IN RE: B.T. (2011)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Opinion By Justice Moseley

Appellant B.T., a juvenile, complains of the trial court's order to transfer her from the Texas Youth Commission to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) for the completion of her sentence.   The background of the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties, and therefore we limit recitation of the facts.   We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.4 because the issues are settled.   See Tex.R.App. P. 47.4. We affirm.

In her first issue, appellant asserts the trial court lacked jurisdiction because her release or transfer hearing was held more than sixty days after the referral was received by the court, which was on May 3, 2010, in violation of section 54.11(h) of the family code.   See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 54.11(h) (West Supp.2010).   Appellant's argument fails for any of three reasons.

First, the trial court actually began its hearing on June 22, 2010, within the time period mandated by the statute, although appellant's counsel requested a “reset” to a later date (in order to subpoena several witnesses), and the hearing was held on July 8, 2010.   Thus, the trial court complied with the statute.   See In re K.H., No. 12–01–00342–CV, 2003 WL 744067, at *2 (Tex.App.—Tyler Mar. 5, 2003, no pet.) (mem.op.) (failure to hold hearing within time specified, even if error, does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction, citing Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.0411 (West 2008)).

On this point appellant attempts to distinguish In re K.H. by arguing that, unlike the situation there, no evidence was adduced here before the statutory deadline.   This brings up the second reason appellant's argument fails, namely, no evidence was adduced when the hearing was first called because appellant requested a delay.   Appellant cannot complain of actions she requested the trial court make.   See Tittizer v. Union Gas Corp., 171 S.W.3d 857, 862 (Tex.2005) (per curiam) (explaining “invited error” doctrine).¹

Third, appellant presents no authority—and we have found none—supporting the argument that failure to comply with section 54.11(h) deprives the trial court of jurisdiction.   Rather, we agree with the Tyler Court of Appeals to the contrary.   See In re K.H., 2003 WL 744067, at *2.

We resolve appellant's first issue against her.

In her second issue, appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by ordering her transferred to TDCJ. Under this issue, appellant recites the standard of review and the applicable law;  she also recounts some of the evidence presented to the trial court.   However, she does not argue why the trial court's decision constitutes an abuse of discretion.   In other words, she does not apply the law to the facts in an effort to explain why the trial court could not have reached the conclusion it did.   We will not make appellant's argument for her.   See Robertson v. Sw. Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 190 S.W.3d 899, 903 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.).   We conclude this issue is inadequately briefed and presents nothing for review.   See Tex.R.App. P. 38.1(i).

We affirm the trial court's order to transfer to the TDCJ.

100977F.P05

FOOTNOTES

FN1. As a result, we need not address the proffered distinction between the instant case and In re K.H..  FN1. As a result, we need not address the proffered distinction between the instant case and In re K.H.

JIM MOSELEY JUSTICE