William Floyd, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee (2015)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, William Floyd, filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's written order denying his motion to suppress.   We dismiss this purported appeal for want of jurisdiction.

On March 6, 2015, Appellant filed Defendant's Notice of Appeal purporting to appeal the trial court's “Order denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress” signed February 24, 2015.   Pursuant to an inquiry by the Clerk of this Court, we know that following entry of that order, further proceedings in the trial court ceased with no judgment having been entered.

The State is entitled to pursue an interlocutory appeal from the granting of a motion to suppress.  Tex.Code Crim. Proc. AnnN. art. 44.01(a)(5) (West Supp.2014).   However, there is no comparable statute or rule that allows a defendant to appeal an interlocutory order denying a motion to suppress.   See Dahlem v. State, 322 S.W.3d 685, 690–91 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. ref'd) (holding that an order denying a motion to suppress is not an “appealable order” for purposes of a defendant's right of appeal pursuant to article 44.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure); ²  Jenkins v. State, No. 03–13–00632–CR, 2013 Tex.App. LEXIS 13288 (Tex.App.—Austin Oct. 25, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (finding no right of appeal from an interlocutory order denying a pretrial motion to suppress).

There being no final judgment of guilt or other appealable order, this appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

FOOTNOTES

2.   The State's right to appeal from an interlocutory order granting a motion to suppress is governed by a different statute and different rules.   See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 44.01(a)(5).

Per Curiam