In the Matter of B.H. v. << (2015)

MEMORANDUM OPINION 1

I. Introduction

We are presented with an accelerated appeal from an order extending inpatient mental health services for a period not to exceed one year.   In three points, appellant B.H. argues that the trial court erred by extending his inpatient mental health services based solely on two certificates of medical examination for mental illness.   We will reverse and render.

II. Background

The State indicted B.H. for aggravated assault after he allegedly caused serious bodily injury to another person on January 14, 2012.   Prior to trial, however, the trial court adjudicated B.H. incompetent to stand trial and ordered B.H. to receive inpatient mental health services.   See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 46B (West 2002).   The trial court later entered orders for extended mental health services.   On October 10, 2014, the trial court conducted a hearing, without testimony, and ordered B.H. to remain in the custody of the Director of the Department of State Health Services, State Hospital Section, for a period not to exceed one year, to receive mental health services.   This appeal followed.

III. Discussion

In his second and third points, B.H. argues that the evidence is factually and legally insufficient to support the trial court's order for extended commitment because the only evidence introduced at the extension hearing was two certificates of medical examination for mental illness.   The State agrees, and so does this court.

Section 574.035(g) of the health and safety code provides, in part, that the trial court may not make its findings solely from certificates of medical examination for mental illness but shall hear testimony.  Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 574.035(g) (West 2002).   Thus, the Legislature specifically prohibited the trial court from basing its findings solely on certificates of medical examination for mental illness.   See id.   Yet, the only evidence in the record of B.H.'s mental state is two certificates of medical examination for mental illness. The trial court did not hear any expert testimony.   Therefore, the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's order.   See Whitaker v. State, Nos. 01–03–00576–CV, 01–03–00577–CV, 2003 WL 22413511, at *2 n.1 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 23, 2003, no pet.) (mem.op.) (stating, as to a second commitment order for a defendant who had been found incompetent to stand trial for assault and criminal mischief, trial court could not make its findings under section 574.035 based solely on certificates of medical examination for mental illness).   Thus, we sustain B.H.'s second and third points and need not decide his first point.   See Tex.R.App. P. 47.1.  (“The court of appeals must hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.”).

The sole remaining issue to resolve is that B.H. has asked this court for the relief of reversing the trial court's order and rendering judgment denying the State's application to extend services, and the State has requested that we remand for a new hearing.   The proper remedy is to reverse and render judgment.   See J.M. v. State, 178 S.W.3d 185, 197–98 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (rendering judgment denying court-ordered temporary mental health services after holding evidence legally and factually insufficient to support trial court's ruling).

IV. Conclusion

We reverse the trial court's October 14, 2014 order extending its prior order for inpatient extended mental health services and render judgment denying the State's application for extension of the prior order for extended mental health services.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See Tex.R.App. P. 47.4.

PER CURIAM