III v. Dell Inc., Seaton Corp. d/b/a Staff Management, Appellees (2015)

ORDER

By Order dated May 19, 2015, this court denied a myriad of motions and objections filed by Joseph E. McClain III in his appeal from the trial court's order granting Dell Inc., Seaton Corp. d/b/a Staff Management's motion declaring him a vexatious litigant.¹  Now pending before this court are two separate series of motions and objections purportedly related to this appeal and that earlier order.   The first series of documents was filed on May 26, 2015, with the second series being filed on June 2, 2015.²  Most of the filings are trial court matters not suited for this court's consideration and are duplicates of motions previously filed and denied.   McClain seeks, among other relief, a default judgment, injunctive relief, a stay of judgment, and a declaration that he is the victim of identity theft.   He has also filed an objection to this court's Order of May 19, 2015, as well as multiple copies of a motion for rehearing challenging the court's previous order.

With all due candor, McClain's objection to this court's earlier order is incomprehensible.   His motion for rehearing is confusing.   He asserts this court could not have properly formed an opinion because none of his motions were heard.   Notwithstanding that McClain is proceeding pro se, he is still held to the same standards as a licensed attorney.  Serrano v. Francis Props.   I, LTD, 411 S.W.3d 661, 666 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2013, pet. denied);  Holt v. F.F. Enterprises, 990 S.W.2d 756, 759 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1998, pet. denied).

From a review of his motions, we surmise McClain is unfamiliar with the chronology of an appeal.   After an appellant's brief is filed, an appellee has the opportunity to respond to that brief.   After all briefs are filed, the appellate record is complete and the appeal becomes ripe for consideration by the court.   After consideration of the record by the court, an opinion and judgment are issued.   Pursuant to Rule 49.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, after the court renders judgment, a motion for rehearing may be filed within fifteen days.

We further note that McClain's brief was due on June 10, 2015, but has yet to be filed.   By letter dated June 17, 2015, he was advised of the failure to timely file a brief and given until June 29, 2015, in which to do so with the admonition that failure to do so would subject this appeal to dismissal.   Tex.R.App. P. 38.8(a)(1), 42.3(b).  McClain's pro se status does not exempt him from complying with rules of procedure.   See Pena v. McDowell, 201 S.W.3d 665, 667 (Tex.2006);  Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex.1978).   Accordingly, this appeal will continue to proceed in due course.   Once a final disposition has been rendered by the court, the time for filing a motion for rehearing will commence.

After consideration of the multiple documents pending, we conclude McClain's motions should be denied and his objections overruled.

It is so ordered.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See McClain v. Dell, Inc., No. 07–15–00141–CV, 2015 Tex.App. LEXIS 5773 (Tex.App.—Amarillo May 19, 2015, order).

2.   McClain has electronically filed multiple copies of certain documents.

Per Curiam