RODNEY LAFRANZ HOLLINS v. THE STATE OF TEXAS (2011)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Opinion By Justice Fillmore

Rodney LaFranz Hollins appeals his convictions in these cases.   In a single point of error, Hollins contends the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to multiple terms of imprisonment.   We affirm the trial court's judgments.   The background of the cases and the evidence admitted at trial are well known to the parties, and we therefore limit recitation of the facts.   We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.4 because the law to be applied in the cases is well settled.

Background

In July 2004, Hollins waived a jury, pleaded guilty to unauthorized use of a motor vehicle (UUMV), evading arrest or detention while using a motor vehicle, and burglary of a building (cause nos.   05–10–01446–CR, 05–10–01447–CR, and 05–10–01448–CR).  See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 30.02(a)(1), (c)(1);  31.07(a), (b);  38.04(a), (b)(2)(A) (West 2011).   Hollins also pleaded true to two enhancement paragraphs in each indictment.   After finding Hollins guilty and the enhancement paragraphs true, the trial court assessed punishment at ten years' imprisonment, probated for ten years, and a $500 fine for the UUMV and burglary convictions.   For the evading arrest conviction, the trial court deferred adjudicating guilt and placed Hollins on ten years' community supervision.

In March 2008, Hollins waived a jury and pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine in an amount less than one gram (cause no.   05–10–01449–CR).  See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(a), (b) (West 2010).   Hollins also waived a jury and pleaded nolo contendere to theft of property valued at less than $1500 and with two prior theft convictions (cause no.   05–10–01450–CR).  See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.03(a), (e)(4)(D) (West 2011).   In the theft case, Hollins also pleaded true to two enhancement paragraphs in the indictment.   After finding Hollins guilty of both offenses and the enhancement paragraphs true, the trial court assessed punishment at two years' confinement in state jail, probated for five years, and a $750 fine for the cocaine conviction and ten years' imprisonment, probated for five years, and a $750 fine for the theft conviction.   The trial court continued Hollins on community supervision in the three previous cases and modified the conditions by ordering Hollins into a drug treatment program.

In August 2010, the State moved to revoke Hollins's community supervision in five cases, and moved to adjudicate guilt in one case, alleging Hollins violated the conditions of his community supervision by committing a new theft offense and other violations.   In a hearing on the motions, Hollins pleaded true to the violations as alleged by the State.   The trial court found the allegations true, revoked Hollins's community supervision in five cases and adjudicated his guilt in one case, and assessed punishment at ten years' imprisonment for the UUMV, burglary, and theft convictions;  thirty years' imprisonment for the evading arrest conviction;  and two years in state jail for the cocaine conviction.

On the new offense, Hollins waived a jury and pleaded guilty to theft of property valued at less than $1500 and with two prior theft convictions (cause no.   05–10–01451–CR).  See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.03(a), (e)(4)(D).  Hollins also pleaded true to two enhancement paragraphs in the indictment.   The trial court found Hollins guilty and the enhancement paragraphs true, and assessed punishment at ten years' imprisonment.

Abuse of Discretion

In his sole point of error, Hollins contends the trial court abused its discretion and violated the objectives of the Texas Penal Code by sentencing him to multiple terms of imprisonment because the sentences neither address his longstanding drug addiction nor provide for his recovery from addiction.   Hollins asserts he requested continued community supervision and drug treatment because he only committed the offenses to support his addiction.   The State responds that Hollins has failed to preserve his complaint for appellate review and, alternatively, the record does not show the sentences violate the objectives of the penal code.

Hollins did not complain about the sentences either at the time they were imposed or in motions for new trial.   See Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a)(1);  Castaneda v. State, 135 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.) (for error to be preserved for appeal, the record must show appellant made a timely request, objection, or motion).   Thus, Hollins has not preserved his issue for our review.

Even if Hollins had preserved error, however, his argument still fails.   As a general rule, punishment that is assessed within the statutory range for an offense is not excessive or unconstitutionally cruel or unusual.  Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd).   In this case, the trial court imposed punishment within the statutory range for the offenses.   See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.32, 12.33, 12.34, 12.35, 12.42(a), (b).

We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing the sentences in these cases.   See Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (as long as a sentence is within the proper range of punishment, it will not be disturbed on appeal).   We overrule Hollins's sole point of error.

Conclusion

In each case, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

ROBERT M. FILLMORE JUSTICE