undisputed that the truck Woods was driving belonged to the front-seat passenger. To prove that he possessed the contraband, the State was required to prove that Woods exercised care, custody, or control over the contraband, and that when Woods was stopped, he was aware that the methamphetamine was in the truck. See Blackman v. State, 350 S.W.3d 588, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Generally, when a defendant is found with others in a vehicle containing contraband, the State is required to satisfy the affirmative links rule to prove that the defendant possessed the drugs found in the vehicle. Id. The affirmative links rule is a rule that is designed to protect innocent bystanders from being convicted of possession based solely on their proximity to illegal drugs belonging to others. Id. at 594-95. Under the affirmative links rule, the State must prove that independent facts and circumstances exist sufficient to allow the jury to reasonably link the defendant to the contraband; these independent facts must show the defendant was connected to the drugs beyond the fact that he was near them. Id. at 594-95. Under the affirmative links rule, the logical force of other independent links, when combined with defendant's proximity to the contraband, may establish, beyond reasonable doubt, that the defendant exercised actual care, custody, or control over the contraband. Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162.

Four witnesses testified during the guilt-innocence phase of Woods' trial, but only two of the witnesses, a narcotics investigator and deputy, both of whom were employed by one of the constables in Montgomery County, provided the testimony linking Woods to the methamphetamine in the truck. The narcotics investigator, who was involved in the investigation that led to Woods' arrest, testified that on the day Woods was arrested, he was on the lookout for a truck like the one he saw Woods driving. According to the investigator, he was looking for a truck like the one Woods was in based on a tip from a confidential informant. From the information the investigator received from his informant, he was expecting a truck like the one Woods was in to pass through Montgomery County on its way to Houston, where the individuals in the truck were expected to stop and obtain methamphetamine. The investigator explained that on the day that Woods was arrested, he saw Woods and his two companions in the truck he was looking for at a fast-food restaurant in Montgomery County. After spotting the truck, the investigator indicated that he followed it in his unmarked car into Harris County. However, the investigator stated that he quit following the truck because he thought the occupants had spotted him. The investigator explained that he pulled his unmarked car into a parking lot, located near the highway, where he could not be seen while watching traffic on the highway. While watching traffic, the investigator noticed the truck Woods was driving leave the parking lot. He followed in his unmarked car as the truck entered the highway. According to the investigator, as he followed the truck, he saw Woods violate several traffic laws. Based on these violations, the investigator asked a deputy constable, who was assisting him in a separate marked vehicle, to stop the truck.

Subsequently, after Woods' truck was stopped and searched by the deputy constable, Woods and his two companions were taken to the police station where they were questioned by the investigator. According to the investigator, the front-seat passenger admitted owning the drugs found in the hidden compartment in the center console of the truck. The front-seat passenger also told the investigator that Woods and a female passenger, travelling in the truck's back seat, were not involved with the drugs.

Based on its verdict, the jury rejected the view that Woods had no involvement with the methamphetamine. In deciding the case, the jury was entitled to disbelieve the front-seat passenger's statement that Woods was not involved and rely on the circumstantial evidence, which does link Woods to the drugs. Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“Because the jury is the sole judge of a witness's credibility, and the weight to be given the testimony, it may choose to believe some testimony and disbelieve other testimony.”).

Based on the evidence before the jury, a number of factors link Woods to the drugs that were found in the truck. There was evidence before the jury allowing the jury to conclude that Woods, before being stopped, was aware the purpose of the trip was to purchase drugs. At the station, Woods told the investigator that he had stopped in Cleveland before going to Houston to meet a person named Jay. According to the investigator's testimony, Jay is a person known to be involved with narcotics. Also, in Woods' interview with the investigator, Woods told him that the group was travelling to Houston to meet a person named Frank. According to the investigator's testimony, the investigator knew Frank to be a narcotics dealer. During his interview, Woods also told the investigator that after taking the truck to Houston, he was the only person in the truck who went into Frank's home. During the trial, the investigator testified that based on his knowledge about Frank, the narcotics that police found in the console of the truck “came from Frank's.”

The testimony of the deputy constable that stopped and searched the truck established that the methamphetamine was found in the truck's center console, that the drugs could not have been easily put inside the console without all of the occupants of the truck having known they were there, and that the drug paraphernalia, like that sold by the headshop in the parking lot where the investigator saw the truck, was on the passenger floorboard in the truck. This testimony provided the jury with additional circumstantial evidence independent of Woods' presence in the truck establishing the purpose of the group's trip into Houston and tying Woods to the methamphetamine that police found in the truck. We conclude that several independent affirmative links were established in the trial that enabled the jury to rationally find, beyond reasonable doubt, that Woods possessed the methamphetamine found in the truck.

The statement Woods gave in his interview to the investigator, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, allowed the jury to conclude that Woods was aware the purpose of the trip was to purchase drugs. The statement Woods gave the investigator also allowed the jury to infer, in light of all of the evidence, that Woods received the methamphetamine while in Frank's home. Additionally, there was evidence at trial showing that drug paraphernalia, like that sold in a headshop near the parking lot where the investigator saw the truck exit, was found on the truck's floorboard after it was stopped. The presence of the drug paraphernalia, in open view of the truck's occupants, offers an additional affirmative link showing that Woods was aware that drugs were in the truck. Finally, while Woods denied having purchased any drugs in the statement that he made to the investigator after his arrest, Woods acknowledged to the investigator that he had “facilitated that deal.”

In this case, Woods does not challenge the validity of the search of the truck. Here, in addition to Woods' proximity to the contraband, the circumstances affirmatively linked Woods to the drugs. In our opinion, the cumulative force of the evidence, when viewed as a whole, and in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, allowed the jury to find that Woods obtained, received, or was aware the contraband was in the truck before he was stopped. See Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 166. We overrule Woods' sole issue and affirm the trial court's judgment.

AFFIRMED.

HOLLIS HORTON Justice