MARVIN RAY STUBBLEFIELD v. THE STATE OF TEXAS (2011)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Opinion By Justice Bridges

Marvin Ray Stubblefield appeals from the adjudication of his guilt for three robbery offenses.   In a single issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in imposing a predetermined sentence in each case.   We affirm the trial court's judgments adjudicating guilt.   The background of the cases and the evidence admitted at trial are well known to the parties, and we therefore limit recitation of the facts.   We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.4 because the law to be applied in the cases is well settled.

In each case, appellant waived a jury and pleaded guilty to robbery.   See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.02(a)(2) (West 2011).   Pursuant to plea agreements, the trial court deferred adjudicating guilt, placed appellant on seven years' community supervision, and assessed an $800 fine in each case.   On January 7, 2010 and May 24, 2010, the trial court denied the State's motions to adjudicate and continued appellant on deferred community supervision.   On July 23, 2010, the State again filed motions to adjudicate, alleging appellant violated several conditions of community supervision.   On February 8, 2011, appellant pleaded not true to the allegations in a hearing on the motions.   The trial court found the allegations true, adjudicated appellant guilty, and assessed punishment at six years' imprisonment in each case.   Subsequently, appellant filed motions for new trial alleging (1) the verdicts are contrary to the law and the evidence, (2) the evidence is insufficient to show violations of community supervision, and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by imposing imprisonment because such punishment violated the objectives of the penal code.   The trial court denied the motions.

In a single issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in imposing predetermined sentences.   Specifically, appellant points to statements made by the trial court during the May 24, 2010 hearing indicating appellant was not going to get “any more chances” to complete his community supervision, and that appellant had been before the trial court on three previous occasions and was “out of chances.”   Appellant argues these statements show the trial court never considered any option other than imprisonment.   The State responds that appellant has not properly preserved his complaint for appellate review and, alternatively, the trial court did not impose predetermined sentences.

Although appellant filed motions for new trial, he did not object to the imposition of alleged predetermined sentences in the trial court.   See Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a)(1);  Castaneda v. State, 135 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.) (for error to be preserved for appeal, the record must show appellant made a timely request, objection, or motion).   Thus, appellant has not preserved this issue for our review.

Even if we considered the merits of appellant's complaint, it is without support in the record.   Due process requires a neutral and detached hearing body or officer.  Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973).   However, absent a clear showing of bias, the trial court's actions will be presumed to have been correct.  Brumit v. State, 206 S.W.3d 639, 644 (Tex.Crim.App.2006).   The complained of statements occurred during the May 24, 2010 hearing where the trial court denied the State's motion to adjudicate and continued appellant on community supervision.   Nothing in the record shows the trial court failed to consider the full range of punishment or did not act impartially.   See Brumit, 206 S.W.3d at 645.   We resolve appellant's sole issue against him.

We affirm the trial court's judgments adjudicating guilt.

DAVID L. BRIDGES JUSTICE