KERICA MCCRAY v. THE STATE OF TEXAS (2011)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Opinion By Justice Lang

Kerica McCray appeals from the adjudication of her guilt for two aggravated assault offenses.   In a single issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in revoking her community supervision.   We affirm.   The background of the cases and the evidence admitted at trial are well known to the parties, and we therefore limit recitation of the facts.   We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.4 because the law to be applied in the case is well settled.

Appellant waived a jury and pleaded guilty to two offenses of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a knife.   See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(a)(2) (West 2011).   Pursuant to plea agreements, the trial court deferred adjudicating appellant's guilt and placed her on eight years' community supervision in each case.   The trial court also assessed a $2,500 fine in one case.   The State later moved to adjudicate guilt, alleging appellant violated the conditions of her community supervision by (1) committing a new offense, arson, (2) failing to pay probation fees as directed, and (3) failing to participate in psychiatric treatment as directed.   Appellant pleaded not true to the allegations in a hearing on the motion.   The State proceeded on the allegation that appellant failed to participate in psychiatric treatment as directed and abandoned the other two allegations.

The trial court heard testimony from two witnesses and appellant.   Rose Lugo testified that although she did not directly supervise appellant, she received the probation department records from appellant's probation officer.   Those records show appellant was required to undergo psychiatric treatment as a condition of her community supervision, which included completing an anger management course and participating in treatment through the Dallas Metrocare Shops Program.   Lugo testified the probation records show appellant failed to participate in the psychiatric treatment.   During cross-examination, Lugo testified a Comprehensive Assessment and Treatment Services (CATS) evaluation stated appellant was diagnosed as bipolar and with personality disorder.

Patricia Scholly, a Dallas County mental health coordinator, testified on appellant's behalf.   Scholly visited with appellant on one occasion, and she also reviewed records and reports from appellant's probation officer.   During their visit, appellant expressed to Scholly a desire to try to seek mental health treatment.   Scholly testified she believed appellant would need “hand holding to go on an MHMR case load” because appellant had no support in the community.   Scholly testified she believed at one point appellant sought mental health treatment, but appellant did not follow through with it.   Scholly further testified that appellant's “GAF score” was “46,” and that “[for] folks that have a GAF score under 50, probation is going to be a challenge.”

During her testimony, appellant said she knew she was required to enroll in a mental health treatment program within thirty days after being placed on community supervision, but her mother was sick and she could not enroll.   Appellant called her probation officer and talked with her several times about the situation.   The probation officer said appellant could have more time.   Appellant testified she talked with the probation officer on March 10, 2010.   The officer said that when appellant came to her office on March 23rd, they would start mental health treatment.   Appellant testified she did not make that meeting because she was arrested for a new offense on March 11, 2010.   Appellant admitted she had been on community supervision for five months before she was arrested on the new offense, and she did not seek mental health treatment during that time period.   The trial court found the allegation true, adjudicated appellant guilty, and assessed punishment at ten years' imprisonment in each case.

Appellate review of an order revoking community supervision is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion.   See Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex.Crim.App.2006).   An order revoking community supervision must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence, meaning the greater weight of the credible evidence that would create a reasonable belief that the defendant has violated a condition of probation.   Id. at 763–64.   A finding of a single violation of community supervision is sufficient to support revocation.   See Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1980).

Appellant contends the trial court erred in revoking her community supervision because the State failed to prove she violated the conditions of her community supervision.   Specifically, appellant asserts the State's witness never identified herself as a probation officer, there were no records offered into evidence supporting the allegation that appellant violated her community supervision, and one witness testified appellant had sought mental health treatment.   Therefore, appellant argues, the trial court erred in revoking her community supervision in each case.   The State responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant's community supervision and adjudicating her guilt because appellant admitted she violated the alleged condition of community supervision.

The trial court heard Scholly's testimony that she believed appellant sought mental health treatment at one point, and Lugo's testimony that the probation records show appellant did not participate in psychiatric treatment as ordered.   The trial court also heard appellant's own admission that she was on community supervision for five months but did not seek psychiatric treatment because her mother was sick at one point and because she was arrested on a new charge before she could begin the treatment.   The trial court, as the fact finder in this case, reconciled any conflicts in the evidence and judged the witnesses' credibility.   See Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 97 (Tex.Crim.App.2003).

We conclude the evidence is sufficient to show appellant violated a condition of her community supervision and, thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant's community supervision and adjudicating her guilt.   We resolve appellant's sole issue against her.

We affirm the trial court's judgments.

DOUGLAS S. LANG JUSTICE