LAURA NOBLES v. THE STATE OF TEXAS (2011)

OPINION

Opinion By Justice Moseley

A jury convicted Laura A. Nobles of the murder of Robert Turner and assessed punishment at thirty-nine years' confinement and a $10,000 fine.   In a single point of error, Nobles argues the evidence was insufficient to show she was the person who caused Turner's death because the evidence shows she did not cause the wound that resulted in his death.   We affirm.

Background

The record contains evidence Nobles, Turner, and others were at a party at Altresha Roberson's apartment.   Everyone there had been drinking for some time and many were drunk.   While Nobles's husband, Cedric Mallard, was at the beer store, Turner stepped on Nobles's foot and they got into an argument.   Dee Dee Sessions and Lamar Gibbs defused the argument and took Turner outside.

When Mallard returned to the party, Nobles complained to him about Turner's behavior.   Mallard then argued with Turner, but that argument was broken up by Sessions, Gibbs, and others.   Another fight broke out inside the apartment between Sessions and Corey Nobles (Nobles's nephew), but quickly ended.   At some point, Nobles retrieved two knives, a short one and a long one, from the kitchen.   In her statement to police after the killing, Nobles said she retrieved the knives from the kitchen so that she and Sessions would have a knife.  (The implication is that she intended to intervene in the fight between Sessions and Corey and have a knife fight with Sessions.)

Somewhere around that time, someone reported that Mallard and Turner had begun fighting again outside the apartment.   Several people came outside to watch the fight.   Nobles ran toward the fight between her husband and Turner with the knives in her hand.   She climbed on Turner's back and began swinging her hands at his back.

Sessions saw Nobles on Turner's back, pulling his neck while Mallard was in front of Turner stabbing him.   Sessions said in his statement that he saw Nobles with two knives and saw her stabbing Turner in the back.   At trial, however, he testified he did not see Nobles with a knife.   Sessions kicked Nobles off of Turner's back.   Turner staggered away bleeding and fell to the ground.

Nobles then started chasing Sessions with a knife in her hand.   Sessions got into a car with his friends and started driving away.   Nobles threw the knife at the car;  she then got into her car and, accompanied by Mallard, chased after Sessions.   Corey Nobles testified that after he fought with Sessions inside the apartment, he came downstairs, grabbed a knife from Nobles, and chased after Sessions.   When he could not catch up with Sessions, he dropped the knife in the grass.

Turner died a short time later.   The autopsy revealed Turner suffered a stab wound to his left chest that penetrated his heart, an incised wound on the left side of his head from his mouth, across his left check and ear to the back of his head, and two incised wounds to his back.   Turner died as the result of sharp force injuries.   Some of the incised wounds were consistent with being made by a serrated knife.   Police recovered a thirteen-and-a-half inch long serrated knife in the grass at the scene which was identified as one of Roberson's kitchen knives.   The other knife was not recovered.

DNA testing was done on samples from the knife handle and blade and from a stain on the knife blade.   The DNA profile obtained from the sample of the knife handle was from a single male and matched the DNA profile of Corey.   The DNA profile from the stain on the knife blade matched Turner's DNA profile.   The DNA from the other sample of the knife blade was a mixture of at least three individuals.   All the genetic markers in the DNA profiles of Turner and Corey were present in the mixture.   Some of the genetic markers in the mixture corresponded to Nobles's DNA profile, but the random match probability for her was very low compared to the match probability for Turner and Corey.   Mallard was excluded as a source of the DNA in the samples taken from the knife.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In her sole point of error, Nobles contends the evidence is insufficient ¹ to prove she caused Turner's death because the physical evidence and eyewitness testimony show she did not cause the wound that resulted in death.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we view all evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979);  see Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) (plurality op.).   We consider all evidence, whether properly or improperly admitted.   See McDaniel v. Brown, 130 S.Ct. 665, 672 (2010) (per curiam);  Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 41–42 (1988);  Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.   It is the responsibility of the fact finder to resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences.  Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319;  Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).   The standard of review is the same for direct and circumstantial evidence cases;  circumstantial evidence may be as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor.  Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex.Crim.App.2007).

As applicable here, a person commits murder if she intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual, or intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.   See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b)(1), (2) (West 2011).   A person is criminally responsible if the result would not have occurred but for her conduct, operating either alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly insufficient.   Id. § 6.04(a).

A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both.   See id. § 7.01(a).   A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if, acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense.   See id. § 7.02(a)(2).   In determining whether the accused is guilty as a party, the fact finder may consider events occurring before, during, and after commission of the offense.  Michel v. State, 834 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1992, no pet.).

There is evidence in the record that Nobles argued with Turner and complained about his behavior to her husband.   Mallard argued and later fought with Turner.   Nobles retrieved two knives, ran to the fight, and began swinging her arms at Turner's back.   There was evidence that Nobles was stabbing Turner in the back.   And witnesses saw her with a knife in her hand after Sessions kicked her off of Turner.

Nobles argues the evidence shows there was only one lethal wound—the stab wound to the chest that penetrated Turner's heart—and she was not in a position to have caused that wound.   However, the medical examiner testified that while the chest wound and the incised wound across Turner's head and neck would have bled the most, all the wounds contributed to Turner's blood loss.   She testified that while it was possible the incised wound alone would have caused Turner's death, there was no way to separate the wounds because they all would have bled.

Proof that the defendant caused the fatal injury is not necessary to support a murder conviction under the law of parties.   See McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 496 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (“proof beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant fired the fatal shot is not necessary for a capital murder conviction where the jury is charged on the law of parties”), abrogated in part on other grounds by Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249 (Tex.Crim.App.1998).  “The mere fact that appellant did not inflict the most damaging blow to the victim does not relieve him of responsibility for the victim's murder.”  Umoja v. State, 965 S.W.2d 3, 6 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1997, no pet.).

The jury could reasonably conclude that in an attempt to assist her husband, Nobles brought the knives to the fight and joined in the violence to aid him in fighting with Turner.   While Nobles said in her statement that she retrieved the knives in connection with the fight between Sessions and Corey, there was other evidence indicating she brought the knives to the fight between her husband and Turner, she participated in the violence against Turner, and she had a knife after Sessions kicked her off of Turner.   The jury was free to weigh the evidence, resolve the conflicting testimony, and draw reasonable inferences.   See Dewberry, 4 S.W.3d at 740.

Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, particularly that detailed above, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed the offense of murder.   The evidence is therefore sufficient to support her conviction.   Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319;  Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 895;  Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.   We overrule appellant's sole point of error.

We affirm the trial court's judgment.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. In Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) (plurality op.), the court of criminal appeals held there is no meaningful distinction between the legal and factual sufficiency standards of review.   Accordingly, we analyze appellant's issues under the legal sufficiency standard set out in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).   See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 895..  FN1. In Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) (plurality op.), the court of criminal appeals held there is no meaningful distinction between the legal and factual sufficiency standards of review.   Accordingly, we analyze appellant's issues under the legal sufficiency standard set out in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).   See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 895.

JIM MOSELEY JUSTICE